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PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 81ST CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

SENATE

THURSDAY, JULY 21, 1949

(Legislative day of Thursday, June 2, 1949)

The Senate met, in executive session, at 11 o'clock and 15 minutes a. m., on the expiration of the recess.

Rev. R. Orman Roberts, D. D., Temple Methodist Church, San Francisco, Calif., offered the following prayer:

Heavenly Father, in the hush of these moments each day we heed the injunction of Holy Scripture, "Be still, and know that I am God." Drawing thus upon the holy reservoirs of Thy wisdom, love and power, we are better able to be our brother's keeper.

Often, at such times, our thoughts go far beyond these hallowed walls to feel the heartthrobs and sense the hopes and aspirations of peoples in teeming cities, quiet countrysides, and in lands beyond the sea. Amid varied emotions, their longing to live at peace with their fellow men haunts them night and day.

Grant then, O infinite God, special guidance to the distinguished servants of the people in this body that, when decisions affecting the peace and security of our world are made, they shall be in accordance with Thy will for all peoples of the earth, in satisfaction of their hearts' desire.

We pray in the name of Him who is the Prince of Peace. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. LUCAS, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Wednesday, July 20, 1949, was dispensed with.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT— APPROVAL OF JOINT RESOLUTION

Messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries, and he announced that on July 19, 1949, the President had approved and signed the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 114) to provide an increase in the authorization for the Federal National Mortgage Association.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Swanson, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 28) favoring the suspension of deportation of certain aliens, with amendments, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

The message also announced that the House had insisted upon its amendment to the bill (S. 1184) to encourage construction of rental housing on or in areas adjacent to Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force installations, and for other purposes, disagreed to by the Senate; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. SPENCE, Mr. BROWN of Georgia, Mr. PATMAN, Mr. MONRONEY, Mr. WOLCOTT, Mr. GAMBLE, and Mr. SMITH of Ohio were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message further announced that the House had disagreed to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 5632) to reorganize fiscal management in the National Military Establishment to promote economy and efficiency, and for other purposes; asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. VINSON, Mr. BROOKS, Mr. KILDAY, Mr. DURHAM, Mr. SHORT, Mr. ARENDS, and Mr. COLE of New York were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message also announced that the House had passed the following bills, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H. R. 627. An act for the relief of Southern Fireproofing Co., of Cincinnati, Ohio;

H. R. 660. An act for the relief of Julia Busch;

H. R. 752. An act conferring jurisdiction upon the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claim of Edward Gray, Sr.; Edward Gray, Jr.; Bertha Mae Gray; Bertha Patmon; and Lindsay Gardner, all of the city of Hamtramck, Wayne County, Mich.;

H. R. 1033. An act for the relief of Mrs. Ethel Barrington MacDonald;

H. R. 1474. An act to confer jurisdiction upon the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claim of Miguel A. Viera for damages sustained as the result of an accident involving a United States Army truck at Leghorn, Italy, on January 11, 1946;

H. R. 1631. An act for the relief of John J. O'Mara;

H. R. 1666. An act for the relief of Maurice J. Symms;

H. R. 1799. An act for the relief of Dr. Jacob Ornstein;

H. R. 2594. An act for the relief of Grace L. Elser;

H. R. 2628. An act for the relief of Auldon Albert Aiken;

H. R. 2928. An act for the relief of Dr. Leon L. Konchegul;

H. R. 3193. An act for the relief of Public Utility District No. 1, of Cowlitz County, Wash.;

H. R. 3300. An act for the relief of Mary Thomas Schiek;

H. R. 3413. An act for the relief of Alfred Baumgarts;

H. R. 3494. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to transfer a building in Juneau, Alaska, to the Alaska Native Brotherhood and/or Sisterhood, Juneau (Alaska) camp;

H. R. 3726. An act for the relief of Knickerbocker Insurance Co. of New York and Atlas Assurance Co., Ltd.;

H. R. 3803. An act for the relief of Mrs. Mary L. W. Dawson;

H. R. 3837. An act for the relief of Annie Balaz;

H. R. 4653. An act for the relief of the New York Quinine & Chemical Works, Inc.; Merck & Co., Inc.; and Mallinckrodt Chemical Works;

H. R. 5155. An act for the relief of Francesca Lucareni, a minor;

H. R. 5160. An act for the relief of Mrs. Giustina Schiano Lomoriello; and

H. R. 5356. An act to provide for the conveyance of land to the Norfolk County Trust Co. in Stoughton, Mass.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of the treaty, Executive L (81st Cong., 1st sess.), signed at Washington on April 4, 1949.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I understand that the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY] does not want a quorum call.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair assumes that the unanimous-consent agreement with reference to the division of time that was to have taken effect between 12 o'clock noon and 2 o'clock p. m. will apply to the time from now until 2 o'clock. Is that the correct interpretation?

The Chair is just now advised, however, that the Senator from Nebraska was given permission by the Senate last evening to speak until 12 o'clock.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the distinguished Senator from Illinois for his observation; also, I appreciate the fact that it requires some time to get started. I desire to use every minute because I have a speech which I am sure I cannot complete in 30 minutes. For that reason, I waive the quorum call, and I am going to ask now, in view of the fact that about 5 minutes have passed since the Senate was called into session, that if I do not conclude by 12 o'clock I shall be given the right to conclude my speech, and that the additional time I may require be charged equally to the proponents and the opponents of the treaty.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair merely wanted to ascertain whether the agreement as to division of time between

12 and 2 applied also to the time before 12 o'clock.

Mr. LUCAS. I object to the last suggestion made by the Senator from Nebraska.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, the remarks I make this morning come from the junior Senator from Nebraska, and in no sense do they represent or reflect the opinions of one who might be speaking by reason of the office he holds in his party or in the United States Senate. What I am about to say represents my own observations and my own convictions.

Mr. President, it is my purpose now to explain the declaration to the ratifying resolution, which I shall offer at the proper time.

The amendment is brief and reads as follows:

The United States of America ratifies this treaty with the understanding that article 3 commits none of the parties thereto, morally or legally, to furnish or supply arms, armaments, military, naval or air equipment or military, naval, or air supplies to any other party or parties to this treaty.

Procedures in the North Atlantic Treaty are divided into two parts. There is the part which provides for preparedness against aggression, and there is the part to govern action after there has been armed attack against one or more of the parties.

The preparedness part is specified in articles 3 and 9.

Article 9 is the planning part of the treaty. It provides for a council representing all of the parties to consider—notice that it says “consider”—matters concerning the implementation of the treaty. The council makes plans and recommendations to implement article 3.

Article 9 also charges the council with the planning for the implementation of article 5, which is the part of the treaty that does not become operative until after there has been an armed attack.

The declaration which I shall offer on behalf of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT], the Senator from Utah [Mr. WARREN], and myself, does not modify or expand in any way the functions of the council as provided in article 9. The council can make recommendations for arms any time it desires—either before or after an armed attack. Obviously, it would be unwise to have a treaty for co-operation against armed attack unless some advance preparations are made prior to such an attack.

As I have already stated, article 3 is the heart of all preparedness action, since it commits all the parties to the treaty to “mutual aid” without defining what the nature of that mutual aid shall be. Article 3 reads as follows:

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

The planning and recommendations assigned to the council to be established

under article 9 are directed to the “self-help and mutual aid” agreed upon in article 3.

The amendment which I intend to offer to the resolution of ratification applies only to article 3. In no way does it modify or change the procedures set forth in article 5, which provisions are carried out only in the event there is an attack upon any or all of the parties. Article 5 says what shall be done after an attack. It is true that the council established under article 9 is directed to consider and recommend for the implementation of article 5, as well as for article 3, in the preparedness part of the treaty.

But I emphasize that the amendment I shall offer would not affect article 9. All the provisions of article 9 for consideration of plans and to make recommendations to implement articles 3 and 5 would be in full force and effect. The amendment is directed to only one purpose: To declare that the understanding of the United States in ratifying the treaty is that article 3 commits none of the parties thereto to furnish or supply arms, armaments, military, naval, or air equipment, or military, naval, or air supplies to any other party or parties to this treaty. It should be specifically understood that arms or weapons include the atomic bomb, atomic weapons of all kinds, all materials which enter into the production of atomic bombs or atomic weapons, and the secrets of how the bombs and other weapons are produced.

This amendment does not forbid or prohibit any of the parties to the treaty from furnishing military equipment or supplies to each other.

It does not prevent or affect in any way practices of our Department of Defense or surplus-property-disposal agencies in selling surplus defense equipment to other nations.

It does not foreclose any authorizations or appropriations which Congress may desire to make to furnish military weapons and supplies to other parties to the treaty.

It does not in any way restrict the creation of a council representing all the parties or interfere with its planning or recommending the furnishing of arms.

Affirmatively the amendment clearly declares the understanding of the United States to be that there is no moral or legal obligation under article 3 for the United States to approve in whole or in part any recommendation of the council for arms or armament.

Senators know that there is no moral or legal obligation upon Congress to approve any arms program which may be recommended by the executive branch of our own Government. Congress has complete freedom of action; and that right of freedom of action should apply in considering requests for arms by foreign countries.

My amendment gives advance notice to all parties to the treaty that the United States understands that it has the right under article 3 to determine what shall be the character of “mutual aid” called for in article 3.

Certainly it is not the intention of the Eighty-first Congress to commit future Congresses, extending over the 20 years of this treaty, to any moral or legal obligation to furnish arms to other countries. Congress should have complete freedom to consider all recommendations by the council provided for in this treaty.

Certainly none of us wants to see a situation develop in which the council decides upon an arms program, or strategic distribution of military, naval or air defenses, and then submits it to the Congress for authorizations and appropriations, with the claim that the Congress is obligated to approve it.

Honesty and frankness is the foundation of foreign relations; and it should be the basis of our foreign policy. Let us know exactly what we are committing the United States to do over 20 years in this treaty. Let us be frank with the other parties to this treaty as to what our intentions are and what our commitments to them are, so that there will be no misunderstanding.

We should not leave the matter of moral or legal obligations hanging in dispute. Senators are well aware of the conflict of opinion which has been expressed during the debate on the treaty. It is not enough to say that Secretary of State Acheson says the treaty means this or it means that. It is not enough to rely, upon the report of the Foreign Relations Committee. It is not enough to say, that Senators on either side of this issue are right or wrong. It will only be enough when the Senate, by a vote on this clarifying declaration, says whether there is a legal or moral obligation to furnish arms under article 3 of the treaty.

If the Senate had before it only the question of whether there is a moral or legal obligation to furnish arms to foreign countries the Senate would have no difficulty in answering that question. But, the Senate has before it a treaty, which it is alleged by the junior Senator from Iowa [Mr. GILLETTE] is the vehicle for arms legislation; and we ourselves must know what the treaty means as well as how other parties to the treaty interpret it.

There is abundant evidence that some of the leaders of the other parties to the treaty believe that once the treaty is ratified the flow of arms to western Europe must begin, not as a free-will gift in self-interest, though it may be, but as a moral right, a legal right, which the western European countries can expect and demand be fulfilled.

Certainly, if we are to share our arms and our armaments with the signatory powers, they will want, and they should have, the best of weapons—not obsolete, worn-out equipment, but effective weapons to meet the offensive in modern war. A second-hand air force is no good, and is not effective. A second-hand Navy is as good as none. If the mutual aid is to be effective, on whatever basis it is to be shared, it must be shared with modern weapons and armaments which

will provide for the mutual defense of all the signatory powers.

This brings up the question, Is there a moral or legal commitment to furnish atomic bombs, or the secrets, or the know-how? Churchill said that the thing which stopped the expansion of communism in Europe was the atomic bomb. Certainly we can all agree that it is a most effective weapon.

I ask the question, Are we to share the atomic bomb, its secrets, and the know-how? Will the signatory nations have a right to them? Is there a moral or legal commitment to do that very thing? A treaty supersedes a law. Under our present statutes they would not have a right; but a treaty supersedes a law. In this treaty are we in any way committing ourselves morally or legally to share the atomic bomb?

The argument is made—indeed, it was made by the senior Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON]—that the time to decide these questions is when the arms-implementing legislation comes forward. But now is the time to decide it, because the treaty will govern the actions which must be taken on legislation to implement the pact.

By adopting the declaration which I shall submit for the consideration of the Senate, the door is tightly and firmly closed against any moral or legal obligation upon the United States to furnish the atomic bomb or any of the materials or know-how in the making of it.

And, if it is not adopted, it can be interpreted that any moral or legal commitment made under the treaty runs to the atomic bomb as well as to any other weapon or arms that may be furnished thereunder.

None of us wants our country to be placed in the position of welshing on its obligations. The United States keeps its word. If we are morally and legally obligated to furnish arms before there is an attack upon any or all the parties, the United States will keep that obligation.

Time and again we have been assured by Members of the Senate on this floor, Senators who are piloting this treaty, that there is no moral or legal obligation to furnish arms before there is an attack upon any of the parties to the treaty. Over and over the Members of the Senate have been told that they will be absolutely free to vote as they choose on any arms program that comes along, without having any moral or legal obligation to vote for it. We also have had interpretations, in the twilight zone, that we have an obligation to provide arms, in view of this or that. Why not put in writing in the resolution of ratification what we actually mean?

The argument is made that the amendment I shall propose is unnecessary and untimely. But let me remind Senators there is nothing sacred about a treaty until it has been ratified.

It is nothing short of effrontery to say the Senate must ratify this treaty as is, without changing a comma, crossing a "t," dotting an "i," or even stating an

understanding of the terms of any part of it. Of course, no Member of this body takes that position.

But my declaration does not amend the treaty. It is a type of reservation to the resolution of ratification that does not require renegotiation of the treaty. It does not require a new meeting of the parties. It can be rejected by the other parties if they do not have the same understanding of article 3 that we have.

This procedure is followed out time after time in treaties, including multilateral agreements.

Mr. President, at this point I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD a list of the treaties which have been adopted since 1939, with respect to which other countries have declared their understandings or interpretations of the treaties or made reservations to them. The list includes such action by the Senate.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TREATIES WHICH HAVE ENTERED INTO FORCE SINCE JANUARY 1, 1939, TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS A PARTY AND WITH RESPECT TO WHICH OTHER STATES HAVE MADE RESERVATIONS OR UNDERSTANDINGS

Protocol embodying a declaration concerning the juridical personality of foreign companies. Opened for signature at Washington June 25, 1936 (T. S. 973, 55 Stat. 1201).

Convention on nature protection and wildlife preservation in the Western Hemisphere. Opened for signature at Washington October 12, 1940 (T. S. 981, 56 Stat. 1354).

Protocol on uniformity of powers of attorney which are to be used abroad. Opened for signature at Washington February 17, 1940 (T. S. 982, 56 Stat. 1376).

International agreement regarding the regulation of production and marketing of sugar. Signed at London May 6, 1937 (T. S. 990, 59 Stat. 922).

Convention on the regulation of inter-American automotive traffic. Opened for signature at Washington December 15, 1943 (T. I. A. S. 1567).

International sanitary convention modifying the International Sanitary Convention signed at Paris June 21, 1926. Opened for signature at Washington December 15, 1944 (T. S. 991, 59 Stat. 955).

International sanitary convention for aerial navigation modifying the International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation of April 12, 1933. Opened for signature at Washington December 15, 1944 (T. S. 992, 59 Stat. 991).

Protocol to prolong the International Sanitary Convention, 1944. Opened for signature at Washington April 23, 1946 (T. I. A. S. 1551).

Protocol to prolong the International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation. Opened for signature at Washington April 23, 1946 (T. I. A. S. 1552).

Recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

Inter-American treaty of reciprocal assistance. Opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro September 2, 1947 (T. I. A. S. 1838).

International telecommunications convention and final protocol of signature. Signed at Atlantic City October 2, 1947.

TREATIES WHICH HAVE ENTERED INTO FORCE SINCE JANUARY 1, 1939, WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE RESERVATIONS OR UNDERSTANDINGS

Convention concerning the minimum requirement of professional capacity for mas-

ters and officers on board merchant ships. Adopted at Geneva October 24, 1936 (T. S. 950, 54 Stat. 1683).

Convention concerning the liability of the shipowner in case of sickness, injury, or death of seamen. Adopted at Geneva October 24, 1936 (T. S. 951, 54 Stat. 1693).

Convention fixing the minimum age for the admission of children to employment at sea. Adopted at Geneva October 24, 1936 (T. S. 952, 54 Stat. 1705).

Convention on the interchange of publications. Signed at Buenos Aires December 23, 1936 (T. S. 954, 54 Stat. 1715).

Protocol embodying a declaration concerning the juridical personality of foreign companies. Opened for signature at Washington June 25, 1936 (T. S. 973, 55 Stat. 1201).

Supplementary arrangement with Canada regarding additional temporary diversion for power purposes of waters of the Niagara River above the Falls. Signed at Washington October 27 and November 27, 1941 (E. A. S. 223, 55 Stat. 1380).

International agreement regarding the regulation of production and marketing of sugar. Signed at London May 6, 1937 (T. S. 990, 59 Stat. 922).

Treaty with the United Mexican States relating to the utilization of the waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande and protocol. Signed at Washington February 3, 1944 (T. S. 994, 59 Stat. 1219).

Convention on the regulation of inter-American automotive traffic. Opened for signature at Washington December 15, 1943 (T. I. A. S. 1567).

Convention with Denmark for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Washington May 6, 1948 (T. I. A. S. 1854).

Convention with the Netherlands for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and certain other taxes. Signed at Washington April 29, 1948 (T. I. A. S. 1855).

Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with China. Signed at Nanking November 4, 1946 (T. I. A. S. 1871).

Declaration on behalf of the United States of America recognizing compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Dated August 14, 1946 (T. I. A. S. 1598).

International telecommunication convention and final protocol of signature. Signed at Atlantic City October 2, 1947.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, the record shows the list of the treaties which have been ratified with or without reservations to the resolution of ratification. It discloses that time after time the signatories have accepted the amendments to the resolution of ratification without any renegotiations whatsoever.

If the Senate wants to attach a declaration or an understanding such as I am proposing, the Senate certainly ought to be free to do so, without being subjected to blasts by outsiders that if such is done, it means the end of the world is at hand.

We must have that freedom of action, or else the Senate becomes a rubber stamp, accepting what is put before it without ever raising a question.

What would be the practical effect if this declaration should be adopted? It would enable the Senate to consider all requests for arms in the light of all the circumstances at the time the requests are made. They could be—and should be—considered in the light of the need of our over-all defenses within our own

national-defense establishment, and also whatever amounts may be found necessary in other parts of the world throughout the 20 years' duration of the treaty. Certainly we should have that right.

Arms proposals for our own country and for countries abroad could and should be considered in the light of our own fiscal situation when such proposals are made. No one now can foretell the future. Certainly no one can tell what will happen in the Pacific or in Europe, on the other side of the world.

Conceivably conditions could develop—and, in fact, they may now exist—indicating that the primary security interest of the United States lies in the Pacific. The peace of the world may depend upon the fate of China. Many patriotic citizens, including Members of the Senate, believe that arms should be furnished in the Pacific to resist the tide of Communist armies sweeping southward.

Last year, on May 27, 1948, I made a request of the Senate Appropriations Committee that the chairman of the committee be instructed by the committee to request, through proper military channels, the appearance of Gen. Douglas MacArthur at committee hearings then being held on all appropriations affecting the Far East. The committee adopted the motion and presented it through the proper channels. At that time it was stated by the high military authorities that although General MacArthur could return to the United States of America, they did not feel that he should be ordered back to the United States at that time.

I felt then, as I do now, that General MacArthur has vast knowledge of political, military, and economic matters in the Pacific about which every Member of the Senate should know. Certainly we should know his reaction to what our Pacific policy has been, is now, and ought to be.

He has not appeared before a congressional committee, to my knowledge, since before the war. General Clay and others high-ranking generals have come back from Germany numerous times to give first-hand reports on the situation in Europe. The administration is long overdue in bringing General MacArthur back home so that he may appear before Congress and give Congress and the American people his advice and judgment on policies affecting the Pacific. Certainly the American people should have a first-hand report on his accomplishments in Japan.

Will we have, or should we have, a Pacific pact similar to the North Atlantic Treaty? While we are ratifying the North Atlantic Treaty, what about our policy in the Pacific? Are we going to close the front door to communism in Europe, but leave the back door to communism wide open in the Pacific? Our policy in the Pacific is drifting like a ship without a rudder.

Once again, I demand from the floor of the United States Senate that the administration bring General MacArthur back home for a report to the Congress and to the American people.

Mr. President, I ask again, can we chart the future? Is any Senator prepared to say that he can now chart his entire future course in every contingency which may arise? Of course, he cannot do so. He can only dedicate himself to abide by what his conscience dictates is best for his beloved country.

As I mentioned a moment ago, can we be sure of what the economic condition of our own country will be during the next year and the 19 years which are to follow? Will we be able to finance all these proposals if we assume moral and legal obligations under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, let alone obligations we might have to assume in other parts of the world?

All these questions are raised to emphasize the importance of making certain that this Congress and future Congresses shall have freedom of action on any question of providing arms prior to an attack upon any of the parties to this treaty.

I desire now to make clear my position with respect to article 5 of the treaty. I think it is the heart of the treaty. In effect, it is a multilateral assumption by the parties to the treaty to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.

I am in favor of extending the principles of the Monroe Doctrine to all of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. I take this position with a full understanding of the heavy responsibilities involved. The Monroe Doctrine has been proven no idle gesture. It has served its purpose in protecting nations of the Western Hemisphere against intrusions by foreign countries. The Monroe Doctrine serves notice to nations across the oceans that any act of aggression in this hemisphere by them will be considered a violation of the interest and the security of the United States.

We have been prepared to back up that notice with force if necessary. We are now, and we must be, prepared to back it up with force in the future, if necessary.

This declaration of policy should be extended to all the parties to the pending treaty, and it should be done with full recognition of what these responsibilities entail.

The Monroe Doctrine does not spell out in detail how the United States will enforce its provisions should any aggressor nation seek to challenge it. The simple notice to the world, as the distinguished Senator from Michigan says, to "keep off the grass" has been sufficient to accomplish its purposes, because back of that notice is the might and power of the United States.

I am willing to extend the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, because America has been in two world wars which America did not start. Certainly these experiences have proved that, when the conflagration of war starts in Europe, America inevitably is drawn in. If we are going to be in all the crash landings, we ought to be in a position to help prevent the take-offs.

Since experience has proved that, when other major nations become embroiled in war, our country eventually becomes a full-fledged partner in the

conflict and in the terrible aftermath of righting the economies of our devastated allies, it behooves us to take a serious interest in what goes on abroad and to pull an oar toward adjusting disputes amicably.

That is why I voted for the United Nations Charter. The United States is no longer an isolated nation. We are part and parcel of the world. Events halfway around the world have their impacts upon us. Cooperation among the nations of the earth, through the facilities provided by the United Nations, is imperative if we, and all freedom-loving peoples everywhere, are to make progress toward that hoped-for day when war will be no more.

And so I wish for the United Nations Godspeed, correcting and adjusting its procedures as experience indicates wise. Broadly considered, I believe the North Atlantic Treaty conforms to the United Nations Charter.

As was pointed out by the senior Senator from Michigan, I voted for Senate Resolution 239, and I am definitely committed to its provisions. But I did not think then, and I do not think now, that it commits the United States of America morally or legally to furnish arms or military aid to any other country.

The ranking minority Member of the Foreign Relations Committee, the distinguished senior Senator from Michigan, asked this question of the Senate: What did the Senate commit itself to, when it passed Senate Resolution 239?

I answer that question by asking this one: Did the Senate, in Senate Resolution 239, commit itself to article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the provisions of which were drafted long after Senate Resolution 239 was adopted by the Senate?

Certainly, in committing myself to Senate Resolution 239, I did not then consider, and I do not now, that it was a commitment that would bind the junior Senator from Nebraska or other Members of the Senate to a legal or moral commitment to provide arms under section 3 of the proposed North Atlantic Treaty.

For that reason it becomes crystal clear that it is absolutely necessary and timely to clarify the Senate's position, and that can be done only by the adoption of the declaration I have proposed.

These are Senators who feel that it is unnecessary to amend the resolution of ratification by this declaration because the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee have made statements which in effect imply at least that the treaty and the arms implementation are separate; that Senators can vote for the treaty and against the arms implementation; that one is not dependent upon the other.

On the other hand there are Senators who take a completely different viewpoint. In fact, I doubt if there has been a debate on the Senate floor in which greater differences existed in the interpretation of a treaty than exist with respect to this one.

Let me review very briefly the history of this treaty in the Senate.

The junior Senator from Iowa [Mr. GILLETTE] stated, in effect, that the North Atlantic Treaty and the arms implementation legislation are inseparable. He said the North Atlantic Treaty is the vehicle upon which the arms-implementation legislation depends. He concluded his speech by stating that he would vote for the treaty, and yet, he said it was the most bitter pill he ever had to swallow. In his mind he feels that the treaty and arms implementation are inseparable, and that the treaty, in reality, forms a military alliance, which he states is a backward step in the quest for lasting peace.

In fact, it is common knowledge that a revamped bill for arms implementation will be before the Congress, I think, almost immediately after the treaty is ratified and I feel the administration will leave no stone unturned to have it passed at this session.

The junior Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT], who stated he would support the treaty, also said, however, there is no moral or legal obligation to provide arms. He said he was supporting the treaty with the full conviction in his heart that there was no such moral or legal obligation.

The senior Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] in unmistakable language told the Senate that, in his opinion, the North Atlantic Treaty and the arms implementation were tied together unless separated by some proposed amendment.

The junior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], who supports the pact, emphatically stated in his formal address there was a moral obligation that the people of the United States of America should recognize, and that moral obligation was to provide arms-implementing legislation. He said further that, unless that obligation was there and the Senate accepted it, the North Atlantic Treaty became merely a scrap of paper.

Then the Senate had the observations of the junior Senator from New York [Mr. DULLES]. He was asked, "Is there a moral and legal obligation to provide arms?" He said, "No." Yet when the junior Senator from Oregon was asked the identical question, he said, "Yes." The present Secretary of State or a future Secretary of State, I submit, can find an abundance of evidence to support a position on either side, as he chooses.

Is this the way the Senate wants to leave to the signatory powers this controversial point? Is this the way the membership of the Senate wants to leave this question in the minds of the American people?

We have been told, and we will be told again, that the adoption of the declaration is unnecessary because this question is already handled in the report of the Foreign Relations Committee. Ordinarily, what a Senate committee report says carries great weight, especially if the report is unanimous and no exception is taken to it.

But let me remind the Senate in this instance that now, long after the report has been made, the debate upon the Senate floor has ensued, and the report, instead of being substantiated, is chal-

lenged, and it loses its effect because of the contradictory interpretations which have been placed upon the North Atlantic Treaty by the different Members of the Senate. That is my position.

This is not only true of Members of the Senate who have taken part in the debate, it is also equally true of statements which have been made by leaders in the foreign countries that are to be parties to the treaty, who in unmistakable terms, have implied that they expect arms and armament of all kinds to flow to them in unlimited quantities after the North Atlantic Treaty has been signed. Most of all, they want the atomic bomb.

Certainly we cannot rely upon the Foreign Relations Committee report to clarify the one big issue, and that is, is there under article 3 a legal obligation to provide arms to the signatory powers before they are attacked?

I say again, with all the emphasis I can muster, that the adoption of the declaration does not foreclose or in any way prevent orderly consideration and action upon requests for military aid at any time in the future after the treaty is ratified.

There are also those who say the declaration is untimely. Yet there is no other time a declaration could be attached to a resolution of ratification than the present. This is the only time under our legal processes when the Senate is asked to advise and consent to the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, which has been negotiated by the President of the United States.

Certainly it is our solemn duty and responsibility to be timely, and now is the only time to have a mutual understanding among all the signatory nations as to what the Senate understands article 3 to mean. Now is the time.

A misunderstanding later will cause a greater impact on the implementation than a clarifying declaration will cause now on our relations with the signatory powers.

Since it is argued that the Foreign Relations Committee has unanimously held there is no moral or legal obligation to furnish arms under article 3, certainly there should be no opposition from the committee or its membership to placing in the resolution of ratification a declaration to that effect. By doing so the Senate would simply be writing into the resolution of ratification what it has been given to understand are the commitments which the Senate makes under article 3.

Mr. President, within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty there is opportunity to strengthen the freedom-loving countries for the maintenance of peace.

Wisely managed, with frank, above-board cooperation among all the parties, the treaty can become a great instrument for peace. Through acceptance by all the parties of the declaration against moral and legal obligation to furnish arms before an attack, each country retains its freedom of action to approach all proposals for arms in the light of circumstances affecting each signatory throughout the life of the treaty.

Such freedom of action must be preserved, Mr. President. We have no right to bind the membership of future Congresses to a limited freedom of action. Under no circumstances should we do that. At all times we should have a right, without any moral obligation, to consider the proposals for arms under article 9 which might be submitted by the Defense Council. We should have the right, without a limitation of any kind, to consider what those proposals are, and, in the light of our fiscal policy and the need of our own defense, we should then consider such proposals.

Mr. President, I have stated my support of the principle of multilateral application of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. I only wish we could, this morning, extend those principles multilaterally to the signatory powers. That is the potential which the Senior Senator from Michigan says he desires. I am perfectly willing to accept that particular responsibility; but I say that with article 3 in the North Atlantic Treaty, to my mind, there is a moral obligation. So I shall offer, on behalf of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT], the Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS], and myself a declaration to the resolution of ratification. I am not asking anything more than has been said time and again on the floor. It will not require renegotiation of the treaty. It is an entirely different procedure. We have adopted such a course time after time since 1939.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I should like to finish my speech before I yield. I am working on a time basis.

With the adoption of the declaration I shall offer on behalf of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT], the Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS], and myself, I shall vote for ratification of the treaty, confident of its success. But I say now that I cannot vote for ratification of the treaty if this vital declaration is rejected. I shall not vote to impose an onerous obligation upon my country.

I now yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. DONNELL. In line with the Senator's question as to whether there is any likelihood of our being obligated to furnish the atomic bomb, there are two thoughts in my mind. One is that the furnishing of the atomic bomb is one thing; the furnishing of information and knowledge with respect to it is another thing. I am wondering whether the declaration intended to be proposed by the Senator from Nebraska for himself, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT], and the Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS], is sufficiently broad to cover the atomic bomb, on the one hand, and knowledge or information concerning it, on the other hand. I should like to suggest that in the interim between now and 2 o'clock the Senator consider the inclusion of this language following the word "supplies," in line 5:

including atomic bombs or knowledge or information of any nature whatsoever.

So it will provide that the United States of America ratifies this treaty with the understanding that the United States

commits none of the parties thereto to supply arms, armament material, and so forth.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Senator for his suggestion. I think I made it very plain in my formal address on that point that I felt that atomic bombs, the know-how, and the information concerning them were inseparable and should be included in arms and planes. I shall be glad to consider it. I want to make it unmistakably clear as to what the Senate commits itself to when it ratifies the North Atlantic Treaty.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. In my opinion, the words "military, naval, or air supplies" clearly cover the atomic bomb. I do not think there can be any question about that. The matter of information is another question.

I should like to ask the Senator whether he has considered the possibility of the treaty suspending and superseding the Atomic Energy Act which now forbids the furnishing of supplies and information to foreign nations, and whether the Senator knows the treaty will supersede the law once it has been ratified.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Senator for suggesting the question. There was no quorum call this morning, and I wanted to complete my remarks before noon. I fully agree with the Senator from Ohio that the treaty does supersede the Atomic Energy Act. If the treaty is signed, it will supersede the present law. That is the reason I asked the question last night as to what our commitments might be. My feeling is that if there is any doubt about our commitments, the nations which are signatory powers should have, not obsolete and worn-out military machinery, but they will want to share percentage-wise in that to which they are entitled, effective offensive weapons.

Former Prime Minister Churchill has said that the thing that stops communism in Europe is the atomic bomb. Does anyone think that the signatory powers will be satisfied with being given old, worn-out surplus equipment? No. They want to have the best defense they can have under the theory of mutual aid. I am in favor of giving them whatever the United States wants to give them when the matter is brought before the Senate and considered on its merits; but I do not want any moral obligation which supersedes the present law.

Mr. JENNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I yield.

Mr. JENNER. Is it not a fact that General Bradley, our Chief of Staff, in testifying before the Foreign Relations Committee, certainly implied, if he did not expressly state, that we do not intend to give the signatory powers junk?

Mr. WHERRY. I have read his testimony; but that is not exactly what I had in mind. Of course we appreciate what General Bradley said. It is certain that the signatory nations will want modern weapons of war. All I am ask-

ing for by the approval of this declaration, I may say to the Senator from Indiana, is that we shall not wrap up in this treaty a moral commitment which will embarrass us, because the treaty supersedes the present law which protects us in regard to the atomic bomb.

Mr. JENNER. Did not the signatory powers, when they signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D. C., on April 4, take into consideration the fact that the very reservation which the distinguished junior Senator from Nebraska has discussed this morning was likely and probable and within the constitutional process of this country?

Mr. WHERRY. Certainly; and that is not all. They not only knew the treaty had to be ratified, but they will accept the treaty with this declaration, as has been demonstrated by the record of what we have done since 1939, unless they have made commitments to the contrary. Some sort of a definition should be provided of what mutual aid really means.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I yield.

Mr. DONNELL. In view of the fact that "mutual aid" is the term used in article 3 and that it might refer to the giving of information as well as physical things, I think it is extremely important to know whether military assistance would include knowledge or information.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, how much time have I remaining?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator has one more minute before 12 o'clock.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I yield.

Mr. WATKINS. I should like to call the Senator's attention to a dispatch from Paris, dated July 20, in which it is reported that the Committee on Foreign Relations of the French Legislature has proposed that the French ratification act should include a provision that an invitation to any additional states to join the pact must be sanctioned by an act of parliament. The committee held that such an invitation would amount to making a new treaty. There has been concern in France lest the pact be construed to include Spain or Germany.

Mr. WHERRY. That is the first I have heard about it.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Nebraska has expired. The hour of 12 o'clock having arrived, the time from now until 2 o'clock will be divided between the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] and the Senator from Missouri [Mr. DONNELL].

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I assume that the proponents of the treaty will be entitled to open and close the debate.

Mr. DONNELL. I think so.

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield to the Senator from Michigan 25 minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.

Mr. VANDENBERG. Mr. President, the reservations upon which the Senate soon will vote clearly crystallize the only remaining point of major controversy over the North Atlantic Pact. This

point has ceased to be the pact's philosophy of action, namely, the probability that no armed aggressor will attack a competently united North Atlantic community which he knows he cannot divide and conquer. Indeed, some critics have gone far beyond this multilateral concept and have offered, unilaterally, as did the able Senator from Nebraska a moment ago, to extend the Monroe Doctrine to Europe and "commit the United States to war if Russia attacks western Europe."

There has been general acceptance of the theme that the surest chance of stopping an aggressor is to convincingly warn him in advance that he is bound to lose his war; also that our own national security is unavoidably involved—pact or no pact—if an armed aggressor starts to march into western Europe.

The pact sensibly proposes that those who share this jeopardy shall share effective vigilance against it. It thus reduces—indeed, it may extinguish—the jeopardy by anticipating it. The exclusive aim is peace.

There are a few Senators who reject this total concept, but among the majority the remaining point of controversy seems to involve only the nature of our responsibility to help our allies "maintain their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

Since the point has already been debated to exhaustion, it may be wishful thinking to hope to clarify the clarifiers, myself included; but it is vitally important to keep the record straight. It is still more important that superficially persuasive reservations—and I say this most respectfully—shall not be allowed to undermine the whole fundamental philosophy of protective action upon which this pact is built and upon which there is such general concert.

Therefore, Mr. President, I briefly discuss reservations with reference to arms and article 3.

Just what are our obligations? A logical answer requires us first to search out the roots of article 3. Where did it come from? Why? What was its initial intent?

The answers are officially available. It came from the Senate itself. It is the Senate's own idea.

On June 11, 1948, by a vote of 64 to 4, the Senate advised the President to seek "association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid," for purposes of "individual and collective self-defense" against aggression.

The President took our advice. Article 3 says that the parties to the treaty "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack"; and article 11 says this "shall be done by constitutional process."

The two propositions are amazingly identical in literal text. The President could not have more faithfully followed Senate advice. Senators attached no "reservations" to their advice—except that they would be free to decide for

themselves whether the advice was satisfactorily followed. They will now exercise that freedom. But we must start with the probative premise that article 3 is literally the Senate's own words.

Now the next question. Why did we, the Senate, use these words about "continuous self-help and mutual aid" to "resist armed attack?" The official answer may be found in the unanimous report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Senate Resolution 239. Let us read it:

The committee considers the principle of self-help and mutual aid followed in the European recovery program equally applicable in the field of security. United States association with arrangements for collective defense must supplement, rather than replace, the efforts of the other participants on their own behalf.

Still quoting the committee.

Such arrangements must be based upon continuous effective self-help and mutual aid. This means, in practice—

Says the committee—

that the participants must be prepared resolutely to defend their liberties against attack from any source, and efficiently to develop their maximum defense potential by coordination of their military forces and resources.

And listen particularly to this, the Senate committee speaking:

The resolution has been designed to avoid open-ended or unlimited commitments and to require reciprocity of aid.

That, Mr. President, is why "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" to "resist armed attack" went into Senate Resolution 239; and that is how it got into article 3 of the pending treaty. It is the exact antithesis of open-ended or unlimited commitments. It is a contract for mutual cooperation in behalf of a common defense objective. It deliberately rejects any idea that the United States accepts any unilateral responsibility which is not shared by others. We, like every other signatory, most emphatically do accept responsibility for contributing to the security of the North Atlantic area in whatever fashion events may require as honestly estimated by each signatory for itself. This may include arms. Perhaps it should. Obviously the administration thinks so. That is for us, the Congress, honestly to decide from time to time—so far as this pact is concerned—after the Advisory Council makes its recommendations under article 9. The extent of self-help will be one of the controlling factors. This is not a one-way street. Wise strategy for peace will be another factor. The goal is peace. The goal is less armaments, not more—if aggressors will allow us to reach it.

Our obligation is to our general responsibility under the pact. Our obligation is to make honest decisions as events unfold and in response to this general responsibility which must be shared by all the others.

The preservation of this free and mutual responsibility is vital to the enterprise. It is vital to the United States

not only as a signatory which gives but also as one which gets.

If each signatory now tries to spell out what it does or does not intend in the application of this concept to unpredictable events, we can make a shambles of this essential spirit of the enterprise which must be general in character if it shall competently cope with an unknown future. If we cannot trust ourselves, we cannot trust others and we cannot expect others to trust us.

There is no hazard in the generality because there is not a word in the treaty which limits final freedom of honorable decision in the execution of its underlying pledge. But there is real hazard in attempting needless specifications because they may invite doubts regarding the validity of our intentions if we seem to be afraid of our own words.

As the pact stands, we are partners in pursuit of a general objective. But after honestly acknowledging the objective, we are free agents in determining our contribution. As a matter of fact, by attempting to define specifications in one instance we may find that we have actually increased our liabilities by neglecting specifications in others. The committee report speaks of "obligations" in 12 different places. They should all remain at the same level of senatorial concern.

If we start to try to spell out what we do or do not conceive our duties to be, there is no reason why every other signatory should not follow suit. Regardless of technicalities if renegotiation should be involved, it requires little imagination, under such circumstances, to see the end of confidence and the beginning of suspicion. This is a classical case where "the letter killeth but the spirit giveth life."

What are our duties under article III in respect to arms?

It is to take our share of responsibility in maintaining and developing the capacity of the North Atlantic community to resist aggression in whatever way, including arms if need be, our own independent judgment from time to time determines to be necessary.

Of course, the situation is not the same under the pact as it is without the pact—or there would be no sense in writing it. But the difference is not in our freedom of honest decision. It is in our acceptance of the general responsibilities to which these decisions shall be honestly applied.

We really, Mr. President, it seems to me, are back to the basic concept which the Senate had in mind when it inspired the pact. Those who do not think it wise for 300,000,000 free people to notify an armed aggressor that he cannot win because of the competent unity he will confront will undoubtedly be anxious to whittle away this general responsibility. That can be the vice of reservations. I can understand how article 3 might bother a Senator who is opposed to this total concept; and I have the deepest respect for the good conscience of others who are anxious to be sure of their ground. But it seems to me that those who sup-

port the concept need not fear the exercise of their own free judgments in honest subsequent decisions implementing this support.

Some of the confusion arises because the administration will follow the pact with an immediate request for a military assistance program for a number of countries outside—and some inside—the pact. Further confusion flows from the unfortunate but understandable coincidence that this military assistance program came to a head when the foreign ministers of all the treaty countries came to Washington to sign the pact.

But there is no further legitimate room for confusion since I put the State Department's categorical statement into the Record a few days ago.

The answer is that the military assistance program which will presently be submitted to Congress is not a program for implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty. It could not be because article 3 requires recommendations under article 9 to initiate any such program.

The State Department says:

The program—

Referring to the pending military assistance program—

would be necessary even if there were no treaty just as the treaty would be necessary if the military assistance program had not yet been formulated. This latter program has its own validity and necessity, rooted in basic elements of our foreign policy. The principal element involved in both is that of the national interest of the United States in insuring the security of certain free nations. The military assistance program is separate from the treaty, except that the treaty and the MAP both serve the national interest and security of the United States and in this way supplement each other. * * * Any further military assistance programs involving Atlantic Pact countries will be prepared and submitted on the basis of recommendations which will be made by the organization to be established under article 9 of the treaty.

That ends the State Department quotation. It also ends any doubt about the status of the treaty in respect to the military assistance program which is waiting around the corner.

This leaves us, therefore, exclusively with treaty obligations as involved in pending reservations. I use the reservation proposed by the distinguished Senator from Utah (Mr. WATKINS) as an example. I understand it now will be offered in conjunction with other Senators, but that it is substantially the same as originally presented, with the deletion of one clause. It reads as follows:

Nothing contained in article III creates any legal or moral obligation on the part of the United States to furnish or supply arms, armaments, military, naval, or air equipment, or supplies to any other party or parties to said treaty.

That is true as far as it goes. But it does not go far enough. It is not all of the truth. Half-truths are dangerous. That is the difficulty in attempting specifications. That is why I am opposed to the attempt. If you start this business, the truth requires you to find

appropriate words to express, among other things, some such added thought as this, and even this is not comprehensive: Unless and until the Congress, in its own judgment, finds the furnishing of such supplies essential to peace and security in the North Atlantic community on the self-help basis defined in the treaty.

Then you are off to an argument, at home and abroad, as to precisely what it is you have said or are trying to say which is different from the treaty—and it is different from the treaty.

The Secretary of State puts it this way:

The pact does not dictate the conclusion of honest judgment * * * it does preclude repudiation of the obligation of making that honest judgment.

In other words, we are not entitled to assert a total disclaimer of mutual responsibility to the pact—as distinguished from its individual signatories—under article 3. Nor is that what any of us really means. Indeed, it may well be that, under warranting justification, we may freely come to the precise conclusion which this reservation would denounce in advance.

This pact establishes no automatic right anywhere to demand arms of us. It does establish a right to present a request, under article 9, and to have it considered by us in the light of this mutual responsibility and our own honest estimate of the need and of our capacity to respond. Period.

No reservation is necessary to protect this point because it is plain in every word that has been uttered in this debate in the presentation of the pact. Surely the opponents of the pact will not be valid witnesses to the contrary because if the pact is ratified, their views will not have prevailed. If it be argued that Senators who vote against the reservation have thereby accepted the unlimited obligations which the reservation would denounce, my answer—of course, with no reflection on the good faith of the authors—is that Senators who vote against such reservations have merely rejected a half-truthful statement of those obligations which remain the same as if the rejected reservation had never been offered. It is infinitely better to stand upon the general text of the pact than to attempt specifications which easily may create more problems than they solve.

It is urged that we must not mislead our associates. I cordially agree. These debates will have disabused their minds of any notion that we are assuming responsibility for arming western Europe to the teeth or of turning ourselves into an automatic arsenal. But it would be even more tragic to invite misgivings that, though we ratify the pact, we shall have no sense of mutual concern in the defense problems of those brave countries which sit in the immediate shadow of the jeopardy which, wherever it might break, is aimed finally at us. The consequences could be appalling.

I happen to be one of those who believe that the overriding authority of this pact is in its potentials under article 5 rather

than in forces-in-being under article 3. But I say again that I recognize the importance of putting this defense in gear and rounding out its normal sufficiency, particularly to sustain law and order against subversion. I shall fit my future judgments to the facts. But I certainly do not intend by my vote to invite the imputation that I am blind to these facts or to my country's interest in them. I consider that my treaty obligation is to give them honest and faithful consideration. I conceive that my right of action is totally my own.

I am certain that this or any other reservation is in no way necessary to protect our constitutional process, our independent judgments, our congressional conscience, and our nonaggressive purpose to use this pact for peace.

Needless reservations, though born of honorable caution, serve only to confuse—perhaps confound—our friends, while potential aggressors take renewed hope that we do not really mean what we say when we dedicate ourselves to effective unity against their North Atlantic conquests.

We may thus defeat our own purposes and cripple the protective values upon which so much depends.

I continue to believe, Mr. President, that this pact—if eloquently approved by the Senate—is our best peaceful and strategic chance to stop another war before it starts. If it starts—pact or no pact—it is headed straight in our direction.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair cannot consume the time of the Senate in answering parliamentary inquiries, because the time is already disposed of by a unanimous-consent agreement, and is in control of the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] and the Senator from Missouri [Mr. DONNELL]. The Chair apologizes to the Senator from Missouri, but a parliamentary inquiry and the answer might consume several minutes.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, I assume that the Senator from Texas expects us to go forward at this point. I yield 20 minutes to the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT].

The VICE PRESIDENT. Before the Senator from Ohio begins, let the Chair respectfully admonish Senators not to engage in conversation. The art of whispering seems to be a lost art in the Senate. Senators who feel it incumbent upon themselves to say anything say it loud enough to be heard. The Chair hopes that Senators will not indulge in conversation during this debate.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I have already stated at length and in detail the reasons why I intend to vote against the North Atlantic Pact. In substance, those reasons consist of the fact that, in my opinion, the North Atlantic Pact is part of a larger project including the arms program. The State Department in some places says it is incidental to the arms program. I think we close our eyes to realities unless we realize that

this is one thing, and that in going into this pact we are committing ourselves to an arms program. Therefore I shall vote against the North Atlantic Pact, unless it is made clear that these two things are separate.

The declaration proposed by the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY] says:

The United States of America ratifies this treaty with the understanding that article 3 commits none of the parties thereto, morally or legally, to furnish or supply arms, armaments, military, naval or air equipment or military, naval, or air supplies to any other party or parties to this treaty.

Either the treaty commits us to that obligation or it does not. We have had throughout this entire debate a marked difference of opinion on that question, which has not been resolved by the very excellent speech of the Senator from Michigan. To my mind it is just as uncertain today whether he thinks there is a moral or legal obligation to go ahead with an arms program, as it was before he began to speak. I have heard that there is no particular arms program to which we are committed; but whether we are committed to an arms program or not, I cannot conclude from the Senator's speech. Even if we adopt this reservation it does not prevent us from proceeding with an arms program. It simply says that when the question of an arms program arises we are entirely free to adopt it if we wish, or to decline it if we wish; that we are not obligated to all 11 nations; that we can pick out a particular nation; that if a nation is threatened with actual attack, as was Turkey, or if a nation is threatened with internal attack, as was Greece, or if there is some country, like China today, which is threatened with Communist attack, and we can see the threat, and see that military aid may be effective, then we can proceed without regard to the obligations in the pact itself.

This does not foreclose us from a military program, but it says that there is no legal or moral obligation in the pact. It says that we can turn down completely, if we wish, the military program presented to us.

This treaty is ambiguous. Who can say that article 3 is not ambiguous? Who can say that there is any certainty as to what it means? Taking the views of various Senators as expressed during this debate, the distinguished junior Senator from New York [Mr. DULLES] said:

I said in substance I see in the treaty no legal or moral obligation to vote any arms program which is not defensible on its own merits.

He takes an extreme view, that there is no obligation whatever. He says in other places that in his opinion the leaders of foreign governments do not think there is any obligation. If so, there can certainly be no objection on their part to our clearly making that statement; nor can I see how there can be a reasonable objection on his part or on the part of anyone who thinks there is no moral or legal obligation, to our frankly stating that fact in a reservation.

The distinguished Senator from New York also disagrees directly with the

State Department. The State Department says the North Atlantic Pact is an agreement on a policy of common defense, and that its very vital corollary is a program of military aid. The distinguished Senator from New York says he disagrees; he says that a program of military aid is not its vital corollary. There we have a direct difference of opinion on a vitally important question.

The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the distinguished Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], it seems to me has taken two inconsistent positions in one sentence. He issued a statement which he said that a vote for the treaty does not carry with it any obligation to vote for arms implementation. But then he said that we must act promptly on arms implementation and assure the co-signers of the pact that we mean business, that we are sincere and earnest. If that is not a statement that there is certainly a moral obligation to provide arms, I do not know what it is. So the distinguished Senator from Texas says clearly that in his opinion there is a moral obligation to provide arms.

The position of the distinguished Senator from Michigan and the position of the distinguished Secretary of State constitute a kind of moderate intermediate position. They say that if we ratify the pact, it cannot be said there is no obligation to help. They say there will be an obligation to help. When they say that, they are talking about military help, not about other help. Article 3 may well bind us to a general ECA program, even if we adopt the reservation; but without the reservation, and in view of the history of what has gone on, it seems to me clearly that Article 3 is an obligation to provide arms.

We are told that there is an obligation to help, but that the extent, manner, and timing are up to the honest judgment of the parties. So, Mr. President, we see that they say there is an obligation.

The distinguished Senator from Michigan seems this afternoon to be saying in effect that of course there is going to be an arms program, but that we can decide just how big it should be and of what it should consist. But he says there is "an obligation." Fundamentally, those who object to the adoption of this reservation think there is an obligation, they know there is an obligation, and they think we must go on to an arms program as soon as we adopt the pact. I cannot escape the conclusion that there is a complete difference of opinion between different Senators on this question. Therefore, such a difference of opinion should be resolved, and should be resolved by the Senate of the United States, before we ratify a treaty which may well develop into one of the greatest foreign-aid assistance programs we have ever seen. It can easily go well beyond the total burden of ECA.

The newspapers differ as to what the treaty means. Mr. Arthur Krock, the distinguished representative of the New York Times, says very clearly that any Member of Congress who reads informed newspaper dispatches must have known

from the time the Scandinavian ministers were encouraged to visit our State Department that the purpose of their visit was to get arms, and that the purpose of getting arms under the North Atlantic Pact was what impelled Norway to reject the Scandinavian pact with Sweden and Denmark.

I cannot find that the Foreign Relations Committee really repudiates the obligation provided under the treaty to supply arms. The distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], who is an excellent lawyer, has taken the position on this floor that there is clearly an obligation under the treaty to provide arms and that we should recognize it now. The Washington Post takes a similar position, namely, that that is what the treaty is and that arms are a necessary adjunct to the North Atlantic Treaty.

So, Mr. President, I cannot understand the position of those who say there is no obligation, and yet are unwilling to vote for this reservation, unless they think really there is an obligation—an indefinite one, perhaps, but still an obligation. That obligation changes, to my mind, the entire spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty.

I do not see how the other signatory countries are going to be discouraged by our adoption of this reservation. They know it is being debated here. They know very well that the arms program is going to be considered. The distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. DULLES], who knows many of the representatives of the foreign countries and has talked to them, says they do not really feel that any obligation is connected with the treaty.

So how can we in any way hurt their feelings by adopting this reservation? If we do not adopt it, are not we deceiving them? If we ratify the treaty, at the same time reserving in our minds the right to vote down any arms program at all, are not we fooling them by refusing to adopt the reservation now? Is not truth the best foreign policy, as it is the best domestic policy? Should not we make perfectly clear what we are doing and how far we are willing to go, and not lead the signatory countries to think that we are coming to their aid with arms sufficient to enable them to defend themselves? How many arms do Senators think are necessary for Denmark or for Norway to have to defend itself against Russia. The Italians must be looking for us to come to their aid. It has come to be assumed as a fact that the United States is coming to the assistance of the signatory nations, to defend them against a possible attack. But that is not so. We are not going to do it, in the last analysis. We may give them arms to some extent, but I myself do not think we should commit ourselves, and I do not think we will commit ourselves actually to send American troops to those countries.

Is it not better to be fair to these countries by defining exactly what we are prepared to do, which, to my mind, means one thing only, namely, to say to Russia that if she goes to war with any

of these countries, although she may win for a time, yet in the end the United States has the power, which it will use in such a war, to attain victory, and the nation that challenges it will go down to defeat. That is what we say, but we should not guarantee arms to these countries. If we do so, I think we make it more probable that there will be a war.

The State Department comes forward with the rather naive view that, after all, the steps provided for under article 9 will not be taken at this time. Whether that means there will be another military program, or what the theory is, I do not know; but I think the idea that the supplying of arms and the pact are separate is merely a theory of the State Department, whereas everyone knows they are together and are one project. That is merely a bright idea conceived by someone in the State Department. They want to go ahead with the military program now; so they suggest that the nations do not meet under article 9, but that the military program be proceeded with as a separate matter.

If that is done, I admit we are not obligated to go ahead with such a military program. But under article 9, later it would be very difficult for us to escape another program.

So, Mr. President, I am opposing the treaty. If the reservation is adopted, I shall vote for the treaty. But with the reservation, this whole program in my opinion is not a peace program; it is a war program. Mr. President, I do not wish to make so didactic a statement as that, so I shall say that with the arms factor the whole tendency of this program is toward a third world war, instead of away from a third world war; because we are in the first place committing ourselves to a vast program of foreign aid.

In the second place, we are committing ourselves to a policy of war, not a policy of peace. We are building up armaments. We are undertaking to arm half the world against the other half. We are inevitably starting an armament race. The more the pact signatories arm, the more the Russians are going to arm. It is said they are armed too much already. Perhaps that is true. But that makes no difference. The more we arm, the more they will arm, the more they will devote their whole attention to the building up of arms. The general history of armament races in the world is that they have led to war, not to peace.

In the third place, we are going back to the old balance-of-power theory. Every American has denounced that theory. Every man who has thoroughly thought out the question of international organization has said the only ultimate hope of peace depends upon the establishment of law and justice among nations, with international action by joint force against an aggressor. We abandon that theory under the treaty and arms program; and we go back to the old balance-of-power theory, which

England followed for years. We are following exactly the theory she practiced—"Keep Europe divided more or less equally and so that neither can afford to attack safely and, ultimately, England has the balance of power." That is the effect of this program to turn back to the balance of power, which never prevented war, except for brief periods of time. It always led to a series of wars in Europe, and it will lead to a series of wars in the world, if that is all we develop.

So, Mr. President, I believe that if we simply want to take a purely defensive action, if we want to warn Russia, we ought to adopt this reservation and then ratify the treaty. But I feel as strongly as I can that if we go ahead with the arms program, in which I think the treaty now involves us, we are adopting a policy far more likely to lead to a third war, and the real tragedy of a third world war, than to peace.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, does the Senator from Texas desire to go forward at this time? If not, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS].

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Ohio used 16 minutes.

Mr. DONNELL. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS].

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Vermont is recognized for 5 minutes, in absentia.

Mr. DONNELL. I do not see the Senator. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Nevada [Mr. MALONE].

THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, the North Atlantic Pact, as now written, will serve to protect the integrity of the colonial system of Asia and Africa—and will cause the Asiatic and African people to favor and to look upon as a savior any nation that will promise them relief from the European nations' colonial yoke—and the nation to promise such relief is Russia. It also, for the first time, removes our prerogative to be the sole judge when our peace and safety is threatened—also to declare war only in the event such peace and safety are threatened.

It is extremely doubtful if the empire nations of England, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium can hold their colonial possessions much longer even with our help—and the wisdom of lining up with this effort and alienating the Asiatic and African people is, to say the least, questionable.

This is not an isolated Atlantic Pact or treaty with the 12 European nations. On June 11, 1947, I debated the Vandenberg resolutions with the senior Senator from Michigan contending at that time that if the Senate demanded that the President make such a treaty or pact without the specific terms of such treaty being indicated, then this body would be morally bound to approve any such arrangements that the President might later send to the Senate floor. I further contended that it was the first breach of the 173-year-old policy of independent

checking on any pact or treaty prepared by the executive branch of the Government.

One year later we find the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, saying that the Vandenberg resolutions were the basis of the pact, and find that all member nations were called to Washington to sign the pact—before it reached the Senate floor—thus, in every way possible embarrassing any Senator who might make so bold as to try to determine its real meaning.

The North Atlantic Pact will develop the basis for supplying arms to Europe, and I say to the distinguished Senators before me today, the arms will be the basis of the boys and girls going to Europe to use the arms.

For a precedent I refer my colleagues to the statement by Winston Churchill during World War II, in the early stages. At that time he said what was needed was funds and credit. We gave them credit. He then said, "Give us the tools and we will finish the job." We gave them the tools. Then we ended up by sending from 70 percent to 75 percent of all the boys and girls who were in the war in Europe. That is exactly where we are headed now. It is the old story over again.

When I mentioned the Monroe Doctrine a year ago last March in the Marshall plan debate as a substitute for our then international policy, then again in the ECA debate on March 30 of this year, then on July 12 in the North Atlantic Pact address and debate, I meant the Monroe Doctrine which we relied upon for 125 years, adopted in 1823, and which is still in existence, regardless of the 1947 Latin-American Defense Pact. I ask unanimous consent to place in the RECORD a very short statement, found at page 142 of a work, *We of the Americas*, by Carlos DeVilles, a statement that the Monroe Doctrine is still in effect and its purpose and effect, also a further statement on the same subject matter.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The last public statement of American foreign policy, issued in the form of a State Department pamphlet on October 20, 1947, observes: "There was a realization that the freedom of Latin America from European control was in the interest of our own security. This view was stated in the form of a policy or doctrine by President Monroe in 1823." The document states further that the two Americas were "brought closer together" through the multilateral agreements against aggressors, which culminated in the Rio de Janeiro continental defense pact of September 1947. It does not state, or remotely imply, that any of these joint agreements is a substitute for a Monroe Doctrine which now has been abandoned.

The Monroe Doctrine as a unilateral instrument or policy is not dead, nor has the self-nominated United States stewardship of this hemisphere been abandoned. Even if it had never been placed in words as a publicly stated policy, it seems to me that the Monroe Doctrine still would be a living reality; for it embodies the instinct of self-preservation of the most powerful nation in the Western Hemisphere. It was a definite part of the United States' position long be-

fore Monroe wrote his now famous message to Congress.

In a congressional resolution, as early as 1811, the United States evidenced increasing concern over the possibility of European invasions throughout the Spanish South. In early American history we frequently find official expression of this anxiety.

The principle of "no European entanglements" was basic to the Monroe Doctrine. Washington had said in his Farewell Address that European interests sprang from causes "essentially foreign to our concerns." Washington's main worry was that American peace and prosperity might be destroyed "in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice."

The Monroe Doctrine simply formulated the method by which these "toils" were to be kept as remote from the United States as possible. Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine are not only complementary; they are one and the same policy—a fact often disregarded by jurists and diplomats.

The Monroe Doctrine was a two-way precept: No European intervention in this hemisphere; no American intervention in Europe. It read: "In the wars of European powers relating to themselves, we have never taken any part; nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defense."

The Monroe move was one of the smartest in the history of world diplomacy. Generally pictured as a show of strength, it should rather be appraised as a bold attempt on the part of a comparatively weak nation to keep all powerful, potential aggressors at a safe distance.

So arrogant did the Monroe Doctrine appear to the Holy Alliance powers that Metetrnich called it "an indecent declaration," and Bismarck, "a diplomatic impertinence."

Not over 12,000,000 people inhabited the United States at that time; its great economic potentialities were just beginning to be developed; it did not have an army or navy of any importance. Unsure of its ability to meet European nations in a cold test of arms, the United States used to the utmost the diplomatic weapon of the Monroe Doctrine. Its purpose was not to invite a test of strength but to avoid one.

When the Truman Doctrine was formulated in March 1947 it was said that it meant an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the world at large.

For a moment it appeared so but it was soon transformed as the Marshall plan was, into a negotiated affair with the European nations and finally has evolutionized into what we see today, a peacetime Atlantic alliance to depend, incredible as it may be, on American lend-lease military supplies and on the protection of the armed forces of the United States.

All potential aggressors knew exactly what would confront them if they violated the Monroe Doctrine, and so would take no chances. For the potential aggressors of our times, it was always a matter of speculation whether the United States would fight in Europe or not; so they assumed it would not, and when opportunity for profitable aggression beckoned, they took the chance.

Even de-isolated Uncle Sam might still have prevented two world wars if he had preserved at least his century-old Monroe grand strategy.

It seems to me that besides the no-meddling-in-Europe clear implication of the Monroe Doctrine there is another basic difference between that doctrine and the one that the United States is now evolving for Europe.

President Monroe deliberately refused to enter into any negotiations or even into a joint declaration with Britain or with any other European nation.

The plan for a joint British-American declaration was Prime Minister George Canning's idea as we all know. So it was carefully weighed by the American Government and rejected. Jefferson and Madison were for it. But Secretary Adams was adamant; he refused to have the United States involved in any European commitment in safeguarding the security of this Nation and of this continent. Monroe followed Adams' advice and so the Monroe Doctrine became a unilateral declaration with no entanglement or commitment to any nation; to be used, as Secretary of State Calhoun said, "As the political interests of the country advised."

Any treaty or commitment would have forced this Nation to accept a foreign interpretation of the doctrine. Being unilateral only the Government of the United States had the right to say when and how the Monroe Doctrine should be brought into action.

Quite different from the Atlantic alliance where there are 11 governments which in due time may claim that any threat real or not or any provoked aggression is a case to bring the alliance into effect and put the United States on the spot.

President Monroe did not consult or negotiate with any of the Latin-American nations which the doctrine was going to protect against alien encroachments.

He did not summon the Foreign Affairs Committee of Congress.

He did not request any legislative authorization or indorsement.

He did not talk of military or economic help to any nation.

There was no Monroe plan nor a Monroe alliance.

His declaration was nothing but a declaration, no pact, no law, no Congress approval, no treaty; it created no obligation on the part of this Nation toward anybody but unto herself.

The doctrine as Wilson said was unilateral proclaimed by the United States on its own authority it has been and shall always be maintained its sole responsibility.

Monroe said that he would consider "dangerous to our peace and safety any attempt on the part of the European powers to extend their systems to any portion of this hemisphere"; he stamped as a manifestation of unfriendly disposition toward the United States any interposition for the purpose of oppressing the Latin-American nations or controlling any other manner their destiny by any European power.

That extremely simple insertion in a current Presidential message to Congress worked for over a century and it worked 100 percent.

It completely achieved its purpose of protecting the United States' flank against powerful potential European enemies.

It gave the Latin-American Republics their chance to freely carve out their own destiny.

It sharply deflected from this hemisphere all new colonizing drives.

Now, what the United States is trying to do for the western European nations today is exactly what she endeavored to do and did during 126 years, for the other nations of this continent.

In both cases, furthermore, the United States were concerned with their own security.

Why then could not a simple stern, American-like declaration work today as it worked 126 years ago?

At the time of Monroe this Nation had 12,000,000 inhabitants and no military power of any kind to face even one of the European nations which received the warning.

Today, it has all the power necessary to back a declaration effectively.

If Monroe had negotiated his doctrine within this Nation and with other nations he would surely have become involved in the same troubles that the Atlantic alliance is having, and will bring and would have meant all kinds of economic and military commitments as this Nation is now assuming.

Mr. MALONE. The Monroe Doctrine simply and briefly left with the United States of America the decision, which we always have made, throughout our 173 years of existence, that we go to war only when our peace and safety are threatened, and that we are the sole judges, under the Monroe Doctrine, when such peace and safety are threatened.

While under the North Atlantic Pact, we would divide that responsibility with 12 European nations. There will be 12 separate nations that, not only will be the judge of whether their peace and safety are threatened, but automatically our peace and safety is assumed to be threatened, and we must then come to their assistance.

In other words, we can, according to the pact, judge how best to help them but it can only lead to one thing, and that is a contest at arms.

I consider the North Atlantic Pact to be one of the most useless treaties we have ever considered, and to be a most dangerous and most radical departure from what constitutes the main duty of this body, which is to protect and promote the legitimate interests and the security of this Nation. Yet I would consider its ratification worth while, if that would solve the great problem which is facing humanity at this moment, the problem of giving back to the American people the management of their foreign policy.

This country was made by the people. They succeeded in everything except in the matter of foreign policy. Why? Because the people were bypassed in that field. Their rights were usurped. If the people had been informed and given a chance, then this Nation would not have been dragged from one emergency to another in the morass of this pact.

Do we realize that actually fewer men are shaping and formulating the carrying on of foreign policies of the United States than are in the Kremlin at Moscow? At least there are 13 or 14 men in the Politburo. Whereas when four men in Washington even commit this Nation to an irrevocable policy with respect to Europe for the next 20 years, and, when these four men agree, the policy becomes bipartisan, if you please, according to an ill-timed concept of the work of the United States Senate, then the whole weight of the machinery of the Government of the two parties goes into action, backed up by the press and by powerful public declarations. To dissent then is heresy, and the people, uninformed and confused, have to bow to the inexorable.

I feel a deep responsibility for what is happening today in the Senate. I feel

responsible because I am unable to convince my colleagues of the perils involved in the surrender of the freedom of action of the Government of the United States; of the perils that their pact involves; of the surrender it means. I am so certain that I am right in opposing this strange European document baptized as a North Atlantic defense pact, that I must admit that it is only because of the failure of the opposition to make its point clear that this vote is going the way it is going: against the United States of America and against the New World.

I said a few days ago that this was the culmination of a plan. I am afraid that unless the American people wake up, it will not be the culmination. Fortunately the American conscience is awakening. We must beware from now on. There is an angry wave of public opinion rising against these un-American policies. They want to know why this Nation cannot have a foreign policy of its own. Why we were led from UNRRA to Bretton Woods; from Bretton Woods to the \$3,000,000,000 loan to England; from the loan to England to the Truman doctrine; from the Truman doctrine to the Marshall plan; from the Marshall plan to the Atlantic alliance while always told again and again that those were the last commitments and the last dollars. From Atlantic alliance we are being led now to a new armaments lend lease to Europe which the Secretary of State announced yesterday will be soon sent to Congress.

The angry wave is rising, gentlemen. This day of joy on this floor is of sorrows in millions of humble homes all over this country. Here are the applauses; there the bells are tolling. Here the flag is up; in millions of American houses and hearts the flag is at half mast. This twentieth of July may go down in history as the day of American dependence just as the fourth was the day of independence 173 years ago. This angry wave of public opinion is not against internationalism; far from that their aim is an effective internationalism to take the place of mere Europeanism which is all that our foreign policy means at this moment.

It is a wave based also on the conviction that the best and only way to serve the world is to keep this Nation safe and strong and secured. We are doing absolutely the opposite today gentlemen.

ONE PART OF A PROGRAM OF FIVE PARTS

The North Atlantic Pact is only one part of a five part administration hybrid national and international program that will average the wage-living standard of living of this Nation with the low-wage living standards and slave labor of the Asiatic and European countries. The complete program includes: The North Atlantic Pact, the Marshall-ERP-ECA plan, the 1934 Trade Agreements Act, the International Trade Organization, the "Bold new program"—point 4 of the President's announcement.

This entire Administration program together with a suggested alternate American program is fully outlined in my address and debate in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of July 12, 1949.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Nevada has expired.

Mr. DONNELL. I yield myself 15 minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Missouri is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, the senior Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] referred at the outset of his remarks to what he termed "superficially persuasive reservations." He then proceeded to discuss the happenings with respect to Senate Resolution 239, which was adopted on July 11, 1948. I understood him to say, in substance, that at that time the only reservation made by the Senate, when it adopted Senate Resolution 239, was as to whether the provision regarding advice which was contained in it was satisfactorily followed by the President in the negotiations which ensued. I disagree most emphatically with the statement made by the Senator from Michigan, and I quote from his own language as it appeared on that date. Said he:

Repeatedly I have insisted that we must be perfectly sure that when we exercise the advice function in respect to the advice to the President on this subject, we are not yielding any of our subsequent consent prerogative. So far as the Senator from Michigan is concerned, he completely disagrees with any assertion that the exercise of the advice functions is a surrender of the consent function.

It is true he said the following, which I think in fairness to him should be included:

I hope there will be no misunderstanding about the nature of the resultant obligation. I do not think the situation remains entirely as it was before we acted. I think we have emphasized our very deep interest in exploring any regional arrangements which may be made, from the standpoint of our own national security. I think that carries with it the implication that if we find it to be to the advantage of our national security, we shall be very definitely sympathetic with the objectives. At that point we shall assess the situation from the standpoint of our own national security, and make our decision accordingly.

Mr. President, this differs very materially from the announcement made today by the Senator from Michigan that the only reservation made by the Senate was whether the advice contained in Senate Resolution 239 was satisfactorily followed.

I desire to address myself briefly to the importance of attaching reservations to the treaty. The Senator from Ohio [Mr. TART] has very clearly pointed out, as I see it, the tremendous importance of the reservation which has been offered by himself and two other Senators and which is now before us, with respect to article 3. In that connection, I should like to refer to the letter written by Charles Evans Hughes, back in 1919 when, referring to the League of Nations, he said:

The proposed covenant should be viewed as a mere beginning, and while it is important that we should have a beginning, it is equally important that we should not make a false start.

So, Mr. President, I submit that it is important here that we make no false start.

It has been suggested that there are various objections to reservations. The experience of our country, to my mind, with respect to reservations, does not make valid that point in opposition to them. In the first place, it is perfectly clear that it is important to have a definite understanding at the time we enter into the pact as to what our obligations under it may be. Obviously, it is also perfectly clear that abroad it is understood in one way, and upon the floor of the Senate it is understood by some Senators in one way and by other Senators in another way.

In the Washington Post this morning I find that Foreign Minister Robert Schuman told the French Cabinet today that he was confident the United States would supply arms aid to western Europe to put teeth into the Atlantic Pact. I read:

Schuman said American aid would be a "natural sequel" to the pact. He added he attached "the highest importance" to President Truman's proposal to Congress for a \$1,450,000,000 appropriation to put teeth into the pact.

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Council of the Republic, corresponding to a senate, voted 16 to 1 tonight for ratification.

Debate will start in the Chamber of Deputies Friday morning and a vote is expected late Saturday night.

Mr. President, it is of the highest importance to have a clear and definite statement in our own minds and in the minds of the other signatories as to what article 3 of the treaty means. It may be thought by some persons that the reservations—and I may say I am not a party to the reservations, but I shall vote for this reservation, and I shall vote against the treaty, even though the reservation be adopted—it may be thought by some persons that the reservations, including this one, are but a means to kill the treaty. If the treaty means anything other than what is in the first reservation, I, for one, do not want to enter the pact. Indeed, I do not want to enter it at all, and, as I have indicated, I shall so vote. But if it does not mean anything other than what is in the reservation, the other parties ought to agree promptly. Some may think that a reservation is but a device to kill a treaty. I have no doubt it has been used in that way in some instances, but the history of our country shows, for illustration, in a statement issued by Mr. Hoskins, of the Library of Congress, whose name has been featured in the debate several times—and if I had any later information I would give it—that 36 treaties with reservations were made by this country from August 4, 1821, to December 21, 1944, and of those treaties only 4 have failed to be subsequently entirely ratified and become effective. In other words, as to 32 out of 36 treaties, reservations certainly have not killed them. I do not know that the reservations in the 4 to which I have referred were or were not the cause of failure of complete ratification of the treaties, but,

obviously, the fact is that 32 treaties out of 36 were not killed by reservations.

If we go back over the history of this country and see the great list of treaties which have been made, we find, for instance, the Jay treaty with Great Britain, made in 1794, involving commercial rights. It was a treaty by which Great Britain surrendered western military posts. It provided also for the settlement of revolutionary war debts, for seizure during the war, and other subjects. The Jay treaty had one or more reservations, I am not sure how many. There was certainly one reservation; and yet the treaty was ratified.

The treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo with Mexico, was entered into on February 2, 1848. It arose out of the Mexican War, and by it the United States received all the southwestern part of the United States. It had one or more reservations, and that treaty was ratified.

The treaty with regard to the Gadsden Purchase, which the Senate will recall as having been entered into with Mexico on December 30, 1853, and which pertained to the acquisition of a part of southern California, had a reservation. It was ratified and went into full effect. When we reach the debate on the subject of the tidelands, we shall find that the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo will feature very interestingly on that point.

The treaty with Great Britain, entered into on January 11, 1809, which settled the boundary between the United States and Canada, had a reservation, but it went into effect.

The treaty with Denmark with respect to the Danish West Indies, had a reservation and went into effect.

So, Mr. President, the thought which may enter the minds of some persons with respect to the possibility of reservations killing a treaty is not sound and is not justified by the history of the United States.

I am against this pact, as I have said, outright. I am against it no matter if every reservation before us shall be adopted. There are numerous reasons for my position. I have attempted to set them forth. I have appeared too extensively on the floor of the Senate, and I shall not now trespass on its time for more than a few moments.

One of the reasons for my opposition to the ratification of the pact is that it is a compact which runs for 20 years—20 long years—without the slightest opportunity on the part of our country to withdraw, no matter what the eventualities may be. We are in it for 20 years, no matter whether France or Italy shall become communistic in time. Notwithstanding the assurances given by the Senator from Michigan, I say those countries likewise stay within the confines of the treaty for 20 years. It is unwise for this country to enter into an obligation which binds it for 20 long years without the slightest possibility of becoming released from it. If this treaty shall be ratified, I, for one, cannot possibly escape the somber thought that our country has mortgaged itself for a vague, indeterminate sum, probably increasing year after year over the period

of 20 years. I cannot escape the thought that from then on, instead of having a clear balance sheet, without contingent liabilities of this kind, we shall have contingent liabilities of almost virtually unlimited and certainly indeterminate amounts.

We are going into a contract which should cause every man, woman, and child with the power of understanding to feel appalled—yes; I mean appalled—at the nature of the obligations it entails. The obligations enter not merely the field of economics, but they go to the extent of affecting the very question of human lives and happiness—yes; perhaps even the life of our Republic—if we should become involved in wars because of the ambitions of some rulers in Europe, by reason of the difficulties and controversies which have pervaded those countries for thousands of years. Our boys and girls may lose their lives as a result of it. They will be mute and dead because of the folly of our becoming a party to this agreement.

Mr. President, there has been argument with respect to article 3. I again point out the vagueness of it, and yet the clarity of it, from one standpoint, that it does impose this vast, indeterminate contract involving an unlimited amount which we cannot anticipate or prophesy.

Then we come to article 5. We were told by the Senator from Michigan this morning that half-truths are dangerous, and I agree with that statement. It calls to mind the article from the St. Louis Globe-Democrat which was read a few days ago with reference to an address delivered by the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], as to which the article said:

Senator CONNALLY pulled out all the stops in a 9,000-word concert appealing for Senate ratification of the Atlantic Pact. He stated the obvious, irrefutable arguments, and then some.

I pause, Mr. President, to say that the St. Louis Globe-Democrat is in favor of ratifying the treaty; and yet it says:

Our automatic involvement in big-scale foreign wars is the fundamental fact of the treaty; without that fact—stated or implied—European nations would not be interested in it. The pact should be sold to the American people on that basis.

I do not see the Senator from Michigan on the floor at the moment. But the Senator is right and the St. Louis Globe-Democrat is right when it says that half-truths are not enough. I read further:

If they will not accept it in its true meaning, now is the time for them to say so.

So, Mr. President, I say that the half-truths point made by the Senator from Michigan is strikingly borne out by this important and strong editorial in this great metropolitan newspaper from my own State.

Mr. President, in addition to the obligations which I have pointed out, however, we are told that this treaty is the best possible deterrent to war. We have argued that up one side and down

the other. I say now, as I have said more than once on this floor, that whether it is or is not a deterrent to war is entirely a matter of speculation, and one man's guess on this floor is pretty nearly as good as another man's guess, because every Senator has intelligence and patriotism and zeal and ardor for our country. But no human being can tell whether this pact will act as a deterrent to war, or whether it will result as Viscount Grey pointed out, as has been mentioned in the previous debates in the Senate, with respect to the agreements which had been entered into in Europe prior to the First World War. The Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], now presiding over the Senate, will, I trust, remember the words of Viscount Grey, that every country had been piling up armaments and making preparations for war. The object in each case, the viscount said, had been security, and he said the effect had been precisely the contrary of what was intended and desired.

Mr. President, I wish to submit in conclusion—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. DONNELL. I yield myself one more minute.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I should like to yield back to the Senator 5 minutes he has previously offered to yield to me.

Mr. DONNELL. I thank the Senator. I shall take but a moment or two.

I wish to say, with the utmost power that I possess, that I think our joining in this pact is a departure from the uniform policy of our country, except in the case of the agreement made at Rio de Janeiro, and the Chapultepec agreement made prior thereto. I approach with fear and trembling this departure from a policy of 160 years, or thereabouts, of our national history, violating, as this treaty does, the fundamental principles laid down by the father of his country, George Washington, violating the principles laid down by Thomas Jefferson, which have been quoted in this debate, and violating the principles laid down by John Marshall, later to become, as he did, the Chief Justice of the United States. I approach it with the fear that our country is committing itself so that from now on, and for 20 long years—and some of us may not be here, may not be alive, 20 years from now—no matter what happens, every morning and every evening during that period when we pick up the newspaper and read what is occurring in the world, we must realize that every cloud across the sky, every cloud across the economic sky, every cloud in Europe, every danger, every threat, every difference of opinion between European nations, may develop into a conflict in which we may become involved under the terms of the contract which we are so solemnly entering into.

Mr. President, we have spoken here about the effect on lives. Going back for a moment to the material features, if I were the Secretary of State of this Government—I shall never be so honored, I

know, but if I were—and I were called upon to make any international agreement contemplated by this treaty, I would not know, in a great majority of the cases, whether the international engagement before me for consideration could safely be entered into, on economic matters, or any type of matters, which some one of the 11 nations or all of them might bring up, after the negotiation of the international arrangement, and whether I shall say, "This violates the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty."

We might ourselves come to the conclusion, on further reflection, that we had overlooked something. In order that we may be sure that nobody could make such a contention, and make it properly, before we entered into international engagements, even on purely material subjects, the Secretary of State, in order to be absolutely safe, would have to exhibit to all the members of the North Atlantic Pact a proposed engagement.

Mr. President, it would appear to me that we are going into something that is the wildest type of vagary. Bearing in mind the traditions of our country, bearing in mind the freedom which we now have, bearing in mind the opportunities which America has, bearing in mind the young manhood and womanhood who will be involved, bearing in mind the material aspects, bearing in mind the spiritual values, it is beyond me how any Senate of the United States can vote to tie us up for 20 long years, without any opportunity of withdrawing.

I appreciate that doubtless this treaty will be ratified this afternoon, but I think that if we ratify it today, we will be making the mistake of our lives, and I most earnestly hope that every Senator who is wavering on the problem, if there be any such, will give consideration to the thoughts I have tried to express.

I pray that this flag of ours which is behind the Presiding Officer may not suffer dishonor, may not suffer loss, by reason of our going into this treaty. I hope that if we go into it, it will justify the expectations of its proponents, but I fear that if we go into it we will be encompassing our country with dangers, with a series of obligations which may prove destructive even of the high purposes of our Nation.

Mr. President, I inquire how much more time our side has.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GEORGE in the chair). The Chair is advised that the Senator's side has 19 minutes remaining.

Mr. DONNELL. Very well. To the Senator from Vermont I yield 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. FLANDERS. Mr. President, I am grateful for an opportunity to express very briefly and finally the reasons why I cannot vote for the Atlantic Pact.

The principal value of the pact is that it gives expression to a national interest in the freedom of western Europe which we must recognize and assert. In the treaty this national interest is so tied up with procedures, with rearming other

nations, with prospective huge expenditures, and with many other dubious commitments, that its simple, fundamental purpose is buried and sunk.

Senate Resolution 134 would have been infinitely preferable. Recognizing, however, that the Senate is expected to ratify the treaty, but that a real opportunity for orderly thought and action exists in connection with the rearmament program, it has seemed wise not to press Senate Resolution 134, but to ask for the earnest consideration of this body of Senate Resolution 133 when the subject matter thereof comes before us.

The dangers in this treaty are numerous. They have been pretty well discussed. I shall briefly recapitulate a few of them.

The treaty reemphasizes the mistaken notion as to the location of the real battlefield in this war. That battlefield is in the minds and hearts of men. Russia has no reason to resort to arms unless she is defeated on her present battlefield. It is proper for us to have our guns cleaned and oiled and our powder dry for military warfare, but the chances are that we will not face the enemy on the military battlefield.

Pursuing this false concept as to the deployment of the enemy force, we have in this measure a new outlet through which ultimate billions will flow to the further weakening of our weakening economy and to the further calm content of the watchful gentleman behind the iron curtain. Fiscal chaos and resulting unemployment constitute the troubled waters in which the enemy is most successful in fishing for its moral and mental support.

It is a fallacious and unsupportable argument that this treaty supports, or in spirit has any relation to, the United Nations. It is an alternative action resorted to as a result of failure in the fundamental purpose of the United Nations. This is no subsidiary crisis or situation. This is the thing itself for which the United Nations is formed.

When it comes to the rearmament program, we will have the opportunity either in Senate Resolution 133 or in some useful and well-thought-out modification thereof to bring such armed support as is advisable back into the procedure and structure which was devised for the United Nations. We can strengthen that organization instead of supplanting it. We can thereby strengthen the ideals and the intangibles instead of permeating them with the cancerous infection of unrestrained and sole reliance on arms programs which may not develop toward the trillions.

Mr. President, never in the three sessions of which I have been a Member of this Congress have I seen a measure more regretfully supported by its friends than is the Atlantic Pact. I shall vote unregretfully for rejection.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, I yield the remaining portion of the time of the opponents to the distinguished Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS].

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I have stated for the RECORD many of the reasons why I think reservations to the treaty should be adopted. I do not expect to convert anyone here today to my

views unless he is already converted to my way of thinking regarding the necessity for making it clear what we understand this treaty to mean. Otherwise my remarks will probably be only for the RECORD.

There has been much discussion of the treaty. We have heard much talk on the need for reservations, or concerning the damage they may do if we adopt them. It seems to me we should keep in mind what the treaty means in its underlying philosophy, and see whether or not the reservation we are proposing interferes with that at all.

The distinguished senior Senator from Michigan said that we must not undermine the fundamental philosophy of the pact. I am wondering in what way and in what respect the reservation to article 3 proposed by the distinguished Senators from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY] and Ohio [Mr. TAFT] and by myself would in any way undermine it.

I have investigated the record somewhat with respect to how this treaty was prepared, and I think we should keep that matter in mind as a part of the history which will aid those who at some time will be required to interpret it. We here may understand it clearly. The senior Senator from Michigan and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and other Senators may understand what they think the pact means. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has written into its report what it thinks the treaty means, and has given us an interpretation; but I point out here and now that such interpretations are in no way binding upon the other parties to the pact, either upon Canada or upon the 10 nations in Europe. What they think about it is important, and what they understand it to mean is important, and the only way we can give our meaning, our interpretation, if there is any doubt with respect to it, is to write it in a reservation, or a declaration as the Senator from Nebraska wants to call it. We can do it in no other way. The other countries are not bound by anything we say in our reports or anything we say in the Senate. They are bound only by a reservation or something that is put in the resolution of ratification which will be of equal dignity with the treaty itself. That is why it is necessary to have a reservation put in the treaty so as to clarify its meaning.

How do other countries understand article 3, which we have been talking about? I have before me now a dispatch sent to the New York Times from Paris under date of July 20. It is headed:

Schuman sees United States military aid for France as natural consequence of pact approval.

PARIS, July 20.—Speaking to the French Cabinet today of the expected ratification of the North Atlantic pact by the United States Senate tomorrow, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman said that military aid by the United States to the European signatories seemed a natural consequence of that ratification.

The same contention was made today in a report of the Foreign Affairs Committee to the National Assembly. The report, quoting the United States State Department, said that although the pact and the military assistance plan had been separately conceived, they were based on the same principles and were complementary.

I think we have had that discussed more or less in the Senate before now.

"In recommending the ratification [of the pact], the Government takes account of the need of the material and financial aid of the United States for our national defense," said the report. "In voting ratification, the Assembly will say that this aid is one of the indispensable elements in the efficacy of the North Atlantic Treaty."

Let me repeat those words:

one of the indispensable elements in the efficacy of the North Atlantic Treaty—

I continue reading:

and of the common defense of the western European countries. It will say that this aid should enable France to bear the effort that will be imposed by putting in order her national defense without endangering her economic stability or her financial recovery.

That is what is being said over there now. That has been said by the Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Schuman, and we have concurrence in that view by the Foreign Relations Committee of the French National Assembly. That is what they understand the treaty to mean.

Someone may want to quibble over the word "natural," and may say "well it grows out of it." They are saying in effect that it is a consequence, it is complementary to it, it is a part thereof, and of the whole understanding. Without military aid, they are telling us in that diplomatic language, the pact will be worthless. There must be something there to implement it, and to put them in position to defend themselves.

Another circumstance which will aid us to interpret the pact, as to what it means and what the other countries think it means is this: We should keep in mind that when the pact was signed the foreign ministers of the nations who came here to sign it were on hand the next morning with specifications and with applications for military aid. They did not present them before the pact was signed. Oh, no, they did not present them before it was signed. But immediately upon its being signed, they presented the specifications and applications. Most of them were specifications covering what they need. The natural inference is that that presentation grew out of what they thought they had agreed to in the pact.

Then we have the dispatch which has been called to the attention of the Senate previously, which came from Denmark—I think the dispatch was placed in the RECORD by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] a few days ago—in which it was said that that Government considered the pact and the contract to be entered into as a sort of a bank account on which they could begin to write checks. That is the way they understood it over there. That is the feeling they have. Yet we say here it does not mean that at all; that there is no moral or legal commitment.

Before I close I desire to call attention to one other thing connected with the matter of reservations. It has been indicated here that we are going to do irreparable damage to the treaty if we adopt some reservations. If Senators will look

at the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of yesterday they will find in the speech I delivered then that I pointed out the numerous times reservations have been written into treaties in the past few years; in fact, the majority of treaties have contained reservations. The other signatory countries are not going to hesitate to write reservations into this treaty if they deem it necessary to do so in order to clear up some of the points in the treaty.

The same dispatch from Paris, from which I have just read, contains this statement:

The committee—

Referring to the French Foreign Relations Committee—

proposed that the French ratification act should include a provision that an invitation to any additional state to join the pact must be sanctioned by an act of Parliament.

The committee held that such an invitation would amount to making a new treaty. There has been concern in France lest the pact be extended to include Spain or Germany.

They are going to protect that situation, and they propose a reservation. Do not be surprised if from the parliaments of Europe which have not already acted upon the treaty a number of reservations are submitted. Are we going to turn the treaty down if reservations are attached? I am certain that we will not. They will aid in clarifying the meaning.

It has been said to us, with reference to the matter of taking in additional nations, that none can be taken in without the consent of all members of the pact. But apparently France wants to be sure of that fact, and so that nation is apparently preparing such a reservation, and she might adopt it.

I call attention to this so that we may see clearly that there is no reason on principle why we should not interpret this pact by the necessary and proper reservations. I believe that the one which has been submitted to interpret article 3 is clear. In principle it has been agreed to by the proponents of the treaty. They have used the very same argument—that we are not bound morally or legally to furnish arms or armaments—as a reason why we ought to ratify the pact. That has been in all their arguments. Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out in his letter to Senator HALE that when that happens, and the proponents rely on such reasons, there can be no good reason for not writing those reasons into a reservation. If it be true that the other nations understand it as we do, why on earth should they object?

Senators will remember that when I asked the junior Senator from New York [Mr. DULLES] whether the principles contained in the reservation which I read to him represented his understanding of what the pact meant he said, "Yes." That was the reservation which I proposed to article 3. It has been reworded, but it is substantially the same as what I read to him at that time. He agreed that it represented the correct interpretation of the pact. At least, the pact did not include the things which I placed in the reservation, which should be excluded.

Mr. President, I intend to speak later during the day when reservations may be offered, but I do not intend to say anything more about the reservation which I have submitted to article 3. However, I invite the attention of Senators to what I said last night, after some intense preparation on the subject. I think it outlines a new approach. It points out to us why article 5 should be looked into with greater care than has been exercised by Senators who have been debating this question.

To me article 5 is the heart of the pact. I have said—and I want Senators to think about this—that if we adopt the pact without certain reservations, either as I have proposed them, or in substance, we are cutting the heart out of the Constitution. I think it goes to one of the great fundamental principles. I shall discuss that question later this afternoon.

Mr. President, I feel that in the interest of good will and understanding with our fellow members in the pact, we should clarify any indefinite, vague language, so that there will be no misunderstandings in the future. This will aid good will. It will aid in the direction of peace. If we adopt a reservation of this kind, it will not prevent us from doing any of the things we want to do, but it will say in unmistakable language that we are under no legal or moral obligation to do those things by reason of the treaty.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, how much time have we left?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three minutes.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, yesterday, as appears on page 9800 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, I made the following statement:

I was very greatly interested, as was the Senator from New Hampshire, in the very beautiful and eloquent address delivered by the distinguished Senator from North Carolina. I notice his emphasis in the concluding portion, and at other places in his address, upon the idea of one God. I should like to ask him a question, and that is whether or not he knows if the word "God," or any synonym of Deity, was mentioned from the beginning to the end of the solemn ceremony of the signing of this treaty for 12 nations by 24 men, except the one concluding sentence or two in the remarks of the representative of the Netherlands, which reads:

"And so with the humble prayer for God's merciful blessing, I declare the Netherlands Government's readiness to sign this treaty for peace."

My attention has been very kindly called by the junior Senator from North Carolina [Mr. GRAHAM] to the fact that, in addition to the sentence quoted by me from the remarks of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, there appears in the remarks of Carlo Sforza, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, a sentence reading as follows:

We must pray to God that this pact will prove to be like the English Magna Carta: on one side intangible, on the other side a continuous creation.

I have also noted that, in addition to the sentence quoted by me from the remarks of the Minister for Foreign

Affairs of the Netherlands, the Minister also said:

We shall sign with a clear conscience in the face of God.

I call attention also to the fact that in the remarks of Joseph Bech, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Luxemburg, on that occasion appears this paragraph:

Nothing proves better this ineluctable solidarity of the destinies of our countries than the fact that the United States, breaking with a tradition two centuries old, is concluding a military alliance in peacetime. That is an event of extraordinary historical significance for the United States and of the utmost importance for Europe.

Mr. President, how much more time have I?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

The Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] has at his disposal the time from now until 2 o'clock.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, we are approaching the final consideration of the treaty called the North Atlantic Pact. It is a treaty of sovereign nations, to preserve their security and independence, not by war, but by means which they believe will prevent war.

I am gratified that in this country treaties cannot be ratified except with Senate approval. In the olden days the treaty-making function was purely one of royalty, of monarchs, sovereigns who handed out in the form of treaties their commitments, without reference to the authority of the people themselves. It is specified in the treaty that this Government and other signers of the treaty shall follow democratic processes—not always in the same way, but that they will follow the constitutional requirements of their respective countries.

Mr. President, this treaty has been attacked on many grounds, one of which is that it is violative of our obligations under the United Nations Charter. I challenge any Senator to find in this treaty anything that is hostile to the provisions of the United Nations Charter. On the other hand, I insist that in a number of its provisions it sincerely and earnestly proclaims its allegiance to the United Nations Charter, and specifies that it is not in conflict therewith.

Let me say to the Senate that this treaty is primarily based upon what is contained in article 51 of the United Nations Charter, that nothing in the United Nations Charter shall impair the inherent right of nations to provide for individual or collective self-defense. In other words, the United Nations Charter recognizes that there is an area into which it cannot obtrude itself, and that is the inherent right—not a right secured from the United Nations, not a right granted by any other governmental power, but an inherent right—to individual or collective self-defense.

We all know that self-defense is one of the most vital and inherent principles in our private life as well as in our governmental relations and obligations. The right of a man to defend his home or his person against violence and attack is absolutely fundamental. It is the purpose of this treaty to permit free

nations to preserve their freedom against invasion and aggression by those who would seek to overthrow their freedoms and substitute slavery and chains.

All of us are aware of the fact that since World War I our American foreign relations have expanded until now they touch and relate to many nations in remote and distant parts of the world. This treaty is a significant contribution to that field. It proclaims our own adherence to the rights of free peoples to defend themselves, and it ought to, and I believe it will, carry to the other nations of the world assurance of our position on all these fundamental questions.

Mr. President, I am sorry the Senator from Missouri has just left the Chamber. I hope he will be called back. I shall discuss another matter for the present.

Most of the heat of the attack on the treaty is based upon complaints about article 3. The Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] has quite amply discussed that particular article of the treaty, but I wish to advert to it briefly at this time.

What does article 3 provide? Let us read it. I hope the Senator from Ohio will return to the Chamber a little later, because I shall advert to some of his views.

Article 3 provides:

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Mr. President, what is wrong with that article? If we are to preserve the integrity of these nations, do we not desire that they will develop their individual and collective power to resist attack? Do we wish to weaken them? Do we wish to discourage them? Or do we wish to do what we think is possible and desirable from the standpoint of giving them resistance and strength to maintain their democracy and to maintain their freedom?

But it is said that under article 3 we are obligated to furnish arms. Mr. President, we are not specifically obligated to furnish anything. There is nothing in the treaty that says we shall give them tanks or bombs or arms. There is an obligation upon the United States—and I do not seek to avoid it—to consider what, in the view of our honest judgment and our sincerity, it would be desirable for us to do to bring about fulfillment of the objectives stated in article 3. In other words, after the treaty has been ratified, if the other nations request arms and point out their reasons and their situation and their inability to provide themselves with arms, then it would be for the people of the United States, through the Congress, to determine whether it was desirable or suitable, under article 3, to give or to furnish them arms.

Senators feel sensitive about the matter of providing arms. Will not the Congress have to be the one to decide whether to provide them? Will not Senators who now are in the Senate Chamber be here then? Are Senators afraid to trust future Congresses? Do they wish to tie the hands of future

Congresses and make a pronouncement that would embarrass a future Congress if it were to consider the matter of giving or withholding arms? I believe the Congress can be trusted. The Congress is being trusted now in connection with this treaty. Cannot we trust future Congresses in regard to the granting of arms? I shall refer to that matter a little later.

I note that the Senator from Missouri [Mr. DONNELL] has returned to the Chamber. Mr. President, I remember, if I am not in error, that when Senate Resolution 239 was before the Senate, the eminent Senator from Missouri supported it. Did he mean what he said when he then said, in language almost identical, I think, to the language of the present treaty, that the Congress approved—

(3) Association of the United States, by constitutional process,

Which is what we are doing in connection with this treaty—

with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

If that doctrine was good a year ago, why is not it good now?

That resolution also provided:

(4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

Why should the Senator from Missouri have changed his views on this subject? Why has he reconsidered his judgment? Why is not the doctrine which was good a year ago, good now?

The distinguished Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT], with a great deal of unctious declared that under article 3 there is an obligation. Of course there is an obligation. I have never said there was not an obligation. There is no detailed obligation to furnish any particular thing, but there is an obligation for the United States to give honest, forthright, and sincere consideration to what may be needed on the part of other governments which cannot themselves supply what they need to contribute to the maintenance of their power of self-defense and the accomplishment of the purpose of this treaty.

Senators are afraid of giving arms to other nations. Did they not vote for arms for Greece? Although I have not consulted the record, yet I am sure I am correct when I say that both the Senator from Missouri [Mr. DONNELL] and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] voted for arms for Greece. I do not know what position the Senator from Utah took in that connection. Did not those Senators vote to give arms to Greece, to enable Greece to protect her independence and to drive out those who were coming there from other countries and interfering with her internal affairs? Mr. President, the Senate voted for arms for Greece, and Congress undertook to supply those arms to maintain her integrity and her independence.

What is the purpose of this treaty? Its purpose is to give arms wherever they

may be necessary to preserve the independence and security of the countries involved. Where can we draw any hostile parallel between these situations?

The other day the Senator from Ohio said he voted to provide Greece and Turkey with arms, and that now he wishes to vote to provide more arms for China. We gave China approximately \$2,000,000,000 for arms and ammunition. I have always been a friend of China. I regret the disasters which have befallen China and her nationalist government. The Senator from Ohio says that war is now going on in China; yet he is in favor of sending arms to China, thereby taking part in a domestic, civil war. I myself am not committed to that course; I am open to further considerations in regard to supplying arms, if the Chinese need them. But if it is all right to send arms to China in order to protect her independence and to preserve her security, why is it wrong to send arms, if need be, under a treaty with the 12 signatory powers? The whole point of the attack made by the Senator from Ohio relates to the subject of arms. The Congress will be the only authority that can grant arms. That question will be considered when the occasion arises. Senators will express themselves, Senators may vote against it. Senators may offer reservations. But that is a question the Congress is capable of deciding when and if it arises. We should not undertake now, without further information, to foreclose the action of the Congress on that subject when it becomes pertinent.

The Senator from Ohio says he favors an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Europe. He wants to draw a line somewhere and declare that the Monroe Doctrine applies to Europe. The Monroe Doctrine has served magnificently in the cause of peace and in the preservation of the independence and security of the nations to the south of us, in Central and South America. Its principles and objectives I entirely approve. But let us see what the course recommended by the Senator from Ohio would be. The Senator is opposed to the North Atlantic Treaty. He would adopt a policy under which the United States would assume sole responsibility for the defense of Europe. We would have no treaty obligations with any European power to stand by our side. It would be a matter of our sole responsibility. We would have the help only of those nations or peoples that voluntarily might come to our rescue or aid. It would be a matter of our sole responsibility. Where would we get bases, if we acted alone, if we should march into Europe and say to these other nations, "You need not bother about this; it is our responsibility; the United States is going to defend Europe, on its own, unilaterally, without your cooperation, unless you see fit to stand by our side?" Where would we get bases in Europe? Where would we get bases in Iceland and in Greenland and in Denmark, if there is no obligation on the part of the nations concerned to aid us or to supply us?

Mr. President, the distinguished and able Senator from Ohio, for whom we all have a high regard, is opposed to sending

arms to the nations who are signatories to the treaty, to preserve their independence, their integrity, and their security. But he is in favor of sending American boys with arms in their hands to Europe to establish a European Monroe Doctrine. The Senator from Ohio says he is in favor of defending Norway and Denmark. He then says that their defense—and I quote him—"is probably impossible." Yet under his theory of the Monroe Doctrine we would be required to undertake the defense of Norway and Denmark. If we are to defend them, will it not be much more desirable that they stand by our side, furnish us bases, and render such assistance and cooperation as are within their power?

The Senator from Ohio says, "Take Italy for example." He says, "I see no way in which we can defend Italy." If there is no way to defend Italy, how are we going to defend it under the Monroe Doctrine? Would it not be of some help in the defense of Italy to have Italy's assistance? Would it not be well for Italy to cooperate with us as to strategic locations and bases? No, Mr. President, from my point of view, it is an illogical position the Senator from Ohio takes.

Furthermore, the assumption by the United States alone of the defense of Europe under the Monroe Doctrine would fall right into the line of Russian propaganda. Russia has been charging that under ECA and under the North Atlantic Pact the United States, which she claims is a great imperial power, will use the advantages we get from those organizations to take over responsibility for all these countries in Europe, subordinating them to our will, and forming a great alliance with the United States at its head. Would not our action in undertaking solely the defense of Europe fit the charges of imperialism made against us by the Russians—in this case taking over all 12 countries, they would say, without their help and without their request?

What about the satellite countries? We do not need to be told they will be armed by Russia, if they are not already armed by her, and that they will fight at the side of Russia whenever she makes war. At the present time, without a treaty, and without anything except the command of the dictator, they are already in an alliance to fight for and to protect and defend Russia. If it is all right for Russia to have such an arrangement, why is not the North Atlantic Pact justifiable when we proclaim within the treaty its peaceful purposes and its solely defensive purposes? We are not urging war.

But it is said, "Oh, it is a military alliance." Mr. President, it is an alliance in behalf of peace. When we speak of a military alliance we think of the classical examples of times that have passed, in which sovereigns or nations made treaties or agreements whereby they stood with each other, both offensively and defensively. The language of our first President, George Washington, in warning against entangling alliances, was inspired by the fact that in Europe at that very moment there were such alliances and treaty obligations among

the European powers, looking to war and not to peace. It was a perfectly natural and wise admonition he gave his countrymen to abstain from alliances of that kind. But I contend this treaty has none of the qualities of the old-fashioned military alliances, most of which were for conquest. They were to build up the ambitions of the sovereigns of the respective countries. Members of the alliance were to stand together defensively and offensively.

It will be remembered that in World War I Italy had a treaty with the Central Powers, a treaty to go to war. The Central Powers complained bitterly because Italy did not respond when they asked her to join their side in the war. That is the kind of military alliance I think about. But I do not see that that in anywise approaches the principles or the obligations of the pending treaty.

What do we face in the pending issue? We all know that the Communist influences and the totalitarian powers have proclaimed their purpose, which is perfectly apparent, to conquer the world by their ideology. They do not say so, of course, but back of that is their armed might—bayonets, airplanes, and all the other instrumentalities of terrific war. They propose to conquer the world. They wish to impose upon the world their ideas of government and their ideas of economics.

What does the destruction of democracy mean? How dreadful it is to contemplate the destruction of democracy in every country where it at present exists. The 12 countries that are associated together in this pact know that whenever and wherever the Russians or other totalitarian masters are able to do so they will crush democracy and place the citizens of those countries in chains and slavery. That means ultimately the United States. After they shall have picked off, one by one, the weaker nations, and have fortified their strength and increased the vast armies which they already possess, when they get more jet planes which fly so rapidly that they can scarcely be seen, when they build up their military strength sufficiently, they will say, with the Red army standing out in the wings, ready to rush to the scene when necessary, as they did in Czechoslovakia and in other countries, "Come over to this side."

If we permit the blocking off of nation after nation we may ultimately stand alone, seeking to preserve our democracy, our integrity as a nation, and our freedom. No, Mr. President, we cannot do that. The Russians look across those little countries and see the United States; they look past the shadows, and look at the United States and assail it with propaganda. What nation is more bitterly and constantly assailed over the air and in the press than is the United States? Every act of the United States for the nations of the world is construed to be imperialistic in nature. That is apparent to all who read or listen. We cannot afford to deny the nations of Europe which are signatories to this pact our cooperation and assistance and, if need be, our arms. Under article 5, if

they are attacked by an armed force, we must go to their rescue and help to preserve their lives. The treaty gives substance, vitality, and encouragement to democracies. The doctrine of totalitarianism is hostile to and determined upon our destruction whenever that can be accomplished.

Mr. President, this is a contest between tyranny and freedom. It is a contest between slavery and democracy. Where do we want to stand on the question? Where shall we stand? We should stand on the side of freedom and democracy against the evil powers which seek to overthrow us.

The United States has had a career that will embellish the pages of history so long as men meditate upon the past. In a little nation of 3,000,000 souls, scattered along the Atlantic coast, our courageous forebears envisaged the accomplishment of liberty, freedom, and constitutional processes. They were successful in that great enterprise, and for 150 years we have grown in strength, resources, and in the admiration of the peoples of the world. We have attracted the adoration of men who love freedom, who look to the great symbol of our national strength with veneration, with love, and, sometimes, with tears.

The United States has been an outstanding champion of democracy and freedom everywhere on this revolving globe. We cannot surrender our position on that question, we cannot give it up; we must meet the responsibilities which face us. Those responsibilities are not confined by our borders. As a great Nation, as a great power, we have responsibilities beyond the surveyor's chain. We have responsibilities to other countries and peoples. We cannot wrap around ourselves the cloak of the publican and pass by on the other side of the street. We cannot do that. We must perform our obligations and our responsibilities.

When the United States was founded and finally established its freedom and independence, the impact within a few years reached across the Atlantic and profoundly affected the peoples of Europe, and the revolutionary movements which followed over the years were inspired by the example of the United States.

That same spirit leaped across the Atlantic Ocean again, and in Central and South America the people were moved to fight, and many of them shed their blood, in movements of freedom and independence. The same spirit swept across the western world. Bolivar, the great patriot of South America, followed the example of George Washington and other patriots who were associated with him, and independence was achieved.

In 1823 President Monroe proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine and asserted that no European or other power should invade the Western Hemisphere with a hostile purpose or with the purpose of establishing any part of their system. That was a world-moving declaration, which has been honored and venerated for 126 years. That doctrine has grown

in strength until it has become a part of the international law of the world. It was not set forth in a statute, but other nations respected it. Great Britain had to release her hold in Venezuela. The Holy Alliance had to give up its plans to reconquer Central and South America under the tyrannical masters it had known. The German Fleet vanished from Venezuela when the United States spoke with a voice of certainty and a voice of vigor.

Mr. President, shall we refuse to remain the champion of democracy and the rights of free peoples to survive without conquest and without being compelled to surrender their liberties? Shall we refuse to assist in preserving democracy and independence in Europe? Shall we decline to help weak and struggling nations to resist aggressors who have only swords in their hands and chains for their victims?

History records that when the Declaration of Independence was being considered in the Continental Congress, Benjamin Franklin said to Jefferson, John Hancock, and others:

We must all hang together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately.

In the world-wide fight of communism against democracy, the democracies must all hang together, or there is danger—I do not concede we shall be defeated—but there is danger to us all unless we hang together.

This treaty undertakes to tie the democratic free peoples of the world into an agreement whereby any invasion of their independence or their democracy or their integrity shall meet the determined resistance of the signatories to the treaty who have pledged their strengths, their resources, and their arms to the preservation of freedom, independence, and democracy.

Mr. President, this treaty has been considered for a long period of time, most laboriously and studiously, by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. That is a bipartisan committee. Both Democrats and Republicans are members of it. Never has there been any idea of partisanship suggested in the consideration by the committee, in the hearings, or in the deliberations on the treaty. In a treaty we cannot specify every detail that may occur in the future. To do so would tie the hands of the Congress. That would be seeking to establish here a dictatorship, as it were, over future Congresses. The obligations are plainly set forth in the treaty, and to the Congress itself must be remitted the matter of whatever we furnish under article 3 or under other articles of the treaty. I am willing to trust the Congress. Congress is where the Constitution puts the responsibility, and that is where we shall put it. I very much hope that the treaty will be ratified without hampering and crippling reservations.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's time has expired. The hour of 2 o'clock having arrived, the Committee of the Whole will rise and report the treaty to the Senate without amendment. The Secretary will report the treaty by title.

The CHIEF CLERK. Executive L, Eighty-first Congress, first session.

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on April 4, 1949.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The treaty is now before the Senate and is open to amendment. If there be no amendment to be offered, the resolution of ratification will be reported to the Senate by the clerk, and it will be open to amendment.

The Chief Clerk read as follows:

Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of Executive L, Eighty-first Congress, first session, the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949.

The VICE PRESIDENT. As announced the other day by the Chair, reservations to the resolution of ratification may be offered and debated, 10 minutes for and 10 minutes against, and then, when the hour of 5 o'clock arrives, voted on in the order of their presentation to the Senate.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. LUCAS. Am I correct in my understanding that only six reservations or amendments have been offered to the treaty?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk advises the Chair that that is true.

Mr. LUCAS. So, under the unanimous consent agreement entered into a few days ago, if no more than six reservations are offered, with 20 minutes' debate allowed on each reservation, 120 minutes or 2 hours, will be consumed.

The VICE PRESIDENT. That seems to be correct. Of course, all the reservations which have been printed may not be offered. Moreover, further reservations may be offered which have not been printed.

Mr. LUCAS. I understand that. What I am trying to do is to speculate a little on what may happen in the event we run out of reservations and amendments before 5 o'clock. Therefore I am going to offer a unanimous consent agreement to cover that sort of a contingency.

I ask unanimous consent that if the time allotted to debate upon reservations and amendments shall expire before 5 o'clock, whatever time remains shall be equally divided between the proponents and opponents of the treaty itself, the time to be controlled by the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] and the Senator from Missouri [Mr. DONNELL].

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the request? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I send to the desk a declaration in behalf of myself, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT], and the Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS]. I ask that the clerk read it as it has been modified.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The proposed reservation as modified will be read.

The CHIEF CLERK. It is proposed to insert the following at the end of the resolution of ratification:

The United States of America ratifies this treaty with the understanding that article 3 commits none of the parties thereto, morally or legally, to furnish or supply arms, armaments, military, naval or air equipment or

military, naval, or air supplies, including atomic bombs and information relating to such bombs, to any other party or parties to this treaty.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, the declaration as I had originally prepared it is now modified to include atomic bombs and information relating to such bombs, to be inserted in line 5, after the word "supplies", which meets the suggestion of the distinguished Senator from Missouri relative to what might be included in arms, armaments, and weapons.

Mr. President, I now offer the amendment to the resolution of ratification, and I wish to emphasize that this declaration applies solely to article 3. Especially do I want to emphasize that after the observations made by the distinguished senior Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG].

Once again, in order to make it crystal clear, the treaty is divided into two parts, a part for preparedness against war, and a part which becomes operative after an attack.

Article 3 is in the preparedness category. Article 5 is in the part which becomes operative after an attack.

Article 9 creates a council representing all the parties to the treaty. The council is to consider plans for mutual aid in preparedness against attack, as outlined in article 3. The council is also to consider and recommend plans for carrying out article 5. But this declaration does not touch article 9 or article 5. It is a whole truth. It does exactly what I think the Members of the Senate should have an opportunity to do.

Is there any legal obligation under article 3 to provide arms prior to an attack? That is what the Senate should declare itself upon, that is the important issue here, that is where the confusion is, not only on the part of those who have made speeches on the Senate floor, in their comments on that particular issue, but certainly it is true of the leaders of the countries across the water which are signatories to the pact. As I have said, this declaration does not touch article 9 or article 5. It applies to the provisions of article 3, which provides for mutual aid prior to an attack.

Should a war start, the procedures defined in article 5 begin, but prior to an attack the council is directed to develop plans for defense in connection with article 5.

These distinctions are pointed out because there has been in the minds of Senators some confusion that the article applies both before and after an attack. The argument has been made that my declaration would have the Senate declare there is not a moral or legal obligation to provide arms at any time, so I want to clarify it, because the article does do exactly what I think the Members of the Senate should have an opportunity to do, namely, to decide now, before it is too late, what we mean in article 3, and the one thing we do not mean is that there is a moral or legal obligation connected with the provision of article 3. That is exactly what has been said. It was restated by the distinguished Senator from Michigan, it has been reemphasized by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations,

so why should we not include in a declaration attached to the resolution what we mean? It is in complete accord with the sentiments which have been expressed on the floor of the Senate.

Attempts have been made to make it appear that adoption of the declaration would nullify the treaty. That is not true. The sole intention of the declaration is to let the other parties to the treaty know that the United States understands that article 3 does not commit any of the parties to the furnishing of arms and armaments, military, naval, and air equipment, or supplies.

I wish to state that the confusion to which I have referred exists not only on the floor of the Senate, it is certainly in the minds of the leaders of the signatory powers. I have here the issue of the New York Times which has just come out:

PARIS, July 20.—Speaking to the French Cabinet today of the expected ratification of the North Atlantic Pact by the United States Senate tomorrow, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman said that military aid by the United States to the European signatories seemed a "natural consequence" of that ratification.

The same contention was made today in a report of the Foreign Affairs Committee to the National Assembly. The report, quoting the United States State Department, said that, although the pact and the military assistance plan had been separately conceived, they were based on the same principles and were complementary.

"In recommending ratification [of the pact], the Government takes account of the need of the material and financial aid of the United States for our national defense," said the report. "In voting ratification, the assembly will say that this aid is one of the indispensable elements in the efficacy of the North Atlantic Treaty and of the common defense of the western European countries. It will say that this aid should enable France to bear the effort that will be imposed by putting in order her national defense without endangering her economic stability or her financial recovery."

In the face of such a statement, in view of such an understanding, how can we as Members of the Senate ratify the treaty this afternoon without a declaration being contained in it which says unequivocally that there is no moral or legal obligation under article 3 to provide arms? I ask how can the Senate do so? Senators who expect to vote for it and Senators who are opposed to it ought to make crystal clear in a frank and truthful way what we mean by the treaty. We should mean what we say.

Attempts have been made to make it appear that adoption of the declaration will nullify the treaty. It is absolute effrontery to say such a thing. Earlier today I placed in the RECORD the number of treaties which have been ratified containing declarations in their resolutions of ratification. Scores of such treaties have been ratified since 1939. Some of the reservations have been proposed by France. By the way, only five of the countries, I believe, parties to the treaty have ratified the treaty. I am not certain of the number, but I believe I am correct in saying the number is five.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I yield.

Mr. WATKINS. I call the Senator's attention to the dispatch from which the

Senator has just read, from Paris, which says that even the Foreign Relations Committee of the French Assembly have proposed a reservation.

Mr. WHERRY. Yes, that committee proposes a reservation which provides that the Parliament of France, by whatever vote is required, must vote to determine whether or not a new member may be taken in under the pact. I do not want to go further into that phase of the subject than to say that every Member of the United States Senate knows that if the declaration is written into the resolution of ratification it will not make one iota of difference to a ratifying country unless a commitment has been made prior to the time. And if a commitment has been made that country ought to be placed on notice now that there is no such moral or legal obligation. If no such commitment has been made, then in the declaration we do exactly what the distinguished ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee and the chairman of the committee say they mean relative to article 3.

Mr. President, again I emphasize that my declaration applies only during the preparedness period. Should an armed attack occur against any or all the parties, the provisions of article 5 would become operative and the United States would be obligated to furnish aid, including military force, to resist the attack. I agree with that provision.

It is my opinion that article 5 imposes upon all the parties an obligation to act according to their constitutional or legal processes to help resist and defeat the aggressor. I agree with that provision.

With article 5 I am in complete accord. It is a multilateral adoption of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States pledges in article 5 to help any or all parties that may be attacked by an aggressor. At the same time the other signatories to the treaty pledge that they will help the United States if an aggressor attacks the United States.

As I said earlier today, the United States has been engaged in two world wars, and the United States has had no part in starting them. It is plain to nearly everyone that if another war between major nations breaks out, the United States will be eventually drawn into it. It is therefore wise for the United States to take a serious interest in what goes on abroad and pull an oar for security and peace. In doing so the United States will assume its responsibility for keeping the peace.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Nebraska has expired.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of my statement may be printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the remainder of the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Perhaps the notice to the world that the United States will support any or all of the North Atlantic Treaty nations if they are attacked by an aggressor, will prevent another war. At any rate, I am in favor of trying it.

It has been suggested that the declaration I propose is not complete—that it does not go far enough and tells only two-thirds of

the story. With that argument I disagree. All the parties to this Treaty know what my declaration means. They know that it applies only to the preparedness program and has nothing to do with article 5.

They also are familiar with the legislative procedures of the United States.

The declaration does not:

Prevent or affect in any way action by the United States or any of the parties in providing arms and armament to any other party to the treaty. This can all go on with the declaration adopted.

The declaration does not handicap or restrict in any way the process of the Council set up in article 9 to submit arms programs to the United States.

The declaration does make plain that there is no moral or legal obligation to approve the recommendations insofar as they apply during the preparedness period, which is covered by article 3.

It is absolutely necessary to adopt this declaration if the treaty is to get off to a wholesome start, with everybody knowing exactly where the United States stands.

It becomes especially important that the declaration be adopted in order to serve notice that there is no moral or legal obligation to furnish other parties to the treaty the atomic bomb, or any other atomic weapons that may be in existence or that may be developed—or any of the ingredients and know-how for the manufacture of atomic bombs.

You Senators know that a treaty takes precedence over a domestic law. When this treaty is ratified all laws to the contrary are nullified. This means that the phrase in article 3—mutual aid—might be construed as including the atomic bomb.

With the adoption of my declaration the door will be locked tightly against such a dreadful contingency. I am unwilling to give to the President of the United States—or any President during the next 20 years—the power to construe this treaty as permitting disclosure of atomic-bomb secrets, or even to furnish bombs to other parties to the treaty.

How long do you think the atomic secrets—our great anchor of safety in this chaotic world—would last, if the United States starts passing around the bombs and secrets among the governments parties to this treaty? The secrets would be out in no time.

If the Senate does not adopt my declaration it will be running the risk of having some administration interpret the rejection as a green light to pass the atom bombs around among our friends abroad.

Should a war break out it is just as possible that the United States would be the first nation attacked as it is that a European nation would be attacked. You know it doesn't take long to fly a plane over the ocean these days.

There is no substance to the argument that the Senate should wait for some arms-implementing program before the passing upon whether the bomb secrets shall be broadcast among parties to this treaty.

Whatever is done on arms after this treaty is adopted will have to be done according to the provisions of the treaty. The time to settle this question is now.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE].

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair will say that 10 minutes is all the time that can be allotted to any Senator to speak on reservations. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. GEORGE. Mr. President, the reservation reads as follows:

The United States of America ratifies this treaty with the understanding that article 3 commits none of the parties thereto, morally

or legally, to furnish or supply arms, armaments, military, naval or air equipment or military, naval, or air supplies, including bombs and information relating to such bombs, to any other party or parties to this treaty.

It would be difficult, Mr. President, to devise a reservation which would more completely negate the treaty. The third article in the treaty itself pledges this Nation to mutual aid and assistance for the specific purposes of resisting armed aggression or attack. It is quite true that hereafter, if the treaty is ratified, the Congress might, even in the face of the reservation, furnish or supply arms, armaments, military, naval, or air equipment or military, naval, or air supplies to any other party or parties to this treaty. That being true, why in the beginning affront the world or the other members to this pact by the declaration that we are under no moral or legal obligation to do it?

As I read the treaty, Mr. President, it seems to me to be very simple. Taking the treaty as a whole and giving effect to all its parts, especially article 3, article 5, article 9, and article 11, it seems to me that there does arise an obligation of mutual aid and assistance. What that aid is to be, when it is to be extended, how much aid is to be given, upon what terms or conditions the aid is to be extended, are all matters reserved to the Congress. That is necessarily so. In the express language of the treaty it is so. But to say that there is no legal or moral obligation arising under the treaty to contribute mutual aid and assistance to build up, first, the strength of the individual state making the contribution, and, second, the area defined in the treaty as the whole North Atlantic area, is to engage certainly in an idle thing. If we mean anything by the treaty we are obliged to concede or to declare—and I prefer to put it in the affirmative—that the treaty taken as a whole, giving effect to all its parts, clearly raises the obligation of mutual aid and assistance to provide defense to the Atlantic area as defined in the treaty, against armed attack, against armed aggression. Otherwise it means nothing. It is proposed to say that while we may do this, we wish it definitely understood that we are disclosing to all the other parties to the agreement our interpretation and our understanding of it in advance, namely, that we will furnish nothing of a military character—that is to say, we are not obligated to do so. Whether we may do so is a matter for our own will, for our own discretion.

Mr. President, a mutual-aid treaty specifically aimed to safeguard the members of the treaty against armed attack would itself be morally repudiated, it seems to me, if we were to say that there is no obligation resting upon us, either moral or legal. I do not know precisely what is meant by "moral obligation" under this pact. The moral obligation is to live up to our agreement. The moral obligation is to carry out faithfully our undertaking. There may be, in a broad general sense, a moral obligation resting upon all of us, individuals as well as

States. But when we speak of treaties and when we deal with treaties, the moral obligation arises from our undertaking, our commitment. If this treaty is to be effective, if it is to mean anything, it must be conceded that it is a treaty for mutual assistance with respect to armed invasion or attack. If it is such a treaty, undertaking, or commitment, then the moral obligation is as clear as the noon-day sun. We are playing on words when we say that we make it crystal-clear that we are not bound to do these things, but that we may hereafter do them when an emergency arises.

Could our act be accepted at full face value by the other signatories to the pact if they should hereafter ratify the treaty with this reservation looking straight into the faces of the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty? The conclusion is inescapable. They could not accept the pact, as read in all its parts, as I have said, as clearly a commitment of mutual aid and assistance.

I grant—and I am pleased to do so—that with respect to what we shall do, when we shall do it, in what quantities we shall make any aid available, or upon what terms or conditions we may extend aid, the matter rests within the bosom of the present Congress or future Congresses. It is true that the treaty does not raise an express obligation or commitment to furnish arms or military aid, but it does not exclude those things. That question is left to the Congress. But if we undertake by reservations to exclude, we may in the next reservation say that we will furnish no money. We may in the next reservation say that we have no legal or moral commitment to furnish food. We may in the next reservation say that we have no legal or moral obligation to furnish something else which these nations, if they are to rely upon our act in approving this treaty for mutual aid and assistance, would certainly have the right to call upon us to furnish.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's time has expired.

The Chair understands, according to his previous announcement, that the various reservations as offered will remain in suspense until the hour of 5 o'clock, at which time they will be voted upon in the order in which they were presented.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I send to the desk a reservation proposed by me. As it is printed, it contains two paragraphs. I intend to present each of those paragraphs as a separate reservation.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The reservation will be stated for the information of the Senate.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, is the Senator from Utah going to present two separate reservations?

Mr. WATKINS. I intend to present two separate reservations.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Only one at a time can be presented.

Mr. WATKINS. I intend to present them one at a time.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The first reservation offered by the Senator from Utah will be stated.

The CHIEF CLERK. At the end of the resolution of ratification it is proposed to insert the following:

The United States understands and construes article V of the treaty as follows:

That the United States assumes no obligation to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area or to assist any other party or parties in said area, by armed force, or to employ the military, air, or naval forces of the United States under article V or any article of the treaty, for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military, air, or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Utah has 10 minutes.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I should like to present a unanimous-consent request. I intend to present the other reservation immediately following this one, and I should like to have the 10 minutes for that reservation added to the 10 minutes I now have.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Utah asks unanimous consent that the 10 minutes to which he would be entitled separately on each of these reservations be consolidated so that he may have 20 minutes on the reservation now presented, which would entitle the opponents to 10 minutes on each of the reservations. Is there objection?

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, does that consolidate the time?

The VICE PRESIDENT. It would consolidate the time of the Senator from Utah, but not the time of the opponents. The Senator from Utah asks that he be permitted to use the 20 minutes to which he would be entitled, 10 minutes on each reservation, at this time. That does not affect the right of the Senator from Texas to use 10 minutes on each of the reservations.

Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Utah? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I have already stated at some length my views with respect to these reservations, the meaning of the treaty, and the underlying philosophy which runs through the treaty, as compared with the historical position of this country with respect to the power of Congress to declare war and the right of the country to have that interpretation maintained. Very few Senators heard my earlier remarks. I prepared them with some care. I wish now to state my argument, so that Senators will have an opportunity to know what is being presented, because in my humble opinion this is an issue of far greater importance than the question which has been raised with respect to article 3.

I presented the argument last night with the intention of placing it before Members of the Senate, for the RECORD, at least, because very few Senators heard my remarks. I think the question is fundamental, and I believe, in ratifying this treaty, we are making a grave departure from the policy of the United States which has made it great during the past 150 years. We have gone a long

distance down the international road. We have made commitment after commitment in our loans, including the Greek-Turkish loan, the ERP program, and the various other things we have done to help Europe. We joined the United Nations.

Now we come to this step, because all the others put together are not doing the job. So now we think it is necessary to enter into this kind of an alliance. Underlying it is a philosophy which, if fulfilled, in my opinion amends the Constitution and takes the very heart out of it.

The principles involved in this matter were more or less discussed in the League of Nations debate in the Senate. Yesterday I referred to a letter written by Chief Justice Hughes to Senator Hale, of Maine. Chief Justice Hughes was in favor of the adoption of reservations to the League of Nations Covenant. Senator Hale was also, and he wanted some advice. I thought the advice he received was good advice.

Fundamentally the issues raised in the League of Nations debate by the famous article 10 with its guaranty to "preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity" of all the members of the League are the same as those raised by article V of the Atlantic Pact, which in effect guarantees in different language, by a new approach, the territory and security of the pact nations in the North Atlantic area.

The times, the circumstances, the nations, and the area involved are different, but the underlying principles are the same.

The essential question, stripped of miscellaneous and extraneous matters, raised, so far as the United States is concerned, is:

Can this country under its Constitution give a firm, binding commitment without any escape clauses, that it will surely, certainly, and promptly come to the assistance, with its armed forces if necessary, of any one or more of the other parties to the treaty in the event they are subjected to an armed attack?

To raise the question squarely it should be understood that an "all-out armed attack" should be the "armed attack" under consideration.

Episodes, incidents, attacks short of an all-out war that have in the past, and can be in the future, readily settled by diplomatic methods are not pertinent to this issue and should not be considered in our debate.

Stated another way, the question is:

Can the President and the Senate by the treaty-making power granted these two divisions of Government by the Constitution, enter into an agreement with foreign powers which will firmly commit this country to go to war either by decision of the President acting under the treaty or by resolution of Congress, which, under the terms of the treaty, it is obligated to adopt?

The European members of the treaty want that firm commitment. They want, and need, according to their view, that kind of commitment.

From what has been said on the floor of the Senate, I am sure that kind of

commitment is intended to be given to them, because if that does not happen, this treaty will not help solve the difficulties or cure the situation; it will not be an overwhelming power that will cause any other nation to hesitate to engage in an armed attack.

The European members of the treaty argue, and their American supporters agree with them, that anything less than a commitment for certain, prompt, immediate armed help will not meet the conditions of a sudden all-out attack of this modern age of supersonic speed planes loaded with atomic bombs and assisted with guided missiles.

The historic and generally accepted American view, is that only Congress sitting at the time the armed attack occurs, has the power, when the attack is made on other than United States territory, to declare war and authorize the employment of the armed forces of the United States to repel such an attack.

This historic view clashes head-on with the so-called needs of our European allies and the exigencies of modern warfare. The problem then confronting the treaty negotiators and drafters was how to write an agreement which would surely and certainly bring the United States and all the allies, for that matter, into the fight the moment it began, with an overwhelming force, and at the same time assure the American and other peoples that their constitutional processes of making and declaring war would be preserved.

In other words, the people in this country are led to believe that this country will engage in no war to assist our European allies in the event an all-out attack is made on them unless and until our Congress has declared war and authorized the employment of our armed forces to fight in that war.

It should be noticed that article 11 of the pact does not say that the provisions of the pact will be carried out by the parliaments, congresses, and legislative bodies of the respective parties in conjunction with their executive departments. On the contrary, it says "in accordance with their respective constitutional processes."

ARTICLE 11

This treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

This language permits, in the case of the United States, the use of a very ingenious device to make the firm commitment of certain, immediate aid in the event of the beginning of a major attack, and at the same time keep the American people assured that its Congress, free, unfettered, and uncommitted, will make

the final decision before we are actually at war.

What is this ingenious device? It will be found in the first clause of the sentence of article 5:

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.

To illustrate the meaning of that clause, an attack then against Denmark is an attack against the United States.

Here is the way, in the case of the United States, that the device is intended to work; here is the reasoning back of it:

First stage: An all-out attack, as distinguished from minor warlike incidents short of a major attack made on the United States, immediately creates a state of war.

Congress does not have to declare war; it happens by the act of the aggressor. Congress may recognize by declaration that a state of war exists, but the state of war was brought about by the act of the enemy power. Under these circumstances, the President immediately orders the armed forces to repel the attack. He does not wait for Congress. He probably would be derelict in his duty if he did wait. That is when an attack is made directly on the United States.

Now let us proceed to the second part of this argument. By the treaty, 10 European nations and Canada are put in the same class as the United States territory when an armed attack is made on them. For that purpose they become United States territory. For the purpose of repelling an armed attack, they become our responsibilities. They are made so by the treaty which, under our Constitution, becomes the law of the land.

The law of the land, which the President is sworn to uphold and enforce, makes it obligatory upon him to regard an armed attack on any one or more of our 11 allies as an attack upon the United States. An attack on the United States creates a state of war between us and the aggressor.

Let me state it another way: An attack on one ally creates a state of war between the nation attacked and the aggressor. That attack is an attack on all parties to the pact. By agreement in the pact itself, then, a state of war is created between the aggressor and all the members of the pact. There is no escape from this conclusion. The President must respond in good faith immediately to defend that additional territory. He must in good faith recognize that a state of war exists between the United States and the aggressor by reason of the treaty of agreement.

In modern war, to adequately defend our allies, he would be required to act immediately, even before he could get to Congress.

If he should order our armed forces into immediate action under the assumption that it was his duty to do so, then Congress would be confronted with a war already in being; and it certainly would not be free to say "No." Our forces would already be committed, and they would be committed under a treaty

which became the law of the land without the House of Representatives having had an opportunity to consider it and render its judgment. It would be completely bypassed. We would be at war by operation of the treaty—in other words, a declaration of war by treaty.

Is there anyone who would contend that the framers of the Constitution ever contemplated any such result or had any such intention when they drafted the Constitution?

All of this could be done under article 11, which provides that the provisions of the treaty "shall * * * be carried out in accordance with their respective constitutional processes."

Carrying out the provisions of the treaty "in accordance with our respective constitutional processes" would include either action by the President in repelling an attack or by action of Congress.

I shall seek to clarify the situation by approaching the problem from another direction.

Article 5 creates an obligation to defend our allies' territory in the event of an armed attack upon them. This is an obligation we did not have before the treaty. I think that should be kept clearly in mind. Simply by making the treaty and adopting the device I have mentioned, which declares, "The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all," we enlarge the territory of the United States for defense purposes.

Article 5 does not increase either the authority of the President or the Congress under the Constitution. That should be carefully considered. It simply adds more territory in which or over which the Executive or the Congress or both can exercise that authority.

This is important, and should be kept clearly in mind. We extend to this new territory the same rights and privileges of defense as possessed by our own territory. By doing this we have taken on an obligation to defend it in case it is attacked. The way we shall discharge that obligation as a practical manner no doubt will be the same general way we discharge the obligation to defend the actual territory of the United States.

Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. About 8 minutes.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, if an all-out attack is made up the new territory, it will call for an all-out defense on our part, the same as it would if an all-out attack were made on our own territory. There can be no difference in the approach, so that the language of article 5 which states that "each of them in the exercise of the right of individual or collective defense * * * will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith individually and in concert with the other parties such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area," is only saying in another way that each of the parties will take the same kind of action as they would take if their own

territory were attacked; that is, they would wage war to defend the area and restore its security the same as they would wage war to defend and restore the security of their own territory.

The reservation I am proposing, which is labeled A, will clarify this situation. It in effect provides that only the Congress can authorize war and the employment of our armed forces to assist in the event one or more of our European allies are victims of armed attack.

It does not leave the field open for the President to act as article 5 would authorize him to do if its meaning were not clarified and restricted. It also states the time-honored and generally understood principle of constitutional law that only Congress can declare or make war and authorize the employment of our armed forces in the prosecution of a war.

It is true that it may make ineffective the device which sought to get around the Constitution. It may mean a few hours delay in the consideration of the emergency; but on the other hand it does no violence to the Constitution; in fact, it protects the right of a free people through their representatives to pass on such a vital matter as the declaring and making of war.

Mr. President, when I say that is an important matter, when I say it is the very heart of the Constitution, I want to remind this body that the people who came to this land, who settled the United States, came here to escape the tyrannies of the Old World. They came here to avoid being conscripted into the armies of Europe. They were conscripted and sent out at the will of one man, the king or the emperor, who could direct them in war, without their having a word to say about it.

The thing we are complaining about now, the thing we are fighting against, is the right or the power of one man, or of a small group of men associated with him, to set in motion the wheels of war upon this world again. We are fighting against that kind of domination. Yet by the treaty we are in effect agreeing that when one nation is attacked it is an attack upon all, that a state of war has been created which puts us into the war.

From then on the Congress, the President, or anyone else simply has the duty of following up and ratifying what has been done and proceeding to wage the war until we will have restored our security.

That is an important right. The people of this land felt keenly about it a few years ago. To show how fickle we are, to show how the tides of public sentiment ebb and flow, only a few years ago the newspapers were filled with the stories of Members of Congress who were proposing a referendum, to let the people of the United States decide by popular vote whether we should or should not have war. There was actually enacted in the Congress of the United States the neutrality law, which required us to remain neutral. And now we have another proposal in regard to this subject, which is just the opposite in its intent. We are now saying in this treaty we agree a state of war will be created between ourselves and any other nation

the moment any one member of the pact is attacked. When that member is attacked, a state of war has been created, and we are in it. We cannot avoid it. If we understand the full meaning of that, we can see how the Constitution has been bypassed, how it has been made inoperative. I will take the proponents of the treaty at their word. If they are sincere and if they believe what they profess they should adopt this reservation. I think the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee said Congress would have the right under the Constitution to declare war, with all that it implies. I reply, of what good is it, of what protection is it to the people of the United States, to say Congress will have that right, if we have created a situation from which there is no retreat, a situation in which, if we honor our obligation under the treaty, there is nothing left to do but to declare war automatically? We would be like a puppet which must move whenever the string is pulled. Our freedom of action would be gone, and that is the heart of our Constitution. That is why our people came here, so that no monarch, no one man could send them into a battle which they did not want to fight, and make them take up the wars of other peoples.

Let me remind my colleagues that every American boy, girl, and every other citizen owes allegiance to his own flag and to the principles of this country; but none of them owes any allegiance to the flags of other lands, or any obligation to defend the soil of other lands. By this device we are setting forth an entirely new principle which extends and makes as a part of our own territory the vast expanse of other nations, with all their quarrels and all their hatreds, built up through thousands of years. The Constitution protects the right of Congress, free, unfettered, and untrammelled, to declare war. All the Senators who have spoken for the treaty say Congress will still have that right, but such a contention flies squarely in the face of and is completely contradictory to the very terms of this agreement which we are asked to ratify.

I know it is said that the latter part of article 5 provides that we are only to use force as we deem it necessary. It is true, if we are in the war and are attacked directly, we shall use whatever force we deem necessary; and we will use the same amount of force if one of our allies is attacked, and a legal state of war is thereby created.

What I am saying, Mr. President, is that the American people should be protected against the right of any President to proceed to act under the treaty as though a war had been declared by Congress. If an attack were made directly, he could move; that is conceded, with the action of Congress. But we now bring into the picture all these other countries, because of which we may automatically be involved in war.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Utah has expired.

Mr. WATKINS. I should like, if I may be permitted to say that my second reservation goes to the protection of the

freedom of the Congress to act as it ought to act. I ask the indulgence of the Senate to offer the second reservation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none.

Mr. WATKINS. The second reservation is on the same printed page, and is the second paragraph.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the reservation.

The CHIEF CLERK. At the end of resolution of ratification, it is proposed to insert the following:

The United States further understands and construes article 5 to the effect that in any particular case or event of armed attack on any other party or parties to the treaty, the Congress of the United States is not expressly, impliedly, or morally obligated or committed to declare war or authorize the employment of the military, air, or naval forces of the United States against the nation or nations making said attack, or to assist with its armed forces the nation or nations attacked, but shall have complete freedom in considering the circumstances of each case to act or refuse to act as the Congress in its discretion shall determine.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Utah.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. THOMAS of Utah. Mr. President, as I understand the question with respect to the reservation, it is that we want to be doubly sure that Congress maintains its constitutional rights and privileges, no matter what happens, after we once ratify the pact. That is assumed in entering into the pact. To assume otherwise would be making an assumption contrary to every tenet of international law. Since the Supreme Court has declared that a treaty is the supreme law of the land, as is the Constitution, how in the wide world could we in any way imply that through the treaty process we could amend the Constitution of the United States? That would be an implication which would destroy the fundamental scheme of our Government; and surely at no time would any Government permit within itself an element which could bring about, by legislative action, the destruction of itself.

The argument which has been advanced in regard to amendments or reservations shows that they have been proposed for the primary reason that there is a feeling on the part of some that greater assurance will be afforded that our country will not get into war if such provisions are placed in the treaty. The treaty must be interpreted in the light of the treaty itself. The treaty guarantees constitutional processes. It provides what can be done and what cannot be done. It carries implications in regard to promises which will be fulfilled; but the enforcement of the promises is left, as is the enforcement of all promises in a treaty, to the good judgment and the moral attitude of those countries which believe in the sanctity of treaties.

No treaty has ever been entered into between nations which does not imply mutuality of some kind. If there is no mutuality there is no need for a treaty.

The treaty itself implies that there will be joint action of some sort, a giving and a taking. If we lose sight of the fundamental purpose of a treaty, what it stands for, the reservations which we may add to it or the interpretations we may place on it do not in any way add to the fundamental powers or give to us greater fundamental powers than we already possess.

Therefore the reservation, as all other reservations to a pact of this kind, is merely something which shows that the Senate is probably doing something it wants to do but it has not full faith in what it is doing.

There is always a psychological aspect to every treaty. I myself believe that the psychological aspect of this treaty is so sure and so certain that it will actually prevent war. That is its purpose, and it is based upon a type of reasoning which has grown out of the incidents which have occurred during two great world wars and between those wars.

There has been attempts made throughout history to try to put a curb upon aggressors, to try to hold them in their place, to try to bring about a unity of right-thinking nations so strong and so complete that no independent aggressor nation would ever dare to attempt to bring about disunity. The treaty implies a high moral understanding. It implies that nations of high civilized character, treaty-keeping character, are willing to pledge themselves that they will do their best to put down aggression.

We have just heard an argument made as a result of fear of article 10 in the old League of Nations Covenant. Article 10 never had a chance to be tried. It was based upon a theory of mutuality; it was based upon a theory of unity; it was based upon a theory that if we could lay our finger on an aggressor and operate against him, the aggression would stop. It was based upon the notion that we could combine right-thinking and right-acting nations in such a way that the preponderance of their force could be hurled against an erring nation, a nation doing wrong. That was the first real attempt to curb an aggressor. It was not given a chance, because there was no way, as was said by the opponents of the idea, to define an aggressor. How could we say when one nation was on a warlike plane and another nation was not? How could we define an aggressor? Therefore, in a sense of frustration at not being able to meet the situation, the people became discouraged and discontented and did not stand for article 10.

I think we all know that no nation goes to war if it is sure it will be defeated. Persons in private life do not attempt to enter into an undertaking if they are sure it will be unsuccessful. Nations, in a way, must take the same sort of chances as those taken by private persons; and no nation will move if it knows it is foredoomed to defeat.

Mr. President, looking at it entirely from a military standpoint, what nation in the world, if it knew it had to fight the United States if it entered into a war, could defeat the United States in the next generation? Everyone knows the comparative strength of the United

States of America and the other nations of the world. Nations are not backward in realizing that strength. We all know it so well that we are happy to take part in this treaty action. There is no doubt in my mind that the Kaiser would not have moved if he had thought he had to fight the United States; and I am sure Hitler would not have moved if he had thought he had to fight the United States. One need not trust to his own ideas concerning such matters. One can turn to history, to the testimony of persons representing those nations, and understand that that statement is true.

Another psychological feature of the treaty which is important is its political and moral aspect. The pact says, in so many words, that the United States admits itself morally bound to use its strength in cooperation with other nations to put down an aggressor and to come to the aid of a victim of aggression. We have said that before in our history, Mr. President. It is no new thing. We have proved that the declaration of President Monroe received the respect of the nations of the world. We do not have to go outside of our own history to prove that. All the fanciful ideas about the fears of tomorrow, about the changing of our Constitution because of the ratification of the treaty, about taking away from Congress its power to act, are all arguments which are not based upon facts, which are not based upon law or upon the experience of nations.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Utah has expired.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield now to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. McGRATH. Mr. President, some of my own constituents and those of other Senators from my section of the country have addressed an inquiry, and I should like to ask the Senator from Texas to permit me to make a statement with respect to it.

There are in certain parts of the world conditions which are constantly tending to better themselves. I refer to the effort of the people of Ireland to unify their country. I should like to ask the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee if in this treaty or in any interpretation of it he foresees that there is anything to prevent continuing efforts to bring about unification of the northern counties with the southern part of Ireland?

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, according to what is already in the RECORD, there is nothing in the treaty which touches the problem with regard to Ireland which the Senator mentions. In fact, as the Secretary of State said in a letter of May 4, which appears on page 1227 of the hearings:

The treaty has no relation whatever to the problem of partition.

This should dispose of this question once and for all.

I am confident the Senator may rest assured that the treaty in no wise relates to the subject he has mentioned. Is that satisfactory?

Mr. McGRATH. I thank the Senator.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes of whatever time I have left to the Senator from Massachusetts.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized for 8 minutes.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I have listened with great respect to the arguments which have been made by those who favor reservations to the treaty, and my respect is very sincere. But I must set down that in my judgment the viewpoint which animates the arguments and the logic which they follow completely lack reality. I think these Senators conduct themselves so as to give the impression that the last two world wars had never taken place. Some of the statements I have heard made, some of the phrases I have heard uttered, take one back to the days 25 years ago when we did not know the sad facts about the world as we know them now.

Let me give a few illustrations. I heard one Senator say that this North Atlantic Pact would promote the balance of power in Europe, that instead of seeking an international approach to the task of getting peace, we were following the old maxim of dividing the world and setting up two rival European camps with approximately equal strength.

It is hard to see how such a statement as that could be made, when we realize that a country like Soviet Russia has 200 infantry and armored divisions in existence at the present time, whereas the second largest land army in Europe, namely, in France, has only nine divisions. How is it possible, in the face of those facts, to talk about any balance of power? There is a great inequality of power, there is no balance of power. How is it possible, in the light of those facts, to speak about an armament race, when the ratio is 200 to 9 in that respect?

I heard another Senator say that we should not give arms before the nations were attacked. I suppose the inference is that we should give the arms after the attack. Anyone who has studied modern military science, even in the most superficial way, knows that unless the arms are available well ahead of the attack, there is no use sending them, because we would never be able to get them in, and the nations abroad would never be able to use them. Even if we were able to get the arms in 2 weeks before the attack, assuming the enemy were obliging enough to tell us when he was going to jump, that is not time enough to train people in their use, to get teamwork, to set up a staff, to set up the whole system that makes armed forces effective.

Arms are one part of an armed force, but they are not all there is to an armed force. When Senators talk about not giving them arms before the attack, they might just as well come out frankly and say they do not want to give them any arms at all, because that is what it amounts to.

I have heard Senators say here today that we should apply the principles of the Monroe Doctrine to western Europe. That is an extraordinary contention to make, when we consider that the Monroe Doctrine has been expanded to cover the

Latin American countries, and that they are all equal partners with us in it now. It is still more extraordinary when we consider that the implication to be drawn from the statement that we ought to extend the principles of the Monroe Doctrine to Europe is that we should undertake the defense of Europe single-handed, without the cooperation of Europeans. I think that is a far more extreme proposal than any we confront in the North Atlantic Pact. It is more extreme because it assumes that we can carry the burden of European defense all by ourselves, it assumes we would be put into a war on the say-so of some foreign aggressor, instead of being able to choose our own way of doing it, and it assumes that as soon as we were in the war we would carry the whole load ourselves, and do all the fighting and killing. There is not much mutuality in that, and there is no recognition of the facts of modern life in that type of argument.

I heard another contention made today the inference of which was that it would be advantageous to us not to give our new weapons to Europeans, that we would be smart if we gave them just our junk, so to speak. That is an extremely short-sighted view. During the war we had a good many allies, thank heaven, and the experience was that the better the equipment we gave them, the better they fought, and the better results they achieved.

I remember one instance during the war in which one of the divisions of one of our allies had no gasoline, and the reason why it had no gasoline was that one American supply officer, who was not possessed of very brilliant intelligence, thought he would be very smart and use his superior knowledge of American paper work and American supply procedure and get all the gasoline for his outfit that ordinarily would have gone to the foreign outfit. How stupid. There was the foreign division bogged down, unable to move, but the Americans who had all the gas for their outfit they needed and much more, went up and had to carry the whole combat load themselves.

Mr. President, if that is promoting the welfare of the United States, then words have no meaning.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield to the Senator from Utah.

Mr. WATKINS. I wonder if the Senator is not misinformed as to what was said, and is not misquoting the record. As I remember, the Senator who referred to this matter of junk said that our military people said, "We will not be sending them junk." It was said that it was assumed that we would send them junk, but the argument, as I got the implication of it, was that we would send them the best weapons we had, and would not send them junk.

Mr. LODGE. The inference I got was that the Senator was very sorry we would not be sending them junk, the tone of his voice indicated that it was too bad we would be sending them good weapons. That was clear to me from the tone of his voice. I cannot quote the remarks, because I have not that good a memory.

Mr. WATKINS. I have not that good a memory either, but it seemed to me that the Senator was trying to point out that we would be sending them the best equipment we had, that others may have said to send them junk. The question was asked of General Bradley in the Committee on Foreign Relations, and also of Louis Johnson, and they said, "We will not be sending them junk." He was calling attention to the load we would be assuming by sending them good weapons.

Mr. LODGE. We should not send them junk, but weapons that are good. I point out that there are pieces of equipment we cannot use here but which those in foreign countries can use, and when we can make that kind of a trade, it is a good trade. They put in their young manhood, and we put in our young manhood, too. We are putting in our treasure and materials, and they are not putting in as much in the way of supplies. But they are putting up their young manhood, and that is a pretty substantial contribution for any country.

Mr. President, I heard some Senators compare the present situation with that which prevailed during the League of Nations debate. That was a startling thing to say, because it seems to me that implicit in this North Atlantic Pact are the lessons which we learned from the League of Nations debate. A guiding concept of the League of Nations, that we would guarantee the territorial integrity of countries, is completely left out of the North Atlantic Treaty. We are not guaranteeing the territorial integrity of any country. The spirit of article 10, which was the heart of the League of Nations Covenant, is frankly, patently, and obviously excluded from the North Atlantic Pact.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield to the Senator from Utah.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Massachusetts has expired.

Mr. LODGE. I have a little more to say, but my time has expired.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, if I am permitted under the agreement, I will yield of my time two additional minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The whole time on the reservation has expired, including the 10 minutes allotted to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. WATKINS. But I had 20 minutes, Mr. President.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator had 20 minutes; 10 minutes on each reservation. The Senator from Utah used 10 minutes on the first reservation.

Mr. WATKINS. There is plenty of time left for debate this afternoon. I doubt if there are going to be any more reservations presented. I believe the Senator from Massachusetts should be permitted to continue if there are no other reservations to be offered.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair cannot anticipate that there are no further reservations to be offered.

Mr. WATKINS. I was going to ask if we can find out whether any more reservations are going to be offered, and if

not, whether the Senator from Massachusetts may be permitted to proceed. As I remember, the Chair said we would divide the time, under the agreement as announced, if it were not all used up on the reservations.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair announced at 2 o'clock that there were six reservations which had been printed and were lying on the table. Whether all of them would be offered the Chair could not say, and whether others would be offered, which are not printed, the Chair could not say.

Mr. CONNALLY. Let me say to the Senator that if there is any time left after we get through discussing the reservations, if the Senator from Massachusetts then wants some further time I shall try to arrange it so he can have further time.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I was simply arguing. I have no set speech.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Other reservations have been ordered to be printed. They might be offered. We cannot tell at this time whether they will be offered or not.

The time having expired under the agreement on the first three reservations, the Chair might inquire if there are any other reservations Senators intend to offer.

Mr. CONNALLY. The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER] has several reservations lying on the table. I do not know whether he intends to present them.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. CAIN. Would it be proper, for the purpose of determining which of the reservations are to be offered, to suggest the absence of a quorum?

Mr. CONNALLY. That would take up a great deal of our time.

The VICE PRESIDENT. That would consume considerable time.

Mr. CONNALLY. I hope the Senator will not make that suggestion.

Mr. CAIN. I merely made the inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. After the reservations offered have been debated under the agreement of 10 minutes for and 10 minutes against, if there are no further reservations, but there still remains some time, it is to be controlled by the Senator from Texas and the Senator from Missouri. Looking at it from this viewpoint it seems likely that there are no other reservations to be offered at this time; but the Chair cannot say.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, Senators who have reservations should be here and should offer them. I have no objection to Senators offering all the reservations they want to offer. But they ought not to wait, and oblige us to send for them to offer their reservations.

The VICE PRESIDENT. It is still about an hour and three-quarters until 5 o'clock.

Mr. CONNALLY. I hope we will not trespass too much on the time we are going to allocate, because considerable pressure has been put upon the Senator from Texas to allot part of the little

time left after we get through with the reservations. The minority leader should have a solution. He usually does.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Senator from Texas. I suggest that we should have a quorum call now.

Mr. CONNALLY. Oh, no.

Mr. WHERRY. And let it be charged equally to both sides. We have not had a quorum call today. By the time the call is concluded, the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER] will be present and have an opportunity to present his reservations.

Mr. CONNALLY. I hope the Senator will not insist on a quorum call, because it cuts down our time considerably. The Senator from North Dakota can be sent for.

Mr. WHERRY. He has already been sent for.

Mr. CONNALLY. The sheriff can be sent after him.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator from North Dakota will soon be here. He is ready to offer his reservation.

Mr. CONNALLY. He cannot offer it in the hall or in the street.

Mr. WHERRY. That is true. That is why I suggested the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. If the absence of a quorum is suggested, the Chair must order the Secretary to call the roll.

Mr. CONNALLY. I hope that will not be done.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, if I may make an observation, under the arrangement made and announced, I take it any Senator would feel he would be within his rights to come in 5 minutes before 5 and offer a reservation.

The VICE PRESIDENT. He would be entitled to offer it at 5 minutes to 5, or even after 5, but in that event he could not debate it.

Mr. WATKINS. That is the reason why I think it is not fair to say that a Senator ought to be here now to offer his reservation. He certainly would be within his rights to present it later.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, I am quite willing to accept the suggestion of the Senator from Nebraska that a roll call be had. I think it would require 10 or 15 minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is the Senator from Nebraska making the point of no quorum?

Mr. WHERRY. I make the point of no quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll, and several Senators answered to their names.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, the Senator from North Dakota is now in the Senate Chamber.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator cannot interrupt the calling of the roll.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the further proceedings under the quorum call be dispensed with and that the order for the quorum call be vacated.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Does the Senator from North Dakota desire recognition?

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I am not going to present my reservation.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from North Dakota makes the announcement that he will not present his reservation.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. WHERRY. If there are to be no further reservations offered, do I correctly understand that under the unanimous-consent agreement the remaining time will be divided between the proponents and opponents of the treaty itself?

The VICE PRESIDENT. If there are no further reservations to be offered, the time from now until 5 o'clock is to be divided equally between the Senator from Texas and the Senator from Missouri. The Chair assumes there are no further reservations to be offered. Therefore the Senator from Texas is recognized.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I am very much pleased that we have finally received at last all the reservations, which I hope will be voted down by the Senate by a very overwhelming vote.

Any reservation is intended to water down and dilute the treaty or to destroy it, if that can be done. That is the purpose of the so-called reservations. The Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS] and other Senators who have offered reservations are opposed to the entire treaty. The Senator from Utah would wipe out the whole treaty if he could. He would provide reservations against the entire treaty if he could.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WATKINS. Was the Senator present last night when I announced that if the reservations I offered were accepted I would vote for the treaty?

Mr. CONNALLY. Oh, yes; but the Senator knew they would not be accepted. The Senator knew the Senate would not be so unwise.

Mr. WATKINS. If the Senator wants to test it out, let the Senator agree to the adoption of the reservation, and I will vote for the treaty.

Mr. CONNALLY. I will say that the Senator's vote is not worth so much to us as to justify giving up the treaty in order to secure one vote for nothing. With his reservations in it the treaty would not be of any value.

Mr. President, the reservation he has discussed is not founded on fact. His reservation provides, "That the United States assumes no obligation to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area or to assist any party or parties in said area, by armed force, or to employ the military, air," and so on, "under article 5 for any purpose." I repeat, he would not want them to be used for any purpose. Not for war, but for "any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare

war or authorize the employment of the military, air, or naval forces of the United States."

That statement in the reservation is not accurate. The Congress has the sole right to declare war, but the President of the United States is Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy. Under the reservation, if an attack were made on New York City, the President could not resist it until he called Congress into session, and it acted. What happened at Pearl Harbor? There was no congressional declaration of war before we began to resist. We were attacked without notice. The President of the United States had a perfect right to put the Navy, the Army, and all other forces into operation to resist that attack.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WATKINS. If the Senator will note this reservation, it says that:

The United States assumes no obligation to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area or to assist any other party or parties in said area, by armed force, or to employ the military, air, or naval forces of the United States under article 5 or any article of the treaty, for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which under the Constitution has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military, air, or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide.

It has to do with an attack which is made upon other parties to the pact, other than ourselves. It does not affect us at all.

Mr. CONNALLY. Does the Senator believe that an attack on New York would not be an interpretation of the North Atlantic area? I think it would.

Mr. WATKINS. That is taken care of under our own Constitution, without any reservations.

Mr. CONNALLY. I am talking about the treaty now. The Senator wants to tie the hands of the Congress and the President. He says:

That the United States assumes no obligation to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area—

I insist that if an attack were made upon New York or any other part of the United States, we would owe an obligation under this treaty to restore that area, and to repel the attack.

Let me say a word or two as to the second reservation, which reads as follows:

The United States further understands and construes article 5 to the effect that in any particular case or event of armed attack on any other party or parties to the treaty, the Congress of the United States is not expressly, impliedly, or morally obligated or committed to declare war or authorize the employment of the military, air, or naval forces of the United States against the nation or nations making said attack, or to assist with its armed forces the nation or nations attacked, but shall have complete freedom in considering the circumstances of each case to act or refuse to act as the Congress in its discretion shall determine.

That reservation is a complete repudiation of the treaty. Under that reservation we would have no obligations

under the treaty with regard to armed force. Senators are saying, "We are for the treaty, except that we cannot furnish any arms." This is a defensive treaty. What are the signatory countries going to defend themselves with unless they have arms? It is said, "We can send them anything else." We can send them a lot of powder puffs, or all-day suckers, but we cannot send them any arms, although arms may be the very thing they need and desire.

Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY].

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. DONNELL. Will the Chair advise us how much time is left to each side?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Starting at 3:16 p. m., there were 52 minutes to each side. The Senator from Texas has consumed 6 minutes.

Mr. NEELY. Mr. President, this is not coming out of my time, is it?

The VICE PRESIDENT. No. That leaves the Senator from Texas 46 minutes and the Senator from Missouri 52 minutes. The Senator from West Virginia has 10 minutes of the 46.

Mr. NEELY. Mr. President, if Thomas Gray had known how interminably a few Senators would talk in favor of the emasculation of the pending treaty, or in opposition to its ratification because our 11 international relations who have joined us in the making of this important document are, unfortunately, all poor relations, the great poet never would have included in his *Elegy in a Country Churchyard* his admonition to grandeur not to "hear with a disdainful smile the short and simple annals of the poor." If Gray could only have envisaged the hundreds of pages and the hundreds of thousands of words of Senate debate in opposition to the treaty that have been written or uttered since the morning of the 5th day of July, he would have known that so far as the Senate is concerned only eternity is longer than the annals of the poor—particularly if the poor happen to be poor international relations and the circumstances such that certain distinguished Senators insist that we wretch on our obligations to help maintain world peace and spurn a golden opportunity to become the beneficiaries of the scriptural assurance: "It is more blessed to give than to receive."

Had all our relations who have become parties to the treaty been rich and powerful, ratification would, in my opinion, have been effected by unanimous consent immediately after the conclusion of the convincing, eloquent addresses of the able Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] and the able Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG]. But in this instance, as in countless others:

Of all sad words of tongue or pen,
The saddest are these: "It might have been!"

Mr. President, all over the world today, as in Xanadu in the age of Kublai Khan, are heard from near and far millions of melancholy "ancestral voices prophesying war." Indeed, the present

far-flung war, whether it be considered cold or hot, has long since emerged from the realm of prophecy into all the earthly regions of reality. It has once more set the world on fire and the faces of millions of fearful men and women turn deadly pale in the ghastly light of the raging conflagration.

To the inhabitants of dreamland, the dwellers in fool's paradise and the advocates of Chamberlain-like appeasement who constantly cry out, "Where are the minions of aggression? Where are the Cossacks who are riding down the lovers of liberty and making war against the democracy and Christianity of the world?" We answer: "Ask the overwhelmed annexed people of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and parts of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Finland, Poland, and Outer Mongolia. Ask the judge and jury that completed the trial of the Coplon case in this city a few weeks ago. Ask the officers and members of the United Nations Organization who have seen a single nation, by the exercise of the veto power, 30 times paralyze the activity and stay the progress of this great humanitarian organization. Go to the dungeon in which Cardinal Mindszenty is rotting away and ask him." If these apostles of Pollyanna will listen to a comprehensive news broadcast any day in the week, they will hear startling answers to their inquiries, originating not only in their own country but from lands across the Atlantic on the east and from beyond the Pacific on the west.

If further answers are desired by those who are too blind to see the fifth columns of communism marching and counter-marching over every great country in Christendom, inquiries should be made of the American aviators who recently completed the task of transporting to Berlin by air hundreds of thousands of tons of food and coal to save the inhabitants of that unfortunate city from starving or freezing to death as the result of Russia's perversity in preventing the delivery of these necessities of life by truck and train.

The headlines of the metropolitan papers on Tuesday of last week would have provided sufficient, if not satisfying, information to anyone who should think of naively inquiring, "What nation is threatening world peace?" Some of those headlines are as follows:

First, "Little blockade' manned by Reds." The article under that headline tells of the stranglehold of Russian soldiers on the only truck-supply route from western Germany to Berlin.

Second, "Pacific Pact Is Proposed Between Nationalist China and the Philippines To Oppose Communism."

Third, "United States Seeks To Oust Red Committeeman."

Fourth, "Czech Reds Seek To Curb Catholics." The article under this caption says, among other things, that the Czechoslovakia Communist Party served notice that it intends to fight the Roman Catholic Church.

To the regret of the United States and all other nations that long for peace, Russia daily adds new fuel to the flames of the warlike fires she has started all over the earth. It is unusual for a day

to pass without newspaper reports of some new unprovoked communistic offenses against humanity. And these daily provocations, in endless variety, have gone on and on until 12 of the important peace-loving countries of the world have at last been forced to lay the foundation for collective resistance to further Russian aggression. And that foundation consists of the North Atlantic Treaty that is now before the Senate.

All the nations that have signed the pending pact have done, are now doing, and purpose to continue to do everything that is consistent with national honor and self-respect in order to preserve everlasting peace with Russia and every other country in the world. But, unfortunately, Russia apparently construes the excessive generosity and tolerance of democratic governments in dealing with her as indications of weakness and fear. And her return for our extreme civility to her is never-ending noncooperation with us and an intensification of her efforts to distress the American people at home and discredit the United States abroad.

Let us hope that before the worse becomes the worst the small group that rules Russia with a rod of iron will consider the ratification of the pending treaty not as a threat but as a solemn warning that there are limits of forbearance beyond which the American people will not forbear, and that there are limits beyond which other nations will not be permitted to trespass upon our liberty or upon that of our neighbors who have joined us in the execution of the North Atlantic Pact.

Russia should, for her own sake, familiarize herself with the elementary history of the United States and from this source learn what our Continental Army, in the Revolutionary War, did to the greatest military power on earth as a punishment for that power's long-continued attempts to tyrannize over our people.

Russia should familiarize herself with the causes and consequences of the War of 1812, in which the United States forever established her right to the freedom of the seas. Russia should particularly note that the night before the Battle of New Orleans, the last battle of the 1812 War—Sir Edward Pakenham, the commander of the British troops, said in a note to Gen. Andrew Jackson, "If you do not surrender, I will storm your breastworks and eat breakfast in New Orleans tomorrow morning"; and that Jackson sent to Pakenham the laconic reply, "If you do, you will eat supper in hell tomorrow night." On the following day the American Army, under Jackson, won a glorious victory; Pakenham was killed and a large part of his army was destroyed. Where the British general ate his supper no man knows.

Russia should take notice of the fact that in 1898 a European country that was then powerful both on land and sea, by a long-continued course of provocation, at last compelled the United States to declare war against her, and in that war Spain's Army was conquered, her navy

was destroyed and she forever lost all her possessions in both the Philippines and the West Indies. From the devastating effects of that war Spain has never completely recovered.

Russia should not be unmindful of the fact that in consequence of long-continued aggression against that country by Germany the United States entered the First World War against her and lavishly supplied the men and means necessary to dethrone the Kaiser, defeat his armies, destroy his navy, and win for the Allies a greater victory than the forces of democracy had ever before won over the hosts of autocracy and aggression.

Russia should particularly recall that in the Second World War the United States once more demonstrated that those who too long abuse her patience and too long trespass upon her rights are eventually subjected to the punishment which only military power can administer. Unhappily, such punishment sometimes constitutes the only language some dictators, tyrants, and aggressors can be made to understand.

It is my fervent hope that the foregoing will, at least to some slight degree, help to arouse Russia to a realization of the fact that she will be in deadly danger if she continues to follow the aggressive international course she has pursued during the last 3 years.

It is my further hope that Russia will profit by the examples of the past and avoid the disastrous consequences suffered by every nation that has ever forced a war upon the people of the United States.

Ever since Hiroshima was destroyed with the atom bomb, the common people of the world have hoped and prayed for peace as they never hoped and prayed for it before. In no other land are the hopes higher, or the prayers for peace more sincere than they are in the United States. The sole purpose of this Nation's joinder in the treaty before us is to preserve peace and prevent war, and to prevent it not by one nation's acting alone but by the 12 nations that are parties to the treaty acting in concert for their common preservation and their common defense against any aggressor that may make war upon them. The wisdom of the agreement of which the treaty is the written memorial is illustrated by the famous Aesop fable, the substance of which is as follows:

An old man had many sons who frequently had trouble with one another. After the father had exhausted his authority in a vain attempt to reconcile them, he at last ordered all the sons to assemble before him. A bundle of sticks, compactly bound together, was then presented to the sons and each was requested to try to break it. But every son failed to accomplish this task. Then the father separated the sticks, gave one to each son and commanded him to break it, and this command was, without difficulty, obeyed. Thereupon the father said: "Behold, my sons, the power of unity."

If you, like the bundle of sticks, will only keep yourselves conjoined in the

bonds of friendship and cooperation, it will not be in the power of any mortal to hurt you; but if your ties of brotherly affection are once dissolved, soon will your rights be violated by everyone that may wish to assault you.

The pending treaty will make the 12 signatory nations, after the manner of the bundle of sticks, so strong that no hostile outside nation on earth will be able to destroy them, or enslave them. The treaty, if ratified without weakening amendments, will be a shield and a buckler to all the nations that have signed it. But if the proposed reservations should be adopted, the treaty would, in the words of the immortal Lincoln, become as weak as soup made from the shadow of a pigeon that had starved to death.

In behalf of the general welfare of the 12 nations which are parties to the pact and in behalf of the peace of the world, let all the proposed reservations be decisively defeated and the treaty, in its present entirety, be ratified by an overwhelming majority.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from West Virginia has expired.

MR. DONNELL. Mr. President, I yield 20 minutes to the Senator from Utah.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Utah is recognized for 20 minutes.

MR. WATKINS. Mr. President, reference has been made to what is meant by the reservations I have proposed, which recently have been the subject of debate. I wish to quote from two distinguished gentlemen who have set the pattern for me and have given me the foundation for my reservations. If my reservations are wrong, then I think the two distinguished gentlemen to whom I refer are wrong, and probably this treaty means something different from what they have said it means.

Let me call attention to the fact that the distinguished senior Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG], in referring to the part that Congress would have in the future in respect to this treaty, declared:

But if it does mean war, only Congress itself, under the specific terms of the pact, can declare it.

The distinguished Senator from Michigan also said:

But suppose the event is obviously of major and deliberate magnitude and clearly discloses a criminal aggressor deliberately on the march—as Hitler entered Poland or as the Kaiser entered Belgium. Let us say that it is clearly the dread thinking which threatens the life and freedom of one of our associated nations, if not ourselves directly. If it is, it threatens the life and freedom of every other associated nation, including our own. If it is, it threatens total war or total surrender, pact or no pact. If it is, our commitment is clear as crystal. It is to take whatever action we deem necessary to maintain the security of the North Atlantic area, which vividly includes the security of the United States. If the only action adequate is war, then it means war. If it does mean war, I venture to assert that, pact or no pact, it would mean war for us anyway in this foreshortened world. If it does mean war, I venture to say that we would be infinitely

better off for having instant and competent allies.

I can agree with a great deal of that, and I do agree with the next statement the Senator made, because I think it is exactly what I tried to put in legal language in the reservation. The Senator from Michigan concluded that particular paragraph as follows:

But if it does mean war, only Congress itself, under the specific terms of the pact, can declare it.

In my argument yesterday, I cited all kinds of arguments as to whether the pact does or does not mean war. I cited an editorial from the New York Times which says that, without quibbling, it means war. I cited an editorial from a St. Louis newspaper which says the same thing.

But here we have statements from the two most important members of the Foreign Relations Committee. All I am pleading for in this reservation is for us to make them effective, in view of the fact that other people seem to have other ideas, in view of the fact that the treaty says that an attack upon one is an attack upon all, and that when that occurs, there will be a state of war with all of the signatories to the pact, and of course in that case we shall be at war. I have said, and I say again, that Congress would then be only an automaton, an agency acting under those circumstances to declare what already was a fact.

In these reservations I have tried to say definitely and distinctly that before war occurs, before that final thing is done, the Congress of the United States will have to declare it by resolution. I am not talking about an attack on New York, either; I am talking about an attack on one of the other signatories to the pact, whose territory we are guaranteeing to defend. That is what this reservation aims at. Of course, under our own Constitution we will take care of the United States. But in this reservation I am talking about the other signatories to the treaty. The reservation says:

That the United States assumes no obligation to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area or to assist any other party or parties in said area—

Which means any party other than ourselves—

by armed force, or to employ the military, air, or naval forces of the United States under article 5 or any article of the treaty, for any purpose—

And I am saying that for any purpose our military forces cannot be used in the event of such attack unless Congress says so.

I also provide—

unless in any particular case the Congress, which under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military, air, or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide.

We are told that Congress has to do it—with all that implies, as the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee says. What does it imply? It implies that Congress shall then consider the

matter, as of that hour and day, and shall do the wise thing for the protection of the United States. That is what I am trying to do. I have put in legal language the very things they have been saying.

Are they against them? Will the treaty be destroyed if we reaffirm our faith in our Constitution, if we say that this must be done to make it clear to the people overseas and to our own citizens, whom we have been assuring over the weeks and the months that, "Oh, the treaty does not automatically commit us to war, because we say Congress will declare war." Yet it is said here, today, that reservation 2 will take the very heart out of the treaty and will render inoperative all the benefits which should come from the treaty.

Suppose an emergency happens, and it is brought before the Congress, is the Congress at that time going to be a rubber stamp? Is it going to be told, "You agreed to this in the treaty; this nation over here has been attacked; we are at war, and now it is your duty to declare war, whether you think we ought to or not"? Remember, Mr. President, the pact is for 20 years. It is not a momentary plan; it is for 20 years. We say as of today, and I think the Senator from Michigan in his speech said, we would respond anyway, pact or no pact. Yes, we would, and I would vote as of today for a declaration of war on any nation attacking these nations in an all-out war. Five years from now, what? Ten years from now, what? Twenty years? The fact of the matter is we are trying to write into this treaty an agreement to preserve the status quo for 20 years. We are assuming it will be that way merely because we agree it will be that way. We have seen our allies, Russia and China and all the others, go somewhere else. Who knows what will happen to the Allies we are going to take on in the pact? I say to my colleagues this is one of the most important sections in the whole treaty. We are making a historic departure from the foreign policy of the past, which has made this the great Nation that it is, and I say the burden is upon those who propose to make that change, not upon us who want to ask certain questions, and who want to see that that Constitution is preserved. From the time of my infancy, I have been taught that the Constitution of the United States was divinely inspired, that it was written by men of God who were called and chosen to write and prepare that Constitution for this great Nation.

I have respect for it. I took my oath of office to defend it, and I am defending it. I am glad to know that the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senator from Michigan agree that that is what must be done when emergencies come. If it is war, then Congress will declare it. They are in agreement with me. That is, they say they are. Then why, in the name of all that is fair, should we not say it to the world so that there will be no doubt about it? It may be said the other nations would become discouraged; we would destroy that psychological warfare or advantage or whatever we are going to get, as my distinguished colleague

from Utah said. We would destroy that. But it almost makes one suspicious, does it not, of the treaty when it is found that, notwithstanding the fact that it is said Congress has the right to declare war, they then do not want to put in anything that notifies the world, and particularly those people in Europe in those countries, that just the moment war strikes we will be in it. The treaty says so. All one has to do is to read it, and he will get that logical conclusion—that an attack on one is an attack on all. An attack on Denmark creates a state of war not only as between Denmark and the attacker but between the United States and every other state, on the one hand, and the attacker.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Utah yield to the Senator from Missouri?

Mr. WATKINS. In just a moment. When that state of war occurs, what Congress, what President, would say "No"? What I am pleading for is on behalf of the generations to come, on behalf of the future Congresses, that it may have something to say about this for its freedom of action. They will do the right thing, we need not worry about that, I may say to my dear colleague from Texas and Michigan, and all the rest. They will have some intelligence. We are the egotistical crowd. We know what we would have done back in the days of World War I. Later, we know Hitler would never have struck, at least I say so, if we had had this type of organization. We say the Kaiser would never have struck, if we had had this type of organization. We know what they do today, and we know what they will do 20 years from now. I say we are taking in a little too much territory. I am calling attention to the fact that we have a Constitution, and its needs protection. The very fact that there are those who begin to point out that this would ruin the treaty, would take the heart out of it, indicates pretty clearly to me that it means something more than what is said. The Senator who said "War would be declared by the Congress, and all that it implies," was correct. What does it imply? Free, untrammelled action, and when the emergency arises, when the circumstances come, I have confidence that under the dictates of Almighty God and his inspiration the Congress at that time, whether it be us or some future Congress, will know what to do and will give the right answer, and if the conditions are the same then as now, yes, they will declare war; there will be no doubt about it. But who knows when an attack is made 15 years from now on some of the signatories of this pact that it will be right for us to come involved in that war at that moment. Those people, those Congressmen, the generation then, should say and determine it.

The other day I quoted from a letter by the late Charles Evans Hughes to Senator Hale. The logic contained in it is old-fashioned, but it is sound and it is true. Mr. Justice Hughes said:

If we are entering upon a new world of democracies, the inevitable consequence

should be recognized. Democracies cannot promise war after the manner of monarchs. It is ideal to attempt to commit free peoples to the making of war in an unknown contingency when such a war may be found to be clearly opposed to the dictates of justice * * *

Article 10 is objectionable because it is an illusory engagement. Whether we shall go to war to preserve the territorial integrity of another state—

And that is about what we are trying to do, not only to guarantee it, but to restore it, to maintain it for 20 years—

the territorial integrity of another state in a situation not now disclosed or described so that the merits of the case may be judged will depend upon the action of the Congress, and that action will be taken according to the conviction of our duty in the light of the demands of justice as they appear when the exigency arises.

That was written by the former Chief Justice of the United States. Senators may laugh at my humble opinions. I am just an ordinary lawyer, a Member of this body. But this is a statement of a man who was during his brilliant career a governor, Secretary of State, and a Justice of the United States Supreme Court. He was a great man, and the principles embodied in his letter are sound and eternal. He continued:

The general guaranty of article 10 cannot be relied upon to produce action contrary to its judgment.

In other words, no matter what we agree, no Congress is going to act contrary to its judgment.

We should not enter into a guarantee which would expose us to the charge of bad faith or of having defaulted in our obligation, notwithstanding that Congress in refusing to make war had acted in accordance with its conception of duty in the circumstances disclosed * * *

This is the reservation Mr. Justice Hughes suggested to Senator Hale:

* * * The United States of America assumes no obligation under said article to undertake any military expedition or to employ its armed forces on land or sea unless such action is authorized by the Congress of the United States of America which has exclusive authority to declare war or to determine for the United States of America whether there is any obligation on its part under said article and the means or action by which any such obligation shall be fulfilled.

That is substantially, in meaning, what I have already said, and as I have already indicated and stated, not by just an ordinary citizen, but by the Governor of the great State, who later became Secretary of State, and, still later, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

I want to read my second reservation, because I am afraid most of the Senators never have read it. It is a declaration right in line with what Chief Justice Hughes said:

The United States further understands and construes article V to the effect that in any particular case or event of armed attack on any other party or parties to the treaty—

It does not say the Congress cannot act when an attack is made on any other of the parties to the treaty—

the Congress of the United States is not expressly, impliedly, or morally obligated or

committed to declare war or authorize the employment of the military, air, or naval forces of the United States against the nation or nations making said attack * * *

Does anyone here want to contend that we are obligated to declare war? Will anyone come out and say we are under obligation to declare war by that treaty, that we make that commitment, that we are obligated to do this, without Congress acting?

is not expressly, impliedly, or morally obligated to declare war or to authorize the employment of the military, air, or naval forces of the United States against the nation or nations making said attack or to assist with its armed forces the nation or nations attacked, but shall have complete freedom, considering the circumstances of each case, to act or to refuse to act as the Congress in its discretion shall determine.

The distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee said it did not imply the right to declare war. Does it imply what I have said in that reservation? I think it does. Under the treaty, we certainly must act. Then, what have we done to America? We have surrendered, through a treaty agreement, and we have the responsibility of sending our boys—our American citizens—into a war with respect to which the Representatives in the House will never have a chance to vote, if we take that position.

Mr. President, what I am pleading for is to do all we can under this treaty, to go as far as we can, to render all the assistance we can, but, in the name of Heaven, do not give up our rights for which we fought. We can do many of the things that are necessary to do without giving up those rights.

General Bradley was asked on cross-examination, before the Foreign Relations Committee, if this were the only way to defend America—

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, I yield two more minutes to the Senator from Utah.

Mr. WATKINS. General Bradley said, "No, but I think it is the best way. Of course, it is not the only way."

I challenge that statement. No alliance has ever worked out that way. Alliances have always resulted in war. The greatest deterrent to war was given to the world in the Sermon on the Mount, in the philosophy of the Saviour. We have ignored it. It is not in this pact. It is not in the United Nations Charter. That is exactly why it cannot get anywhere—because we do not have peace-loving nations in the Charter. We have infidels, who are antichrist and antidog. Unless we can get great nations to agree on the principles taught by Christ, no matter how many votes we take out of a pact or a charter, it will not succeed.

I plead with my colleagues to give me a yea-and-nay vote on the reservation. Even if I am the only Senator to vote for it, I want it to go on record. I plead for a yea-and-nay vote on this reservation.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Indiana.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Missouri has 30 minutes and the

Senator from Texas has 36 minutes remaining.

The Senator from Indiana is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. JENNER. Mr. President, we live in a troubled world. Our position is precarious. Let us not make it more so. There have been great historic changes in the course of our Nation's previous policy. They provide reasons for deep concern. It should be said they also provide great reasons for inspiring hope. We are living in the new atomic age, and the need for hope is the paramount need of the world today, for man has, during the war just ended, so impetuously invaded those precincts which heretofore have been reserved to God himself, as to make even the strongest among us tremble. With the aid of radar man can look through the clouds and scan the moon. Through the release of atomic energy he has asserted tangible control over the very stuff of which the universe itself is made. Can there be any question that a new age is upon us and that the old equilibriums of history, the old balances of power upon which the North Atlantic Treaty bases the future peace of the world, are as terrifying in extent as were the Pharaohs. Do not call me an isolationist. Call me a realist. If there are any isolationists in this body they are those who are trying to foist upon the American people for the next 20 years the old equilibrium theory of history which has failed time after time, or the archaic and ancient theory of the balance of power.

Let us face a few fundamental facts which have been brought out in this debate. Military alliances—and this treaty is a military alliance—have inevitably resulted not in peace, but in war; and the same Senators who today are trying to sell the North Atlantic Treaty as an instrument of peace are the ones who stood on the floor of the Senate within the past 2 years and asserted that all the rest of our foreign policy, including lend-lease, was for peace and not for war.

There are some other fundamental facts which we may as well realize. Every crisis, every emergency, which the United States has faced in the past several years has been answered on one theory—taking money out of the pockets of the American taxpayers. Let us realize this basic fundamental principle. We can buy a government in Europe, or any other place in the world, but we cannot buy the hearts, the souls, and the minds of their people. How do we expect the great democratic, liberty-loving, friendly allies who are to be members of the pact to look upon us? We are thoroughly despised today throughout the world.

Let me read to the Senate this editorial:

The reason that Britain's welfare state is about ready to go bankrupt is because the United States has a welfare state.

This remark is not an editor's aberration. It's the sober view, offered in all seriousness, of Mr. Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary.

Listen to the doleful Mr. Bevin:

"The United States is as much a welfare state as we—the British—are—"

Do Senators think they love us? They hate us. They hate us for our cockiness,

for our smugness. The editorial goes on to say—

only it is in a different form. One of our difficulties in the balance of payments today is the fact that the United States, in carrying out its welfare policy, has given basic prices to agriculture * * *."

I quote further from Mr. Bevin, as he is quoted in the editorial:

"I do not object—to the American welfare state. I think it is right, but on our part we have not yet worked out basic prices for commodities in the return way * * *."

I quote further:

"The Marshall plan must not be belittled. It must not be allowed to run down. It must be allowed to be carried on to the final fruition of European cooperation * * *."

I read further from the editorial:

Among the other United States policies causing trouble Mr. Bevin cited our high unemployment-insurance program and sick pay and the possibility that a great medical service will be established by the Government.

Now that explains everything. The British have a welfare state set up to guarantee full employment and cradle-to-the-grave security. This welfare state is slowly going bankrupt because it all costs more than the economy can pay for. Britain hasn't enough money—there's a dollar shortage, remember—to buy the things it needs from the United States to keep the welfare state going.

And the reason it can't buy is that we have a welfare state too. That is, our Government is also trying in its modest way to guarantee full employment and provide cradle-to-the-grave security. That means that the United States has inflated its wage-price structure, particularly farm prices. So the British welfare state can't afford to buy much from the American welfare state.

Now the only hope in this situation is that the American welfare state still has some reserves left, a little extra left from what is consumed by the state. And this little extra must be given to the British welfare state lest Attlee's ateller comes tumbling down.

Thus the fond best wish of Britain is that the United States doesn't go in for any more state welfaring, so that the British can be supported in their welfaring.

And, strangely, Mr. Bevin's right. He's spoken the only sense we've seen in the overseas cables.

We can luxuriate in but one welfare state at a time. Somebody—in this case the United States—has got to keep solvent so as to be able to foot the bills.

Mr. President, we cannot have a welfare state, we have to remain economically strong in order to support the English welfare state. But by the North Atlantic Pact the British may say, "You can have an armed encampment in America while we go ahead with our welfare state, but you cannot spend your money at home, because we must go on with our national socialization."

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McMahon in the chair). The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, I yield two more minutes to the Senator from Indiana.

Mr. JENNER. Therefore, I say, Mr. President, the one best hope for peace on this earth is that we remain economically and militarily strong. Moscow will keep the peace only so long as

we are strong enough to stay her covetousness.

All the jibberish and the double talk about this treaty was answered by the distinguished Senator from Georgia a few moments ago when that distinguished statesman said, "Of course there is a moral commitment." He did not refer to any specific article, but he said that moral commitment runs all the way through the treaty.

Of course, all Senators know that within the next 30 days there will be an arms implementation bill on this very floor for consideration, and again we will not get the truth, as we could not find out the truth about our commitment to Canada and the British about the atomic bomb, as we could not get the truth about what was told Norway would happen if she would come here and sign. We have been told that there will be a request for \$1,450,000,000. I say that is a fraud on the American public. The \$1,450,000,000 is for the cost of the transportation of war goods. It will cost the American taxpayer nearer \$10,000,000,000 than a billion. So I come back to my basic conclusion, can America afford it? If we go into an economic tail spin, I say that there goes the last best hope for peace on earth.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, I yield 13 minutes to the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT].

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I would not speak again if it had not been for the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Georgia. I think, however, his address makes very clear the complete difference of opinion, among those who are supporting the treaty, as to what it means, whether there is an arms obligation or is not.

The distinguished Senator from Georgia said that there was a moral and legal obligation to give arms. He said if this reservation were adopted, it would kill the treaty. He said if this reservation were adopted, the treaty would mean nothing, and be ineffective. I disagree completely with his position, but it only points up the necessity of adopting the reservation, if one does not agree with the position of the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. President, his position is fundamentally different from that, for instance, of the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG]. The Senator from Michigan emphasizes the fact that the heart of the treaty is the warning to Russia that we will be in the war if there is a war. The arms are incidental. He said in his original speech:

I know, Mr. President, there are many friends of this great peace adventure who are inclined to put their overriding emphasis upon the subsequent physical implementation of the pact. There are those who count it disingenuous to take any other view.

I do not agree. Frankly, I should have much less interest in this treaty if I thought its repressive influence for peace is measured by or dependent on any such implementation.

Yet the Senator from Georgia says that is the essential feature of the treaty. The Senator from Michigan said further:

It is not the military forces in being which measure the impact of this "knock-out" admonition, important though they are. It is the potential which counts, and any armed aggressor knows that he forthwith faces this potential from the moment he attacks. It is this total concept which, in my view, would give even a reincarnated Hitler pause.

Mr. President, the question here is, and that is what the vote on this reservation involves, do we think this is the real heart of this treaty, the warning to Russia, the Monroe Doctrine effect, or do we think it is the arms implementation, the preliminary aid to all these European nations?

I agree fully with the distinguished Senator from Michigan, and when the Senator from Georgia says that this treaty does not mean anything without the arms, I think he fails to realize the tremendous departure from our policy proposed, something that was denied for 150 years by the leaders of this country. It was against the whole foreign policy of our Government. It is a great departure, but one I think is necessary, to say that we will be in a European war if Russia starts such a war.

The pact itself is a tremendous departure, a tremendous concession. That is the heart of the treaty. I think that if we merely make it incidental to the arms obligation, as the State Department is inclined to do, if we do not make it perfectly clear we are going to deal with the arms question when it comes before us without obligation to any nation, then I think we are taking an additional and unnecessary step, a step which defeats the very deterrent effect on war which the treaty itself, without the arms, imposes upon all of Europe, as so graphically said by the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. President, I believe the treaty ought to be an obligation of the type of the Monroe Doctrine. I think the distinguished Senator from Texas does not quite realize what the Monroe Doctrine was. He seemed to think it was a much more extreme thing than this treaty is. Of course it was not. I quote from the message to the Congress at the time the Monroe Doctrine was enunciated:

We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

I suppose what the doctrine refers to is aggression, and what it says is that

if there is aggression on an American state we will go to war. That is not said expressly. The United States is not bound in clear terms, as the treaty now before the Senate would bind us. The doctrine was stated in a mild way, but it was the most effective peace measure in the history of the world. It kept other nations from attacking South America. A similar doctrine respecting the North Atlantic area, without the arms, without even the bilateral obligations, I believe, would be exactly as effective as the Monroe Doctrine was with relation to South America.

The distinguished Senator from Texas says the Monroe Doctrine went further than the proposed treaty does. Of course it did not. It left us much more free than the Atlantic Pact would. Under the Monroe Doctrine we could determine whether the aggression was justified; perhaps whether it had been stimulated by the improper action of some South American state. A nation might go in to collect a debt, but if it was obviously going to get out immediately it had collected it, if there was no permanent aggression, we were not obligated to go to war. In case of aggression our war would probably be directly with the European state which threatened the aggression; it would, to a large extent, be a war at sea. But above all it included no arms for any South American nation. There was no arms program in connection with the Monroe Doctrine.

So it seems to me that if we adopt this treaty without reservation, in view particularly of the speech of the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], we are going far beyond the Monroe Doctrine. We are getting into a military alliance. That is what it would be. The moment we put the arms provision in the treaty the alliance becomes a military alliance. The moment we arm the signatory nations it becomes at least a potentially offensive military alliance, because today nobody can separate offense from defense. The arms given for defense can be used for offense. The days of the Maginot line are gone. Defense is a dynamic, active process which consists largely in attacking the other nation at its weakest point. When we undertake to arm these nations to the teeth we turn a defensive alliance into an offensive alliance. Under the treaty we would obligate ourselves to go to the defense of the nations parties to the treaty, if they are attacked, no matter what the reason for the aggression is.

It seems to me that the pact, with the arms provision in it, would be no longer a deterrent. It would rather be an incitement to war, because Russia knows that we cannot complete the arming of these nations for 3 or 4 years. Russia may feel, if we were going to furnish arms to the signatory nations, that she would be justified—I do not think she would be justified, but she might think she was—in taking action against them before they were fully armed. She might contend that by our action she was going to be surrounded with arms from Norway to Turkey, and that sooner or later means war. In that event Russia might want war before we could arm the nations

fully. We cannot arm them for 3 or 4 years.

For that position I have the general support, in fact my belief grew from the position of the distinguished junior Senator from New York [Mr. DULLES], who in an article published in the New York Times on March 9, 1949, was quoted as saying the following:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES bluntly warned the negotiators of the proposed Atlantic Pact today to avoid all commitments that might be construed by the Soviet Government as "bringing United States military might" directly to Russia's Scandinavian border * * *

While the Soviet Government has no present intention of resorting to war as an instrument of national policy, nevertheless, said Mr. DULLES, it can be assumed that the Soviet state would use the Red army if its leaders felt that their homeland was imminently and seriously threatened.

It would, indeed, involve a high tribute to Soviet leaders to assume that, under these circumstances, they would exercise more self-control than would our people under comparable circumstances, as, for example, if the Soviet Union had military arrangements with a country at our border.

I think once the arms provision is added to the treaty it rather makes war more likely instead of making peace more likely.

As I said before, I believe the treaty is a violation of the whole theory of the United Nations. The United Nations permits nations to say, "We will come to the defense of each other if we are attacked and the United Nations does not act." It fills up a gap because of the veto in the United Nations. The United Nations Charter does not contemplate that under article 51 one of the most powerful nations of the world shall undertake to arm one-half the world against the other half. The United Nations looks to a gradual reduction of armaments. It does not contemplate the building up of an armament race.

It seems to me this treaty, taken altogether, with the arms, the whole program, which I think is inseparable unless we now make it perfectly clear that it is separable, unless we say in the reservation that we do not give the arms—I think this whole program means an armament race in Europe, and armament races in the future, as in the past, in my opinion, are more likely to lead to war than to peace.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Ohio has expired.

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, how much time have I left?

THE VICE PRESIDENT. Eight minutes.

Mr. DONNELL. I yield myself the remaining portion of my time.

The distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], speaking to the reservation "That the United States of America ratifies this treaty with the understanding that article 3 commits none of the parties thereto, morally or legally, to furnish or supply arms, armaments, military, naval, or air equipment or military, naval, or air supplies, including bombs and information relating to such

bombs, to any other party or parties to this treaty," says very clearly the following, and I have in my hand a transcript of his statement:

It would be difficult, Mr. President, to devise a reservation which would more completely negate the treaty.

At a further point the Senator from Georgia said:

Mr. President, a mutual-aid treaty specifically aimed to safeguard the members of the treaty against armed attack would itself be morally repudiated, it seems to me, if we were to say that there is no obligation resting upon us, either moral or legal.

So we find the distinguished Senator from Georgia coming here as a witness, direct and positive and unequivocal, to the effect, as I read his testimony, that there is an obligation under this treaty to furnish arms. For the Senator from Georgia, who is now upon the floor, said that the reservation which is proposed, which undertakes to say that the United States ratifies the treaty with the understanding that article 3 commits none of the parties to the furnishing of arms negates the treaty; therefore, obviously, he believes the treaty to be diametrically opposed to the provisions of the reservation.

Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Georgia shows, if I may be pardoned by him and by the Senate, a most unusual conflict of opinion, as I read his statement. In the earlier part of it he said, with respect to the reservation:

It is quite true that hereafter, if the treaty is ratified, the Congress might, even in the face of the reservation, furnish or supply arms, armaments, military, naval, or air equipment or military, naval, or air supplies to any other party or parties to this treaty.

I may interpolate, Mr. President, that I think he is entirely correct; that even if the reservation is adopted, Congress does have the right and power of its own volition, but not because of an obligation, to furnish the arms, armaments, and so forth. But on a subsequent page in his testimony, what do we find he said? He said:

It is true that the treaty does not raise an express obligation or commitment to furnish arms or military aid, but it does not exclude those things. That question is left to the Congress. But if we undertake by reservation to exclude, we may in the next reservation say that we will furnish no money.

Mr. President, this reservation does not exclude arms or armament, or any of the other equipment. It merely provides that we ratify the treaty with the understanding that we are not committed by article 3, but that it is left open to our own judgment.

Awhile ago I mentioned on the floor of the Senate a very significant observation by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of little Luxemburg, one of the signers, which I judge, by the way, will have the same vote on matters in the council as we do. What did the distinguished Foreign Minister say? This is what he said on the afternoon the treaty was signed.

This is his official speech made at that time:

Nothing proves better this ineluctable solidarity of the destinies of our countries than the fact that the United States, breaking with a tradition two centuries old, is concluding a military alliance in peacetime. That is an event of extraordinary historical significance for the United States and of the utmost importance for Europe.

To say that this is not a military alliance, to say that this treaty does not contemplate the binding of the signatories to furnish arms and equipment, to my mind is an absolutely mistaken construction of the treaty.

We were challenged this afternoon by the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] to show any danger whatsoever to the United Nations from this charter. I accept that challenge. I point out to him testimony which the Senator highly regards, and which I highly regard, the testimony of the distinguished junior Senator from New York [Mr. DULLES], in which he points out a number of dangers, one of which is that of the bypassing of the United Nations. I do not have time to develop the point. I made it on the floor of the Senate the other day, and quoted the Senator from New York. In substance it is that there is a danger in the event that this body of 11 nations shall consistently and frequently begin to meet together and decide things together. There is danger of arousing antagonism, antipathy, and envy—possibly even conflict—and breaking down the United Nations by reason of the bloc formed within it. Plenty of dangers to the United Nations could be readily demonstrated.

In my mind, and in the minds of many Senators, this treaty is a step designed to carry this Nation forward into a federation of nations. A Senator from New Jersey on my side of the aisle and a Senator from Tennessee on the other side of the aisle rose and eloquently and powerfully portrayed the advantages of a federation of nations. We were told by the distinguished former Secretary of War, Mr. Patterson, before the committee that the plan in behalf of which he, Justice Roberts, and Mr. Clayton appeared before the committee envisaged the idea of a legislature of the federation of the world. I questioned him on this point. I read the following from page 615 of the committee record:

Senator DONNELL. There would be a legislative body which would pass laws which would apply to all of the component entities, one of which would be the United States of America; is that right?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, sir; within the limited fields.

Senator DONNELL. Which include the political, economic, and military fields?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, but, of course, limits within those fields, too.

Senator DONNELL. Could you tell us what those limits are?

Mr. PATTERSON. Those are the limits where local interests were believed to be predominant.

Senator DONNELL. And who would decide whether or not they were predominant.

Mr. PATTERSON. That would be in the charter that you would adopt.

Senator DONNELL. Would you plan that the union itself, the Atlantic union, would decide whether or not local interests were pre-

dominant, or would each particular component country in that union have the right to determine whether local interests were predominant?

Mr. PATTERSON. No nation would join it who thought its proper local interest would be infringed.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DONNELL. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I ask the Senator from Missouri if he will read into the RECORD the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act relative to international arrangements?

Mr. DONNELL. I am glad to do so. Section 8, under the heading "International arrangements," reads as follows:

SEC. 8. (a) Definition: As used in this act, the term "international arrangement" shall mean any treaty approved by the Senate or international agreement hereafter approved by the Congress, during the time such treaty or agreement is in full force and effect.

(b) Effect of international arrangements: Any provision of this act or any action of the Commission to the extent that it conflicts with the provisions of any international arrangement made after the date of enactment of this act shall be deemed to be of no further force or effect.

(c) Policies contained in international arrangements: In the performance of its functions under this act, the Commission shall give maximum effect to the policies contained in any such international arrangement.

Mr. President, this afternoon I wish to renew with all the power within me the feeling that we are making a great mistake in binding our country by a series of exceedingly strong obligations to a course of action for 20 long years, without the ability to repent at any time during that period. The treaty would be binding, not only on ourselves, but upon the generation yet unborn.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the opponents has expired.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from California [Mr. DOWNEY].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. DOWNEY. Mr. President, it is my intention to vote for the pending treaty and against all reservations. However, I have little to add to the profoundly able debates which have preceded my statement. I wish to associate myself with the statesmanlike addresses delivered by the distinguished Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] and the distinguished Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG].

I wish, however, to present to the Senate the views upon this treaty of Upton Sinclair, one of America's noted authors. Recently I received a letter from Mrs. Sinclair enclosing a statement which her husband, Mr. Sinclair, had made in advocacy of the Atlantic Pact. I ask unanimous consent that the letter be printed at this point in the RECORD as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MONROVIA, CALIF., May 7, 1949.

Senator SHERIDAN DOWNEY,
Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR DOWNEY: When you and I last met we were discussing the various per-

sonalities which had helped to make and to break Epic. Maybe you recall what I told you was the reason for the peculiar behavior of one of them. I'm taking him as a sample of the behavior pattern (to use a psychology term) which distinguishes the Commies all over the world. (I don't know what became of him; I presume that he still functions somewhere in the devious way in which he functioned in Epic.)

Now we are living on a planet infested with swarms of such people; they have multiplied and spread into every country, and won the suffering, ignorant masses to a belief that communism will give them freedom from their sufferings and revenge on all who possess even small amounts of material goods. But we, of this fairly comfortable United States of America, go about our daily pleasures and chores with a false sense of security, partly due to our ignorant belief that the atom bomb will save us from Russia's grim determination to rule the world, and partly due to our self-indulgent wish to enjoy each day, without sacrificing even a portion of it, to the protection of our inherited freedom. We take this freedom for granted because our forefathers fought for it and we inherited it—just as the sons and daughters of rich parents take their economic security for granted. And so, it is history repeating itself; it is the glory and luxury of ancient Rome and ancient Greece falling into the decay which preceded the conquests which ended the glory and luxury.

I'm presuming to make this little speech to you because I have spent my adult life as the wife of a man who was spending his as a crusader for human freedom, and so have had to become a close observer. During those years I knew many of the individuals who left the Socialist Party to become Communists. They were of the congenial adventurer type, who can be thus typed because they all displayed one identical behavior pattern. It is the old rule-or-ruin type. And they are devious.

We have been out of politics for years, because we knew that no writer should give up his most effective tool, the pen, for one which other men are better fitted to use, and because both of us came out of that terrific Epic campaign too ill physically to endure any more political activity. But recently we saw that the time had come when we could no longer retain this political isolation. Upton would have to declare his opinion in a public way, because the devious Communists were misusing his name and influence. This misuse of his name was not new, but what was new was the crisis in the cold war. The false peace offensive of Russia to prevent the accomplishment of the purposes of the Atlantic Pact included the propaganda activities of all the small but powerfully effective Communist-front groups. It was in these groups all over the world that his name was being misused.

It was the same pattern of deviousness reported to us in letters from the readers of his books all over the world. So cleverly had he been misrepresented that many of his readers wrote that they were not sure where he stood.

Now, I'm sure that you know that he does have a lot of influence on "the people." Perhaps you do not know that this influence is scattered all over the world; for his books have been translated and read all over, for a third of a century, beginning with *The Jungle*, which had wide distribution in both Germany and Russia as well as in other countries. One of the tragic difficulties of the present is that the average person does not know the magnitude of the difference between Russian communism and what on the European continent is called social democracy and in England Fabian socialism. An example of this difference exists, however, today for all to see, if only the average citizen wanted to trouble himself to see. I mean the difference between

Russia under communism and England under the British Labor Party. Russia is a police state, threatening the freedom of all peoples everywhere. In England there is an extension of the New Deal, as we had it during the Roosevelt regime. In Russia there is violence and ruthless suppression. In England there is freedom of speech, the secret ballot, and the decent self-discipline of a people using these instruments of freedom to further achievements of democracy.

This is a heart-to-heart letter from Upton's wife to a United States Senator who was his running mate on the Democratic ticket in the epic campaign of 1934. I hope you give it a little of your thought.

Our foreign policy at this hour is more urgent than any legislation concerning our internal affairs, urgent as these may be.

I am supplementing this letter with a copy of a statement Upton has just sent off to the New Leader for publication in that rather small but excellent New York newspaper. I feel sure I am not asking too much of your time, crowded as I know that time to be. As I said before, I know, or have known, individual Communists, and so can see the meaning of Russia's "peace" offensive.

Sincerely,

MARY CRAIG SINCLAIR.
(Mrs. U. S.)

Mr. DOWNEY. Mr. President, I was a candidate for Lieutenant Governor of California on the Democratic ticket in 1934. Upton Sinclair was then the Democratic candidate for Governor. During several months of the campaign I became intimately acquainted with him. Throughout his life Mr. Sinclair had been an ardent, outspoken, and crusading Socialist. Although I had never believed in the same political principles as had he, I recognized always his candor, his burning genius, and his profound devotion to the welfare of all humanity.

It is said that his works now are more widely read throughout the world than are those of any other American or foreign author. In the past decade Mr. Sinclair has written nine great books, known as the Lanny Budd series, on international subjects. One of them, *Dragon's Teeth*, received the Pulitzer prize in 1943.

These novels constitute, in my opinion, one of the greatest outpourings of genius, both in quality and quantity, that have ever occurred in the literary world.

The statement which was enclosed by Mrs. Sinclair, from her husband, is very brief, and I wish now to read it to the Senate:

(By Upton Sinclair)

I have been asked by the new leader to elaborate on my statement concerning Russia which was embodied in an article by Prof. George Counts, published in the March 19 issue of that paper. Last January Professor Counts kindly wrote me that Mr. Fadeyev had included me in a published list of the "finest writers, artists, and scientists of the capitalist world" who "invariably have become friends of the U. S. S. R."—the "whole flower of world culture." On January 6 I wrote Professor Counts the reply which he published in the above-mentioned article. In this reply I called Russia "a reactionary, nationalist imperialism" and said that "the present party line is bound to lead to another world war." I told Mr. Fadeyev that either he "had not read my books" or that "they have been incorrectly translated in the Russian editions."

Mr. Fadeyev's kind of misrepresentation of Socialists had become an old story to me.

It began in the 1920's when Willi Munzenberg in Berlin took to signing my name to manifestos which I had never seen; I warned him twice in letters, and when he did it again I exposed him in an article in *Vorwarts*, the Social-Democratic newspaper of Berlin. But no writer whose books are published as mine are in most of the countries of the world can answer all the falsehoods and misrepresentations made about him by individual Communists. It would take a staff of translators and secretaries and a small fortune, none of which I ever possessed.

For the past 12 years I have devoted myself to writing a series of historical novels depicting the world in our time. I have tried in these books to give all sides a hearing, as an honest historian should. I could only hope that they were honestly translated.

I have defended the right of the people of Russia to choose their own form of government, as long as I could hope they were choosing it. But I have been forced to realize that it does not happen. The Communists themselves make it impossible for an honest man to defend anything they do. They take advantage of any such defense by pretending that he approves of everything Russia does, just as Mr. Fadeyev did.

I have spent my life in upholding American democracy by criticizing its imperfections in order to help all of us to continue improving it. For this right to openly criticize, I thank my God and those great American revolutionists who gave us our freedom and the Constitution under which we enjoy this right.

The Russian people were given a Constitution which proclaimed their freedom, but it is never made effective in practice and is nothing but camouflage. Indeed it turned out to be one of those many devices by which the Communist leaders have, throughout the years, misled the liberals outside of Russia into believing that Russia was building a free state.

If any one in Russia dared to criticize the evils of the present Russian system, as I have criticized those in my own country, he or she would be shot, and countless thousands have been so shot.

The failure of the Russian leaders to improve upon the inhuman regime of Czarist Russia has brought all the truly liberal forces of the world into danger. Russia's brutal Communist regime has made it all too easy for fascism to proclaim that all brands of liberalism are dangerous and lead to despotism.

It is necessary for the world outside of Russia to show up the Russian rulers and keep them from expanding their power. Incidentally, this is the only thing we can do to help the people of Russia. The free peoples everywhere must be saved from the war of world conquest which Russia's leaders are fomenting. For that reason we must unite wholeheartedly with the other free peoples of the world in the Atlantic Pact.

I have thus quoted at some length from Upton Sinclair because of my conviction that his noted voice, both in America and abroad, should be heard in this debate, and by his millions of devoted readers scattered everywhere.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, how much time have we remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GEORGE in the chair). The Senator has 28 minutes remaining, so the Clerk advises.

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH].

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, I shall add just a few words to the debate because of the regret I feel over

the interpretation of this pact as made by my distinguished friend and colleague the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT]. If I interpreted the pact in the way he does—as an incitement to war and a balance-of-power armament race—I would be as much opposed to the pact as he is. But I hope I can indicate my own interpretation of the pact in a few words; and I express the hope—I admit it is a very vague one—that if the Senator from Ohio could only interpret the pact in the way I do, he would vote for it.

I have put down my points in order, and I shall present them briefly in an endeavor to make clear what the whole debate means to me.

First of all, Mr. President, it seems to me that the North Atlantic Treaty is the essential next step since the United Nations Charter was ratified in the great movement toward international collaboration to preserve the peace. The only reason we have to have this treaty at this time is that the United Nations failed to function as intended because of the abuse of the veto power. Because of that difficulty, we now have no way to use the collective force of the world to stop aggression. It is my considered judgment that had Hitler faced an Atlantic Pact he would never have started World War II.

My second thought is this: This treaty is the logical next step in the development of our conception of the Monroe Doctrine, and it makes possible the extension of the Monroe Doctrine because the nations affected welcome it and are a part of it. The whole purpose of the Monroe Doctrine was to preserve our independence, our way of life, and our democracy. As I construe the North Atlantic Treaty, it has exactly the identical purpose and is a logical development of our original Monroe Doctrine conception.

My third point is that the Atlantic Pact is basically an expanded Monroe Doctrine, which the Senator from Ohio has stated he hoped we might have, but with this important difference—and here is where I differ from the Senator from Ohio: It is not a unilateral declaration but is a collective assumption of responsibility. I think this treaty is a multilateral acceptance of responsibility, and I believe that the nations participating in the treaty desire to have it work in that way. Certainly the nations of South America no longer wish to be treated paternalistically, but they wish to accept their own responsibility and be treated accordingly. The Act of Chapultepec and the Rio Pact are evidence of the development of a unilateral Monroe Doctrine into a multilateral doctrine. Today our independence, our way of life, and our democracy are threatened, just as they were in the days of Monroe and Canning; but we have learned that in order to preserve them in the present contracted world we must include in our pacts of mutual aid the democracies of western Europe, as well as our fellow Republics of the two American continents. Mr. President, I submit that this treaty is a logical development of the principle of the Monroe Doctrine.

My fourth point is that the treaty obviously creates obligations, but a vote for the treaty does not bind any of us to vote for an armament program which may call for specific armament aids to specific countries. There should be no arming of separate countries. There should and will be, undoubtedly, recommendations from the Council set up under article 9, and a joint defense program undoubtedly will be recommended and probably will be adopted, with all the treaty countries participating. That will be a joint, over-all interpretation of what the treaty means—not an armament race, but just the reverse, namely, an attempt to reduce armaments by this approach.

My fifth point is that it should be pointed out and emphasized that beyond any specific military preparations—I admit that in the near future such specific military preparations on our part would be inadequate in case Russia were to decide to move aggressively immediately; and I believe that too much stress has been placed upon that point—the big value of the pact is its psychological effect in warning any aggressor country that very definitely we will be lined up with the other Atlantic Pact countries to protect the whole area against aggression. We intend to bring out clearly that we favor all attempts for self-help and mutual aid, other than merely military aid, and that we will do all we can to make the participating countries strong economically, socially, and spiritually. It is this emphasis which, to my mind, has been overlooked in our debates, but I believe it is the all-important emphasis. The spotlight should be taken off the military phases, and should be placed on the psychological value of the pact as a whole and the mutual aids, such as ECA and other operations, given to participating countries, which will make all of them a united front against the threat of another world war.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from New Jersey has expired.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, I wonder whether I can obtain an additional half minute, in order to conclude my remarks.

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield an additional half minute to the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, my sixth point is that any proposals for joint military aid must be treated on their own merits, and can be adequately considered after the pact has been ratified and the over-all psychological defense has been perfected.

My seventh point is that the pact is within the spirit of the United Nations, and will aid in the development of the over-all purposes of the United Nations in the preservation of peace.

We need the pact in order to make the United Nations succeed.

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield 9½ minutes to the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY].

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, a few moments ago, as I sat back of the pillars and listened to the argument on the floor of this Chamber, the clock seemed to be

turned back, and I remembered that Webster stood upon this floor and in his reply to Hayne, he began with the general idea that it was well to pause and chart our course. I think all of us are grateful that, under a government such as ours, we can pause, even if it takes weeks and weeks, to chart our course. I think we have charted the course here. While the pact has made queer bedfellows, I think that out of the discussion we are charting a course. I have no fear of the result. I trust the fears which we have heard expressed will vanish, and we shall know that light of the right kind has entered our minds to direct and guard and guide these people. We are but the servants of a great people, and we should not fear.

I have spoken twice on the pact. In a series of interchanges with my distinguished friend, the Senator from Missouri [Mr. DONNELL] on March 30, I stated my conclusion as to the meaning and obligations of the pact.

Mr. President, the pact means something. We are not entering into a mere scrap of paper.

Something was said a few minutes ago about our breaking with tradition. We broke with tradition in 1776. We have broken with traditions through the years of our national life when it meant progress. That [pointing to the painting] was a breaking with tradition when Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation.

The world has been contracted through our ingenuity. The question is whether we are going to be adequate to meet the responsibility. I think we are. So I would say to those who have expressed a little fear, "Fear not, God's in His heaven, all's right with the world." The Lord has looked after us, and if we play the game squarely as we should, as men, this Government will perform its obligations and the world will be our debtor.

I shall not discuss the reservations; they have been fully covered. I merely want to say the English language is a vehicle, a queer vehicle at times. One distinguished Senator said, on an occasion when he was leaving the old Senate, "The human mind is a queer contraption. Men can see what they want to see." I listened to the argument by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] and I listened to the argument of the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG]. I think they were complementary. I felt they both demonstrated clearly that the great result which would come out of this international arrangement or agreement was that America—America, Mr. President, mind you, the leader among the nations; your country and mine—speaks definitely, concretely, and dynamically in an age of uncertainty; speaks to the world as to where we stand. It says, in other words, "One for all, and all for one." Under one part of the pact it says, "If there is an attack, we are in there shooting." It says, in no uncertain language, that if and when the Congress of the United States deems it necessary to take steps to look after ourselves and the peace of the world, it will become necessary to take other steps in the nature of

insurance. Some have called it providing arms, some have called it consultation, some have called it this and that. I care not what it may be called.

Mr. President, we are living in an age which is entirely different from the one in which our fathers lived. The traditions of our fathers which have been demonstrated to be sound and healthful, and applicable to world conditions today, we should maintain and retain. Let us recognize that the world of today is a different world from what it was in the days before World War II. We have planes now that will travel from 700 to 900 miles an hour. We have guided missiles that will go 3,000 miles. We have other instrumentalities. The good Lord only knows what is around the corner. It is not the same age. What is more, we have gravitated to a position of responsibility, and we are either going to meet it head on, or we are going to fail in our leadership in this critical age.

So, Mr. President, I am grateful for the opportunity to say a few words at the conclusion of this debate. I have no fear of the results. This pact will not bring the millenium. It will not cause war. It will not by itself make for peace. Russia and the peoples of the earth will decide the course of history. But this pact will, I hope, make for unity among the contracting parties and restrain any potential aggressor.

Within the four corners of this pact or treaty will be found the intent of the pact makers. Its purpose is clear, to provide unity of action to resist aggression.

Walter Lippmann, in his column as it appeared in the Washington Post of July 14, 1949, sets out clearly the argument in relation to the obligation of this country as interpreted by the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT], and Secretary Acheson, the obligation in relation to supplying arms. It was this editorial of Lippmann's that caused me again briefly to restate my own viewpoint.

I am of the opinion that if this pact becomes the law of the land—

First. It does not in any way delimit the right of Congress to say what the implementation shall be, if any, under the pact.

Second. This, to me, is particularly clear because under article 9 there is the specific provision that the Council can only recommend the measures for implementation under 3 and 5. Recommend to whom? Answer: To the signers of the pact.

I hold that the international conditions or circumstances, as they develop, will determine the character and need of the implementation, and then the Congress will determine how this Nation shall meet that need. Of course, as a practical matter, if an emergency arises, the President, under his powers, would act. That power to act can be delimited neither by treaty nor by act of Congress.

In view of the fact that a military-aid bill is in contemplation and that previous discussion by the State Department with the leaders of other nations in relation to military aid may have created in the minds of some of the statesmen of the

other pact-signer nations the conclusion that the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] has contended for, namely, "that every one of the other signatories now believes it would acquire a treaty right to receive arms and that we have a treaty obligation to supply arms to each and every one of them," I believe the suggestion of Walter Lippmann in relation to any arms assistance that is to be given should be carried out, to wit: Make the European arms bill a part of the American military budget. Authorize the Pentagon to furnish arms to the European defense system up to a specific amount out of surplus, if that is found to be the right thing, and instruct the administration to find the money by economy within the existing military appropriations.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, how much time have we left?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Fifteen minutes.

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON].

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, we do not make any facts when we ratify this treaty. We did not make any facts when we negotiated it. The treaty is the recognition of the facts which have been made largely by others. The policy we set forth in the treaty is a policy which every thinking man in the country knows we would have to adopt in the event a conflict should break out. The sensible part for us is to see that that conflict does not commence again. There are those who say we do not know whether the Kaiser and Hitler would have marched, if we had had this kind of instrument in existence in 1914 and 1939. But there are hundreds of thousands of our dead, and the dead of other lands, who lie buried all over the earth, who bear mute testimony to our failure to speak bravely and in time. The pact is an effort to prevent that terrible catastrophe from happening again. We have pledged our troth one with another to see to it that no aggressor dares again make war on the world.

The Senator from Ohio has referred to the fact that he wants to face realities, but it seems to me that he and every other Senator who has taken the position he has, has flown away into the stratosphere, and has denied the realities the Soviet Union imposes upon this country and upon the world. We who shall support this treaty are the ones who face reality—the reality of a despotic and cruel power which has said time and time again that it intends to inherit the earth. That, Mr. President, is what at all costs we are determined to prevent. That, Mr. President, is the reason for this treaty.

The Senator from Ohio talks about our facing an arms race. I pointed out last night that the greatest arms race the world has ever known is not faced—we are in it. We might as well admit it. There will undoubtedly come a time when the Soviet Union will be in possession of weapons of mass destruction, with which in sufficient quantities, she might be able to impose her will upon the world. When that day comes, the safety of this country will depend entirely upon the kind of

combination we have with other free peoples of the earth. This is a step, and a mighty effective one, looking toward that day—that day which we are going to face just as surely as we are here in this Chamber today. That is facing reality, and any attempt to deny it is running away from it.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, how much time have we left?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Twelve minutes.

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN].

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I shall vote for ratification of the Atlantic Pact and against amendments or reservations. In voting for the pact, I refuse to assume any commitment, moral or otherwise, to vote for the military-aid program. This does not necessarily mean that I will be against the military-aid program. As a matter of fact, I favor a practical and intelligent military-aid program if it appears necessary. I favor anything that is a timely challenge to destroyers of peace. But I certainly reserve my judgment and my right to determine the kind of such military aid, its amount, and its duration.

I can see no inconsistency with this position as taken by myself or by my colleagues who, having voted in favor of the ratification of the pact, may vote against the military-aid program in the form recommended by the administration; nor would it be inconsistent for other Senators to vote against the ratification of the pact and yet support a military-aid program in a form satisfactory to them.

The Atlantic Pact and the military-aid program, although possibly dependent upon each other, are each separate and distinct. Their joining together is entirely dependent on the will of the Congress. The two may meet. But it is for the Congress of the United States, exercising its sovereign constitutional right, to determine the time and the conditions for such a meeting, and even whether this meeting should take place at all. It is with this understanding, confirmed by the distinguished senior Senators from Michigan and Texas as well as by the State Department, that I intend to vote for the pact.

I have no quarrel with those of my colleagues who will vote against the ratification of the pact. I respect their earnest determination to abide by the principles which guide them. It is perfectly clear by now that a more practical and more powerful instrument of peace than a mere military alliance could have been devised by the State Department. I can see behind some of the articles of this pact dark clouds of confusion leading possibly to mutual dissatisfaction and dissension among its signatories. A far better pact could have been written had the State Department taken the American people more into its confidence instead of conditioning and pressurizing American public opinion with its official propaganda machine.

In the political field the Atlantic Pact, like the Marshall plan in the economic field, contains a great idea. The idea is to ally a united front of peaceful nations

against any design for conquest by a desperate nation feverishly rearming behind the iron curtain.

The American people are ready to meet this threat and are willing to undergo any sacrifice necessary to maintain peace in the world.

The State Department is apparently not yet quite ready to meet the challenge squarely. It could have produced a pact with a more practical and more effective instrument to carry out the great idea of cooperative defense of peaceful nations against the scheming war lords of any nation.

Thus, we are confronted with a most unwelcome choice: We must either vote for the pact, realizing that it is but little better than a military alliance and that it offers no permanent solution to the problem of world peace; or we must vote against the pact and run the risk of further encouraging aggression and discouraging our peaceful Atlantic neighbors. In voting for the ratification of the pact, I believe I choose the best of these two alternatives.

After the submission of the Atlantic Pact, the task of those who now favor its ratification would have been less difficult had the State Department been more logical and less inconsistent in its statements about the pact, its purposes, and its commitments. Instead of frank and direct statements on the relation between the Atlantic Pact and military aid to other signatory nations, we were given statements which tried to satisfy everybody and pleased no one.

At first it was stated officially that the Atlantic Pact constitutes a moral commitment for military aid to Europe now. Later it was officially stated in the Department of State Bulletin that the military assistance program was formulated, not only separately, but even before the Atlantic Pact was formulated. And as for commitments, legal or moral, the latest position in the State Department is that the ratification of the Atlantic Pact does not commit us in any way, shape, or manner to the military assistance program.

Again, until quite recently, the speeches of State Department officials were bristling with the phrase "implementation of the pact"—meaning the military aid program that would follow the ratification of the pact. Today, I understand, the word "implementation" is taboo.

I submit, Mr. President, that when the American Nation is about to be launched on a new and perilous journey of peacetime military alliance, when we are about to undertake a new and gigantic experiment jointly with the nations of western Europe, numbering about 200,000,000 people, it would have been far better not to have been confronted with the contradictory and illogical statements of the framers of the Atlantic Pact.

Mr. President, I have delivered approximately half of what I had prepared to say, and I now ask unanimous consent that the remainder of my remarks may be printed in the RECORD, in order that I may give back a little of the time allotted to me by the Senator from Texas.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The remainder of Mr. AIKEN's speech is as follows:

There are other circumstances that make the passage of the Atlantic Pact more stormy than it should be. It is a strange coincidence that the latest of the inevitable series of British pound crises should have coincided with the debate on the Atlantic Pact.

Another strange coincidence is the reported demand by the British Government for detailed information and assistance to build atomic bombs. Why is this demand—a demand which apparently is so weighty and so urgent as to cause the President to call an extraordinary meeting—why, I ask, is this demand made now during the critical phase of the debate on the Atlantic Pact? Is it by any chance to impress the United States Senate with the thought that unless Britain is lifted once again from her deep financial pit—a pit which in large part is of the British Government's own digging—that unless we rush to her assistance with extra billions of dollars she will regretfully have to produce her own atomic bombs and make her own arrangements with other European nations and perhaps with Soviet Russia?

I should have much preferred to hear about an extraordinary meeting under our President in which there would be discussed not the question of how to produce British atomic bombs with the help of American dollars, but the question on which our survival might depend, and that means how to stop ideological fanatics from producing and using any atomic bombs; how to avert the impending atomic catastrophe; how to lift from the backs of the farmer, the working man, and others, the back-breaking load of the armament race; how to put out the flames of violence and war that are breaking out more and more often over the fear-drawn face of the earth; how to use the might of America and the yearning of humanity to establish a world organization based on a world law against aggressors, interpreted by a world court and enforced by a world police from all peaceful nations.

We have been disappointed with the results obtained by the United Nations. Although it has many fine and constructive accomplishments to its credit, particularly in the economic and cultural fields, the stern fact remains that it has failed, and failed sadly in its primary purpose, as stated in the UN Charter: "To maintain international peace and security."

Ever since the United Nations was founded, well-intentioned people have been asserting that its structure was sturdy, that it needed only time to grow and become strong. I have been one of those people. Now, however, it has become apparent to all that in preventing armament races and ridding the world from the fear of war it has been impotent. Impotent because of the veto right.

It has been said that it is the Russian misuse of the veto which prevents the United Nations from functioning. This is not technically true. The veto right is there in the Charter, duly approved and signed by all members of the United Nations. Russia has a perfectly legal right to use this power.

It is not Russia's vetoes that are endangering the future of the United Nations and the world. It is the obvious defects in the Charter itself, which enable Russia or any other permanent member to paralyze it at will.

It was not the absence of the United States that caused the downfall of the League of Nations. It was the presence of the same defects we see now in the Charter of the United Nations. Great promises made in the United Nations Charter have been betrayed through these fatal defects. It was promised there to eliminate the armament race. That promise is a tragically empty phrase.

Only 4 years after the United States Senate ratified the United Nations Charter we are witnessing the biggest armament race of all time. The substance of America, of Russia, and of the world is being sapped by this cancerous growth. No nation in the world is immune from this all-devouring plague that could spell certain disaster even to America in spite of our vast resources. Even the Marshall plan with its gigantic appropriations is but a stream flowing into the raging sea of destructive armament production.

It was solemnly promised in the United Nations Charter to build an international police force to protect the many peaceful nations against the violence of the few. Today, after 4 years of fruitless efforts, the United Nations has not even a company of soldiers, nor is it likely to have, except as private guards to its officials.

When the United Nations was confronted with the terrifying problem of the atomic bomb, it failed after its Commission held over 200 meetings.

Yet it is clear to every thinking American that unless we can stop the armament race, remove the atomic threat before it engulfs us, and establish an international police force of all peaceful nations, this Atlantic Pact, or a hundred Atlantic pacts, can only postpone but never prevent a catastrophic war of nations.

But if we use the Atlantic Pact as an instrument to produce a greater influence for a truly effective world organization, then the Atlantic Pact may prove to be the foundation stone for a world pact within which the American, the Russian, and all other peoples may work side by side for lasting peace.

This is the reason why I, together with 10 of my colleagues, subscribed on July 8 to the resolution so ably presented to this Senate by the distinguished junior Senator from Alabama for the extension of the Atlantic Pact either into a revised United Nations or into a world pact open to all nations including Russia, should she choose to join, and for the establishment, meanwhile, of an Atlantic contingent from smaller nations as a nuclear international police force. We intend to pursue the principles and methods of this resolution when the military aid bill is introduced.

We seek no war with Russia, nor do we condone the appeasement of Russia. We believe there is a third way—a stronger and a nobler way. That way lies in the completion of the task begun by the nations of the world in San Francisco in 1945—the task of saving the world by the only way that the world can be saved—the way of a world organization under lawful authority to punish the actual, and to disarm the potential, aggressors.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. Seven minutes remain.

MR. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Florida [Mr. PEPPER].

MR. PEPPER. Mr. President, whether one favors the ratification of the Atlantic Pact or opposes it, I am sure there is not a Member of the Senate who does not regret the necessity for this decision. It is not a choice we voluntarily assume, Mr. President, but it is a necessity which we feel compelled to face. There are some who see in the pact more danger than the uncertainty of not ratifying it in this body. On the other hand, others feel conscientiously that its calculated and unknown risks are better to be assumed than others of which we know not. So, Mr. President, I shall cast my vote for the advice and consent which I hope the Senate will give to the ratification of the pact.

I think it will be proven that the important part of this proposal is not that one which has been causing the most concern to some—the assumed obligation to furnish arms. The important part of the pact is the express obligation which we for the first time assume to go to the aid of any country in this group which is the victim of armed attack. We give up our freedom of choice to be neutral or to take sides; we abandon the previously enjoyed prerogative of debate and discussion, and we commit ourselves irrevocably to the defense of a nation which is the victim of an armed assault. That is a new and, it may be, a dangerous departure from our previous course in international policy.

I believe General Marshall stated the basis of this proposal when he appeared last year before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House and said that the purpose of this pact is to bring about an equilibrium in world power which we will make possible the effective functioning of the United Nations as it was intended to function when it was originally conceived. Because I think the pact, under all the circumstances, will contribute to a stronger United Nations and, in the end, an effect in world government and universal peace, I shall support it.

MR. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes.

I have in my hand a letter from the Secretary of State dealing with reservations. I do not think I shall have time to read it all, but I ask that it be incorporated in the RECORD in full.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 15, 1949.

The Honorable TOM CONNALLY,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: In response to your request for my views concerning the various reservations which have been proposed with respect to ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty by this Government, I should like to deal with them collectively in this letter. I am also writing you concerning each of them individually.

The effect of the proposed reservations would be to cast doubt upon the determination of the Government and people of the United States to do their utmost for peace and thereby substantially to nullify the effectiveness of the treaty as an instrument for accomplishing its great purpose—the maintenance of peace.

The treaty has been negotiated and signed by the United States as a major step in carrying out the advice given by the Senate when it adopted Senate Resolution 239 by an overwhelming vote. Among the objectives which that resolution advised the President that the United States should particularly pursue was:

"Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security."

I attach great importance, as I am sure the Senate does, to those words "making clear its determination." The treaty has been designed, with full and complete constitutional safeguards, to make our determination just as clear as is humanly possible. In transmitting it to the Senate the President stated:

"The treaty makes clear the determination of the people of the United States and

of our neighbors in the North Atlantic community to do their utmost to maintain peace with justice and to take such action as they deem necessary if the peace is broken."

This vital element was also stressed by the Foreign Relations Committee's report in dealing with the main purpose of the treaty and in its summary of reasons for recommending ratification.

I cannot stress too much the importance of making clear our determination if we are to accomplish our great objective of maintaining peace. Anything which casts doubt upon our determination, or the will of the American people, as would adoption of the proposed reservations, would greatly reduce the effectiveness of the treaty as a contribution to peace.

I can think of few events that would cast more doubt upon our determination to do our utmost for peace than for the Senate of the United States to accept amendments to the pending resolution which would involve the renegotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty. The treaty has been concluded after long and painstaking negotiations in which there was full consultation and cooperation between the United States negotiators and the Foreign Relations Committee, and in which the United States negotiators scrupulously followed Senate Resolution 239 as their directive, even to the extent of embodying some of its actual language in the treaty. It has the strong and unanimous support of the Foreign Relations Committee. To reopen negotiations with 11 other nations, 5 of which have already deposited their ratifications, would give rise at least to prolonged delay in bringing the treaty into effect and would certainly create the greatest uncertainty as to the intentions and dependability of the United States. Such action by the United States would not only raise doubts as to our determination in the minds of those who might be considering aggression, but would certainly raise the gravest doubts in the minds of our partners in the pact and thereby destroy the momentum of confidence which has been growing steadily as the result of the determination hitherto shown on the part of the free nations to act resolutely together.

In view of these considerations, which I know from statements you and Senator VANDENBERG have made during the debate that you have much in mind, I strongly hope that the treaty will be approved by the Senate without any reservations whatever.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON.

Mr. CONNALLY. One of the most important portions of the letter is as follows:

I can think of few events that would cast more doubt upon our determination to do our utmost for peace than for the Senate of the United States to accept amendments to the pending resolution which would involve the renegotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty. The treaty has been concluded after long and painstaking negotiations in which there was full consultation and cooperation between the United States negotiators and the Foreign Relations Committee, and in which the United States negotiators scrupulously followed Senate Resolution 239 as their directive, even to the extent of embodying some of its actual language in the treaty. It has the strong and unanimous support of the Foreign Relations Committee. To reopen negotiations with 11 other nations, 5 of which have already deposited their ratifications, would give rise at least to prolonged delay in bringing the treaty into effect and would certainly create the greatest uncertainty as to the intentions and dependability of the United States. Such action by the United States would not only raise doubts as to our determination in the minds of those who might be consid-

ering aggression, but would certainly raise the gravest doubts in the minds of our partners in the pact and thereby destroy the momentum of confidence which has been growing steadily as the result of the determination hitherto shown on the part of the free nations to act resolutely together.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, permit me to say that the purpose of all reservations is to dilute and water down the treaty itself. The purpose of those who propound reservations is to cut and chisel away some parts of the treaty they do not like. I hope Senators will vote against all reservations and in favor of the ratification of the treaty.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's 2 minutes' time has expired. He has two more minutes.

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield the balance of my time to the Senator from Illinois [Mr. LUCAS].

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Illinois is recognized for a minute and three-quarters.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, that will be sufficient time. I merely asked the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee for a minute or two in order that I might at this time pay a tribute to all members of that committee. The painstaking way in which the members of that committee exhaustively considered every phase of the North Atlantic Pact seems to me to deserve the appreciation and the sincere commendation of all Members of the Senate, irrespective of how they shall vote.

I wish to pay special tribute to the distinguished Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], the chairman of the committee, as well as the leading minority member, the distinguished Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG]. From the beginning to the end of the hearings and throughout the debate on the floor of the Senate the discussion has been kept upon a high and dignified plane. Not one utterance, I believe, will be found in which there was any partisanship shown in connection with this great, controversial issue, an issue perhaps as soul searching and far reaching as any that has ever been debated in the Senate of the United States.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's time has expired. All time for debate has expired. The vote first comes on reservation No. 1, as modified, offered by the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY], for himself, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT], and the Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS].

Mr. DONNELL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will state the reservation, as modified.

The CHIEF CLERK. It is proposed to add the following at the end of the resolution of ratification:

The United States of America ratifies this treaty with the understanding that article 3 commits none of the parties thereto, morally or legally, to furnish or supply arms, armaments, military, naval or air equipment or military, naval, or air supplies, including atomic bombs and information relating thereto, to any other party or parties to this treaty.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the reservation as modified. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the Secretary will call the roll.

The roll was called.

Mr. MYERS. I announce that the senior Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business, having been appointed an adviser to the delegation of the United States of America to the Second World Health Organization Assembly, meeting at Rome, Italy.

The result was announced—yeas 21, nays 74, as follows:

YEAS—21

Brewster	Flanders	Schoeppel
Bricker	Jenner	Taft
Butler	Johnson, Colo.	Taylor
Byrd	Kem	Watkins
Cain	Langer	Wherry
Cordon	Malone	Williams
Donnell	Martin	Young

NAYS—74

Alken	Hoey	Morse
Anderson	Holland	Mundt
Baldwin	Humphrey	Murray
Bridges	Hunt	Myers
Capehart	Ives	Neely
Chapman	Johnson, Tex.	O'Connor
Chavez	Johnston, S. C.	O'Mahoney
Connally	Kefauver	Pepper
Douglas	Kerr	Reed
Downey	Kilgore	Robertson
Dulles	Knowland	Russell
Eastland	Lodge	Saltinshall
Eaton	Long	Smith, Maine
Ferguson	Lucas	Smith, N. J.
Frear	McCarran	Sparkman
Fulbright	McCarthy	Stennis
George	McClellan	Thomas, Okla.
Gillette	McFarland	Thomas, Utah
Graham	McGrath	Thye
Green	McKellar	Tobey
Gurney	McMahon	Tydings
Hayden	Magnuson	Vandenberg
Hendrickson	Maybank	Wiley
Hickenlooper	Miller	Withers
Hill	Millikin	

NOT VOTING—1

Ellender

So reservation No. 1, offered by Mr. WHERRY, for himself, Mr. TAFT, and Mr. WATKINS, was rejected.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to remark that with the exception of one Senator, who is absent abroad, by leave of the Senate, on official business, every Member of the Senate voted on this roll call.

The question now is on reservation No. 2, offered by the Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS], which will be stated:

The CHIEF CLERK. At the end of the said resolution of ratification it is proposed to insert the following:

The United States understands and construes article 5 of the treaty as follows:

That the United States assumes no obligation to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area or to assist any other party or parties in said area, by armed force, or to employ the military, air, or naval forces of the United States under article V or any article of the treaty, for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which under the Constitution has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military, air, or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, on this question I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered, and the roll was called.

Mr. MYERS. I announce that the senior Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business, having been appointed an adviser to the delegation of the United States of America to the Second World Health Organization Assembly meeting at Rome, Italy.

The result was announced—yeas 11, nays 84, as follows:

YEAS—11		
Butler	Langer	Watkins
Donnell	Malone	Wherry
Jenner	Taft	Young
Kem	Taylor	
NAYS—84		
Aiken	Hendrickson	Miller
Anderson	Hickenlooper	Millikin
Baldwin	Hill	Morse
Brewster	Hoey	Mundt
Bricker	Holland	Murray
Bridges	Humphrey	Myers
Byrd	Hunt	Neely
Cain	Ives	O'Connor
Capehart	Johnson, Colo.	O'Mahoney
Chapman	Johnson, Tex.	Pepper
Chavez	Johnston, S. C.	Reed
Connally	Kefauver	Robertson
Cordon	Kerr	Russell
Douglas	Kilgore	Saltonstall
Downey	Knowland	Schoeppel
Dulles	Lodge	Smith, Maine
Eastland	Long	Smith, N. J.
Ecton	Lucas	Sparkman
Ferguson	McCarran	Stennis
Flanders	McCarthy	Thomas, Okla.
Frear	McClellan	Thomas, Utah
Fulbright	McFarland	Thye
George	McGrath	Tobey
Gillette	McKellar	Tydings
Graham	McMahon	Vandenberg
Green	Magnuson	Wiley
Gurney	Martin	Williams
Hayden	Maybank	Withers

NOT VOTING—1

Ellender

So reservation No. 2, offered by Mr. WATKINS, was rejected.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question now is agreeing to reservation No. 3, offered by the Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS]. The reservation will be stated.

The CHIEF CLERK. At the end of the resolution of ratification it is proposed to insert the following:

The United States further understands and construes article 5 to the effect that in any particular case or event of armed attack on any other party or parties to the treaty, the Congress of the United States is not expressly, impliedly, or morally obligated or committed to declare war or authorize the employment of the military, air, or naval forces of the United States against the nation or nations making said attack, or to assist with its armed forces the nation or nations attacked, but shall have complete freedom in considering the circumstances of each case to act or refuse to act as the Congress in its discretion shall determine.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered, and the roll was called.

Mr. MYERS. I announce that the senior Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business, having been appointed an adviser to the delegation of the United States of America to the Second World Health Organization Assembly meeting at Rome, Italy.

The result was announced—yeas 8, nays 87, as follows:

YEAS—8		
Butler	Kem	Taylor
Donnell	Langer	Watkins
Jenner	Malone	
NAYS—87		
Aiken	Hickenlooper	Morse
Anderson	Hill	Mundt
Baldwin	Hoey	Murray
Brewster	Holland	Myers
Bricker	Humphrey	Neely
Bridges	Hunt	O'Connor
Byrd	Ives	O'Mahoney
Cain	Johnson, Colo.	Pepper
Capehart	Johnson, Tex.	Reed
Chapman	Johnston, S. C.	Robertson
Chavez	Kefauver	Russell
Connally	Kerr	Saltonstall
Cordon	Kilgore	Schoeppel
Douglas	Knowland	Smith, Maine
Downey	Lodge	Smith, N. J.
Dulles	Long	Sparkman
Eastland	Lucas	Stennis
Ecton	McCarran	Taft
Ferguson	McCarthy	Thomas, Okla.
Flanders	McClellan	Thomas, Utah
Frear	McFarland	Thye
George	McGrath	Tobey
Gillette	McKellar	Tydings
Graham	McMahon	Vandenberg
Green	Magnuson	Wherry
Gurney	Martin	Wiley
Hayden	Maybank	Williams
Hendrickson	Miller	Withers
	Millikin	Young

NOT VOTING—1

Ellender

So reservation No. 3, offered by Mr. WATKINS, was rejected.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question now recurs on agreeing to the resolution of ratification, which will be read.

The Chief Clerk read as follows:

Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of Executive L. Eighty-first Congress, first session, the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the resolution of ratification.

Mr. WHERRY and other Senators asked for the yeas and nays, and they were ordered.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The yeas and nays having been ordered, the Secretary will call the roll.

The roll was called.

Mr. MYERS. I announce that the senior Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business, having been appointed an adviser to the delegation of the United States of America to the Second World Health Organization Assembly meeting at Rome, Italy. If present, the Senator from Louisiana would vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 82, nays 13, as follows:

YEAS—82		
Aiken	Douglas	Hayden
Anderson	Downey	Hendrickson
Baldwin	Dulles	Hickenlooper
Brewster	Eastland	Hill
Bricker	Ecton	Hoey
Bridges	Ferguson	Holland
Butler	Frear	Humphrey
Byrd	Fulbright	Hunt
Cain	George	Ives
Capehart	Gillette	Johnson, Tex.
Chapman	Graham	Johnston, S. C.
Chavez	Green	Kefauver
Connally	Gurney	Kerr

Kilgore	Miller	Smith, Maine
Knowland	Millikin	Smith, N. J.
Lodge	Morse	Sparkman
Long	Mundt	Stennis
Lucas	Murray	Thomas, Okla.
McCarran	Myers	Thomas, Utah
McCarthy	Neely	Thye
McClellan	O'Connor	Tobey
McFarland	O'Mahoney	Tydings
McGrath	Pepper	Vandenberg
McKellar	Reed	Wiley
McMahon	Robertson	Williams
Magnuson	Russell	Withers
Martin	Saltonstall	
Maybank	Schoeppel	

NAYS—13

Cordon	Kem	Watkins
Donnell	Langer	Wherry
Flanders	Malone	Young
Jenner	Taft	
Johnson, Colo.	Taylor	

NOT VOTING—1

Ellender

The VICE PRESIDENT. The resolution of ratification having received the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the Members of the Senate present, and a quorum being present, it is agreed to, and the treaty is ratified.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE—EDWARD B. LAWSON

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is it desired to take up at this time the nominations on the calendar?

Mr. LUCAS. We may as well dispose of the nominations to which there is no objection. I am not sure whether there is objection to the nomination of Mr. Lawson.

Mr. WHERRY. I have no objection, but I believe objection was made the last time from the other side of the aisle. Perhaps the Senator from Illinois knows about that. I think there was no objection from any Senator on this side of the aisle.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The nomination will be stated.

The Chief Clerk read the nomination of Edward B. Lawson, of the District of Columbia, to be Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Iceland.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed; and, without objection, the President will be immediately notified of the confirmation of the nomination.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. LUCAS. I move that the Senate now proceed to the consideration of legislative business.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of legislative business.

PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE FLAG STAMP—RESOLUTION OF PITTSBURGH LODGE, NO. 46, LOYAL ORDER OF MOOSE

Mr. MYERS. Mr. President, I present for appropriate reference, and ask

unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, a resolution adopted by Pittsburgh Lodge, No. 46, Loyal Order of Moose, of Pittsburgh, Pa., relating to the selection and sale of an official pledge-of-allegiance-to-the-flag stamp.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Whereas through the efforts of the Americanism committee of the Allegheny County Committee of the American Legion, Department of Pennsylvania, the United States Congress approved a resolution in 1945 officially adopting the pledge of allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, thereby vesting said pledge of allegiance with the same reverence that attends our national anthem; and

Whereas this same Americanism committee from the county of Allegheny, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, under the leadership of Col. John H. Shenkel, sponsored House Resolution No. 4320 presented by Hon. HERMAN P. EBERHARTER on April 25, 1949, whereby Congress authorized the issuance of a new stamp having thereon an imprint of the Capitol of the United States, the United States flag, and the official pledge of allegiance to the flag; and

Whereas the authority of the Postmaster General of the United States to select commemorative issues of stamps is limited to 12 from more than 70 requests submitted for consideration; and

Whereas the selection of the official Pledge of Allegiance Stamp would be in the interest of Americanism and in view of the fact that the resolutions of Congress to make the pledge of allegiance to the flag official and to authorize the Pledge of Allegiance Stamp were first sponsored by the Americanism committee of the American Legion in the county of Allegheny, Pa.: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the governor and members of Pittsburgh Lodge, No. 46, Loyal Order of Moose, Supreme Lodge of the World, in meeting assembled, That the Postmaster General of the United States be requested to select the official pledge-of-allegiance-to-the-flag stamp as a commemorative issue and further, if said stamp is selected that it be first placed on sale in the post office at Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, Pa., on August 11, 1949, the second day of the convention of the American Legion, Department of Pennsylvania, and further, that copies of this resolution be sent to Hon. Jesse M. Donaldson, Postmaster General of the United States, Senator Francis J. Myers, Hon. Joseph J. Lawler, Assistant Postmaster General of the United States, Senator Edward Martin, Congressman Harry J. Davenport, Congressman Robert J. Corbett, Congressman James G. Fulton, Congressman Herman P. Eberharter, and Congressman Frank Buchanan.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. GEORGE, from the Committee on Finance:

S. 2298. A bill to authorize the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to convey certain lands and to lease certain other land to Milwaukee County, Wis.; without amendment (Rept. No. 738).

By Mr. CONNALLY, from the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. J. Res. 79. Joint resolution authorizing Federal participation in the International Exposition for the Bicentennial of the Founding of Port-au-Prince, Republic of Haiti, 1949; with an amendment (Rept. No. 739).

By Mr. FULBRIGHT, from the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. J. Res. 3. Joint resolution to provide that any future payments by the Republic of Finland on the principal or interest of its debt of the First World War to the United States shall be used to provide educational and technical instruction and training in the United States for citizens of Finland and American books and technical equipment for institutions of higher education in Finland; with amendments (Rept. No. 740).

By Mr. MCFARLAND, from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:

S. 1973. A bill to further amend the Communications Act of 1934; with an amendment (Rept. No. 741).

ASSISTANCE TO STATES IN COLLECTING SALES AND USE TAXES ON CIGARETTES—MINORITY VIEWS (PT. 2 OF S. REPT. 644)

Under authority of the order of the Senate of July 11, 1949,

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado, as a Member of the Committee on Finance, submitted his minority views on the bill (H. R. 195) to assist States in collecting sales and use taxes on cigarettes, which were ordered to be printed.

REPORTS OF PERSONNEL AND FUNDS BY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, the following reports were received by the Secretary of the Senate:

JULY 21, 1949.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1949, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Sourwine, J. G., counsel.....	\$10,330.00	\$4,849.34
Davis, Joseph A., chief clerk.....	9,222.11	4,582.03
Rosenberger, Francis C., assistant chief clerk.....	7,484.07	2,640.20
Ruddy, J. Carlisle, professional staff member.....	9,222.11	4,582.03
Young, Robert B., professional staff member.....	9,064.11	4,529.62
Covert, Maurice W., professional staff member.....	9,064.11	4,433.28
Green, George S., professional staff member.....	8,037.08	2,991.55
Mathews, John H., professional staff member.....	8,037.08	2,076.22
Rogers, Mary, clerical assistant.....	5,529.08	2,650.23
Fox, Miriam O., clerical assistant.....	5,529.08	2,650.23
Canon, Mildred E., clerical assistant.....	5,529.08	2,485.83
Sheaff, H. Joan, clerical assistant.....	4,701.44	1,906.50
Duborg, Barbara E., clerical assistant.....	4,701.44	1,565.80
McNamee, Patience E., clerical assistant.....	4,701.44	1,411.94
Creasy, Orrin E., clerical assistant.....	4,453.15	1,373.03
Redden, Doris M., clerical assistant.....	4,370.38	291.35
Holland, Margaret L., clerical assistant.....	3,791.04	157.96
Ganss, Helen W., clerical assistant.....	3,791.04	157.96

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure.....\$121,922.88
Amount expended.....45,335.10

Balance unexpended.....76,587.78

PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman.

JULY 15, 1949.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY—SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION (PURSUANT TO S. RES 137 OF THE 80TH CONG., AS AMENDED)

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from January 3 to June 30, 1949, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Arens, Richard, staff director.....	\$9,538.12	\$4,690.04
Blair, Drury Harvey, staff member.....	7,405.06	2,330.07
Cochran, William F., staff member.....	3,956.56	636.47
Davis, Dorothy A., stenographer.....	3,956.56	1,879.34
Davis, Thomas J., staff member.....	7,405.06	3,623.48
Dekom, Otto J., investigator.....	6,931.05	2,021.53
Earl, Owen K., staff member.....	2,406.80	557.95
Grefe, Charles A., staff member.....	6,025.66	2,447.06
Johnson, Ethel L., staff member.....	7,010.05	3,499.84
Loftus, John A., staff member.....	7,800.07	3,755.16
Lojewski, Stephanie E., stenographer.....	3,956.56	1,978.26
Massey, Guy M., staff member.....	7,010.05	3,499.84
Mechling, Margaret M., stenographer.....	3,956.56	1,681.52
Mesmer, Fred M., staff member.....	7,405.06	3,623.48
Messersmith, James C., staff member.....	6,931.05	3,465.48
Morrill, Mary E., stenographer.....	3,956.56	1,278.84
Noyes, Anne F., staff member.....	6,931.05	3,292.21
Odham, Lois Catherine, stenographer.....	4,453.15	2,157.58
Randolph, Frank P., staff member.....	6,931.05	3,292.21
Redden, Doris M., stenographer.....	3,956.56	1,278.84
Schroeder, Frank W., investigator.....	6,931.05	2,021.53
Smithy, Wayne H., staff member.....	1,713.80	680.73
Stevens, William A., staff member.....	6,931.05	2,406.58
Turner, Mary A., stenographer.....	3,956.56	1,176.96
Williamson, Francis L., staff member.....	6,931.05	1,656.30
Zimmermann, John F., staff member.....	6,025.66	2,327.46

PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman.

BILLS INTRODUCED

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. HICKENLOOPER:

S. 2299. A bill to amend section 60 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. BRICKER:

S. 2300. A bill to amend section 12B of the Federal Reserve Act, pertaining to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. BREWSTER:

S. 2301. A bill to promote interstate and foreign commerce and strengthen the national defense by providing for commercial cargo and transport aircraft adaptable to military transport service; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. KILGORE:

S. 2302. A bill for the relief of Morris Linde, Sonia Doreen Linde (wife), and Mary Linde (mother); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LANGER:

S. 2303. A bill for the relief of Nicolaos Stefanos Kaloudis; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. McGRATH (by request):

S. 2304. A bill to amend the act entitled "An act to regulate boxing contests and exhibitions in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes," approved December 20, 1944; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. McCARRAN:

S. 2305. A bill to authorize suits against the United States to adjudicate and administer water rights; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. McMAHON:

S. 2306. A bill for the relief of Vera Sarah Keenan; to the Committee on the Judiciary. (Mr. PEPPER introduced Senate bill 2307, to remove the limitation upon the maximum deposit insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which was referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency, and appears under a separate heading.)

By Mr. KNOWLAND:

S. 2308. A bill for the relief of William Alfred Bevan; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

LIMITATION UPON MAXIMUM DEPOSIT INSURED BY FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill raising the limit on bank deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation so that all bank deposits may be insured, which I believe can be done under the assessments now being levied against the banks of the country.

The bill (S. 2307) to remove the limitation upon the maximum deposit insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, introduced by Mr. PEPPER, was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

AMENDMENT OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE—AMENDMENT

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (H. R. 5268) to amend certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, which was referred to the Committee on Finance, and ordered to be printed.

CERTAIN CONSTRUCTION AT MILITARY AND NAVAL INSTALLATIONS—AMENDMENT

Mr. GREEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 1875) to authorize certain construction at military and naval installations, and for other purposes, which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and ordered to be printed.

NOTICE OF MOTION TO SUSPEND THE RULE—AMENDMENT

Mr. O'MAHONEY. In accordance with rule XL of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I hereby give notice in writing that it is my intention to move to suspend paragraph 4 of rule XVI for the purpose of proposing to the bill (H. R. 4177) making appropriations for the Executive Office and sundry independent executive bureaus, boards, commissions, corporations, agencies, and offices, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1950, and for other purposes, the following amendment, namely:

On page 63, after line 23, insert a new paragraph, as follows:

"SEC. 102. (a) No part of any appropriation contained in this title for the Atomic Energy Commission shall be used to confer a fellowship on any person who advocates or who is a member of an organization or party that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence

or with respect to whom the Commission finds, upon investigation and report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the character, associations, and loyalty of whom, that reasonable grounds exist for belief that such person is disloyal to the Government of the United States: *Provided*, That any person who advocates or who is a member of an organization or party that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence and accepts employment the salary, wages, stipend, or expenses for which are paid from any appropriation contained in this title shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both: *Provided further*, That the above penal clause shall be in addition to, and not in substitution for, any other provisions of existing law."

Mr. O'MAHONEY also submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to House bill 4177, making appropriations for the Executive Office and sundry independent executive bureaus, boards, commissions, corporations, agencies, and offices, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1950, and for other purposes, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

(For text of amendment referred to, see the foregoing notice.)

TRANSFER OF VESSEL *BLACK MALLARD* TO STATE OF LOUISIANA—CHANGE OF REFERENCE

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, on yesterday the bill (H. R. 5365) to provide for the transfer of the vessel *Black Mallard* to the State of Louisiana for the use and benefit of the department of wildlife and fisheries of such State, was inadvertently referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. I think it should have been referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs be discharged from the further consideration of the bill and that it be referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

HOUSE BILLS REFERRED

The following bills were severally read twice by their titles, and referred, as indicated:

H. R. 627. An act for the relief of Southern Fireproofing Co., of Cincinnati, Ohio;

H. R. 660. An act for the relief of Julia Busch;

H. R. 752. An act conferring jurisdiction upon the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claim of Edward Gray, Sr., Edward Gray, Jr., Bertha Mae Gray, Bertha Patmon, and Lindsay Gardner, all of the city of Hamtramck, Wayne County, Mich.;

H. R. 1033. An act for the relief of Mrs. Ethel Barrington MacDonald;

H. R. 1474. An act to confer jurisdiction upon the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claim of Miguel A. Viera for damages sustained as the result of an accident involving a United States Army truck at Leghorn, Italy, on January 11, 1946;

H. R. 1631. An act for the relief of John J. O'Mara;

H. R. 1666. An act for the relief of Maurice J. Symms;

H. R. 1799. An act for the relief of Dr. Jacob Ornstein;

H. R. 2594. An act for the relief of Grace L. Elser;

H. R. 2628. An act for the relief of Auldon Albert Aiken;

H. R. 2928. An act for the relief of Dr. Leon L. Konchegul;

H. R. 3193. An act for the relief of Public Utility District No. 1, of Cowlitz County, Wash.;

H. R. 3300. An act for the relief of Mary Thomas Schlek;

H. R. 3413. An act for the relief of Alfred Baumgarts;

H. R. 3726. An act for the relief of Knickerbocker Insurance Co. of New York and Atlas Assurance Co., Ltd.;

H. R. 3803. An act for the relief of Mrs. Mary L. W. Dawson;

H. R. 3837. An act for the relief of Annie Balaz;

H. R. 4653. An act for the relief of the New York Quinine & Chemical Works, Inc., Merck & Co., Inc., and Mallinckrodt Chemical Works;

H. R. 5155. An act for the relief of Francesca Lucareni, a minor; and

H. R. 5160. An act for the relief of Mrs. Giustina Schlano Lomoriello; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 5356. An act to provide for the conveyance of land to the Norfolk County Trust Co., in Stoughton, Mass.; to the Committee on Public Works.

H. R. 3494. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to transfer a building in Juneau, Alaska, to the Alaska Native Brotherhood and/or Sisterhood, Juneau (Alaska) camp; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

ADDRESS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT TO THE DEMOCRATIC MIDWEST CONFERENCE

[Mr. LUCAS asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD the address delivered by the Vice President to the Democratic Midwest Conference, in Des Moines, Iowa, June 13, 1949, which appears in the Appendix.]

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE IMPERIAL COUNCIL OF THE SHRINE OF NORTH AMERICA

[Mr. LUCAS asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD the address delivered by the President before the Imperial Council of the Shrine of North America in Chicago, Ill., July 19, 1949, which appears in the Appendix.]

BUTTER PROVISIO IN THE ARMED SERVICES APPROPRIATION BILL

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement I have prepared relative to the proposal to remove from the armed services appropriation bill the so-called butter proviso.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Why are the oleo interests so eager to have the butter proviso removed from the armed services appropriation bill? There may be a clue in these figures from the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the United States Department of Agriculture. In the first 5 months of 1949 butter consumption was approximately 20 percent greater than in the comparable period of 1948. Retail prices for butter were about 20 percent lower.

The lower retail prices for butter, accompanied by the increase in consumption of that product, has reduced the market for oleomargarine. In the first 4 months of 1949 consumption of oleomargarine in the United States was approximately 5 percent smaller

than a year ago, although oleo prices were down about as much relatively as were butter prices.

Are the oleo interests now attempting to recoup their lost markets by passing off their product on the armed forces? I am opposed to any attempts to foist a second-choice butter substitute upon service men and women, and will demand the restoration of the butter proviso.

LEAVES OF ABSENCE

Mr. BALDWIN asked and obtained leave to be absent from the session of the Senate tomorrow.

Mr. KILGORE asked and obtained leave to be absent from the session of the Senate tomorrow.

AMENDMENT OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT, AS AMENDED

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 256) to amend the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, which was, on page 11, line 19, strike out all after "maintained" down to and including "act" in line 23, and insert "solely by water carriers subject to this part which engages in activities relating to the fixing of rates, publication of classifications, or filing of schedules by such carriers."

Mr. REED. Mr. President, the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce reported the bill unanimously. The Senate passed it on the Consent Calendar unanimously. There are a number of items in the bill and the House amended one of them very slightly. I move that the Senate concur in the House amendment.

The motion was agreed to.

AMENDMENT OF MINIMUM-WAGE LAW—ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, a few days ago the Senator from Illinois announced to the Senate that, following the disposition of the North Atlantic Treaty, we would then proceed to the consideration of Senate bill 653, Calendar 640, which is a bill to provide for amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and for other purposes. I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of that bill.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be stated by title.

The CHIEF CLERK. A bill, S. 653, to provide for the amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and for other purposes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Is the motion debatable?

The VICE PRESIDENT. It is debatable.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I should like to make an inquiry of the majority leader about the further program after this bill is disposed of. I should like to understand, if I may, what is to be taken up following the bill to which the Senator refers. Certain legislation is pending in which many of us are very much interested. If the able majority leader will advise us further, it will be appreciated.

Mr. LUCAS. I shall be very glad to advise the Senator from Arkansas, and I was going to do that following the adoption of the motion to consider Senate bill 653. What we expect to do, and what we will do, is, on tomorrow, lay the pending business aside and take up the appropriation bill known as the Economic Recovery Act, or House bill 4830, which is on the calendar. It is an act making appropriations for foreign aid for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1950, and for other purposes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Will it be the purpose of the majority leader from time to time during the pendency of Senate bill 653 to lay it aside and dispose of appropriation bills?

Mr. LUCAS. In view of the fact that we have a dead line on all these appropriations, which I understand, is July 31, it is the intention of the majority leader to continue on with the appropriation bills until we conclude consideration of all of them.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Until they are all concluded. Is that correct?

Mr. LUCAS. That is correct.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the able majority leader yield further?

Mr. LUCAS. I yield to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Some time ago, and I believe it was the 13th of June, there was reported by the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Senate Joint Resolution 108, generally known as the economy resolution.

Mr. LUCAS. I am familiar with that.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Thereafter, I believe on the 27th of June, a petition was presented, signed by some 61 Senators, and subsequently, I think, by 63 Senators, to both the majority leader and the minority leader, requesting the schedule of legislative business be so arranged that the resolution might come before the Senate. May I inquire of the able majority leader whether there is any prospect that that resolution can be brought up and action had on it prior to concluding the disposition of the regular appropriation bills?

Mr. LUCAS. I may say to my very distinguished friend from Arkansas that it seems to me we should not consider the petition which has been presented to the majority and minority leaders, until we have disposed of the remaining appropriation bills. As I understand, there is approximately \$30,000,000,000 to be considered in the four appropriation bills. I further understand that some reductions have been made by the Appropriations Committee, and probably other amendments will be offered when the bills come before the Senate for consideration, amendments to effect further economies. It seems to me, as I said once before, it would be premature to take up consideration of the resolution referred to until we conclude action on pending appropriation bills.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the majority leader yield so that I may further interrogate him with respect to what action has been taken by the policy committee of the majority with respect to the resolution?

Mr. LUCAS. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Has any action been taken by the Policy Committee? Some of us are very much interested in having the resolution considered. It has been quite some time since it was reported. Nearly a month has expired since such a large number of Senators expressed their desire to have the resolution considered. We were hoping it might be considered before all the appropriation bills were passed, so we could know and be advised whether there is any prospect of reduction by this process, and whether, if not by way of specific cuts, the cuts might be made across the board indiscriminately on these bills? In other words, it poses a pretty difficult problem here in the situation we are in, and we are trying to determine how it is best to proceed in order to give expression to what appears to be the majority sentiment of this body.

Mr. LUCAS. Let me say, to the Senator from Arkansas that the majority leader is attempting to carry on a program in the Senate in the manner he conceives to be in the best interests of all, and in line with the decisions of the Democratic policy committee. That committee has considered the resolution. We took no action on it. I think I can safely say it was almost the unanimous consensus of the committee that it was premature at this time to give it consideration. I know that is the judgment of the committee, and it certainly is the judgment of the majority leader. I would not consent to taking up the resolution ahead of the appropriations bills.

Mr. McCLELLAN. If I may ask the majority leader, has the majority policy committee indicated at what time, or can the majority leader indicate to this body, at what time he thinks it would not be premature to bring up the resolution?

Mr. LUCAS. No, I cannot indicate to the Senator from Arkansas just when it can be brought up. I should like to proceed with the consideration of the appropriation bills and see what progress we make. It is my understanding it will take probably about a week to dispose of the appropriation bills, because there is controversial matter in most of them.

Mr. McCLELLAN. If I may further inquire of the able majority leader, is he in position now, or does he anticipate he will be in position at any time within the next few days, to indicate whether in accordance with the request as expressed in the petition of a majority of the Senate, we shall have an opportunity to vote upon the resolution?

Mr. LUCAS. I could not give the Senator from Arkansas any commitment at this time as to when we are going to take up the resolution. I cannot do it, because there is other important legislation on the calendar. The reciprocal trade agreements program has been laid aside from time to time. I want to express my appreciation to the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], chairman of the Finance Committee, who has been very kind and considerate in agreeing to have this measure set aside for other important legislation. The deadline was June 30. We hoped to take that measure up following consideration of the appropriation bills and the minimum-wage law.

Mr. McCLELLAN. That is, the reciprocal trade agreements program?

Mr. LUCAS. That is correct.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Then I assume it will take about a week to pass all the appropriation bills, and possibly another week to dispose of the pending business, the wage and hour bill, and we will then go into the reciprocal trade agreements for another period of several days, possibly. So there is no prospect of getting to this resolution until the very closing hours of the session, as I understand the program announced by the able majority leader.

Mr. LUCAS. I would not say that that is the program we will follow word for word, or bill by bill. I may say to my good friend, the Policy Committee will consider it again at the next meeting. We try, in the Policy Committee, not to schedule action on bills too far ahead.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Can the able Senator advise us when the next Policy Committee meeting will be held, and when we may know the result?

Mr. LUCAS. There will be a meeting of the Policy Committee next Tuesday. I should be glad to have the Senator come before the committee to give us his ideas about the resolution. I am sure the members are very much interested and would like to ask the Senator a few questions.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I should be very happy to do that. In fact, I can answer the questions now, if anyone cares to ask them. I shall be very glad to make a statement before the committee.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Illinois to proceed to the consideration of Senate bill 653, the minimum-wage bill.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Illinois yield to the Senator from Nebraska?

Mr. LUCAS. I do not want to cease and desist with my friend from Arkansas, if he has any more questions along this line to ask me.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am afraid my able and distinguished friend, the majority leader, ceased and desisted before we started. I have not been able to get anywhere yet. I am trying to determine whether there is any hope of bringing up this resolution in the regular way and letting the Senate pass upon it in its own right, as a measure which is on the calendar awaiting consideration.

Mr. LUCAS. I now yield to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I want the floor in my own right.

Mr. LUCAS. I have a motion pending.

Mr. WHERRY. I know. The motion is debatable.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Illinois that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the so-called minimum wage bill.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, the inquiry which was addressed to the majority leader by the distinguished senior Senator from Arkansas involved a col-

loquy with reference to which I should like to make a few observations.

First, the senior Senator from Arkansas asked the distinguished majority leader what the majority policy committee had done relative to a resolution, and particularly a petition asking that the resolution be brought up. That petition was also directed to the attention of the minority leader, and I want the distinguished Senator from Arkansas to know that when it came to my office I took it up with the policy committee of the minority, at the very next meeting, which I think was 2 weeks ago, or at least a week ago—

Mr. BRIDGES. It was 2 weeks ago.

Mr. WHERRY. I want to say to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, for the information of the majority leader and of the Members of the Senate, that the minority policy committee unanimously agreed that the resolution should be brought up as a part of the agenda and made a part of the program at the proper time and as quickly as may be possible. I think that information should be in the RECORD at this point.

I should like to say further to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas that I realize the difficulties of getting a program at the close of the session. There is considerable justification for the majority leader not to know whether he can bring a particular matter up at a particular time, but I feel that inasmuch as 63 Senators signed the petition, it behooves the Members of the Senate and the majority leader to arrange ample time for such consideration. When 63 Senators wish to have a resolution debated, the will of the Senate is involved, and not the will of any one Member of the Senate. I say that kindly, and I say it constructively. I should like very much to see the resolution brought before the Senate as quickly as is possible.

Mr. President, I shall not object to the consideration of the minimum-wage bill. I understand from the majority leader that it is to be the unfinished business tomorrow, and that it may be temporarily set aside to permit consideration of one of the appropriation bills. But I think the record should show and the Members of the Senate should know that the petition requesting that the resolution which has been referred to be brought up should be given our most serious consideration and attention.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I can appreciate the problems and the difficulties of the policy committee and of the majority leadership, in view of the crowded calendar which we have, in trying to arrange a schedule satisfactory to the Members of the Senate and accommodating them, but, Mr. President, some of us feel that this resolution is of great importance. We do not want to wait until the closing hours of the session of the Congress, and pass a resolution with no opportunity for the House to act on it. Assuming the House should act on it, it will probably meet with disapproval and there will be no opportunity to express

ourselves. I want to be assured that the Senate will have an opportunity to vote on the resolution. In view of the fact that the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments reported it, and in view of the fact that 63 Senators have expressed themselves as desiring an opportunity to discuss and vote on the resolution, I feel that I have some responsibility at least to do everything in my power to persuade the leadership to assure the Senate that the resolution will be scheduled in an order which will permit it to be brought up before the adjournment of the Congress, so that we can have full, appropriate, and final action on it. I cannot get that assurance.

I do not say this in criticism, but if that assurance cannot be given, then we have one other alternative, namely, to offer the resolution as an amendment possibly to some bill. I said there was only one alternative. That is not quite correct. Of course, I could move, as could any other Senator, to lay aside the unfinished business at any time in order to take up the resolution. I certainly would be most reluctant to take that action, because it would have the appearance of my undertaking to usurp the leadership of the majority party. I was hoping that the problem could be worked out so that we would have an opportunity to discuss the resolution on its merits and in its own right, and to act on it in time to make certain that it would go through the proper processes and either become law or fail to become law after it had gone through those processes. Then we would know where the responsibility might lie if it failed to become law, or where it might lie if it should become law.

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. BRIDGES. I should like to ask the minority leader a question, after listening to the colloquy between the distinguished Senator from Arkansas and the majority leader, and also between the Senator from Arkansas and the minority leader. I have listened to the very smooth, suave, astute, and diplomatic reply of the Senator from Illinois, and I ask the minority leader whether he has any commitment to bring up the resolution which has been referred to?

Mr. WHERRY. I think we have no commitment in any way whatsoever. That reply might be a little more blunt than the Senator from Illinois would make it.

Mr. BRIDGES. The Senator from Illinois took such a roundabout, smooth, suave, diplomatic way to reply that I wondered how the Senator from Nebraska interpreted it.

Mr. WHERRY. I interpret it to mean that there is no commitment on the part of the majority leader to take up the resolution about which the Senator from Arkansas has been speaking. That is the reason I thought the Senate should know and the RECORD should show the action of our own group on this side of the aisle. I wished to call attention to the fact that 63 Senators have petitioned the majority leader and the minority

leader, asking that the resolution be brought up. I feel that is a consideration which should appeal to all Members of the Senate on both sides of the aisle.

Mr. BRIDGES. Does the Senator believe, based upon what has been said and upon his experience, that those who believe in economy in the Senate will have an opportunity to vote on the resolution?

Mr. WHERRY. I believe there will be an opportunity to vote on the resolution. I think such opportunity should be provided, and I hope it will be provided in the program which will be submitted by the distinguished majority leader. I want to say that I shall cooperate with him in every way.

Mr. BRIDGES. Does the Senator believe that if a resolution is presented, bearing the names of 63 Senators of both political parties it is a reflection upon the Senate if 63 Senators whose names are on a petition are not allowed to vote on such a resolution?

Mr. WHERRY. My answer to that question would be that I think if 63 Senators ask that a certain piece of proposed legislation be brought up they are entitled to their day in court, and that it should be brought up as a part of the program which is to be submitted to the Members of the Senate.

Mr. BRIDGES. Can the minority leader assure me that he will use his influence with the majority leader to see that this resolution is voted upon, not at "some time," but in plenty of time so that action may be by the House?

Mr. WHERRY. My answer is, unequivocally, "Yes." I shall use all the influence I have at my command, and I am satisfied that the majority leader will provide an opportunity for 63 Senators to consider legislation which they want brought up on the floor of the Senate.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Illinois.

The motion was agreed to and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 653) to provide for the amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and for other purposes.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I should like to make an announcement of some interest to all Members of the Senate with respect to next week.

I anticipate, from the information I receive from Members of the Committee on Appropriations, that there will be rather lengthy debate upon the appropriation bills. We are moving along toward the end of the session. No one knows just what date the session will end, but I am going to make a suggestion that next Tuesday and Thursday there be night sessions to consider the business before the Senate. I make the announcement now so that Senators may have notice of the night meetings just as far as possible in advance.

Mr. WHERRY. What are the majority leader's plans for Saturday sessions?

Mr. LUCAS. If we can have night sessions, I think we can dispense with Saturday sessions. It is a little difficult to get Senators to attend sessions on

Saturday. Every Senator must have the same problems the Senator from Illinois has with respect to the mail which piles up during the week, and dispensing with Saturday sessions will give us an opportunity to do some work in our offices.

Mr. WHERRY. Several Senators on this side have come to me and asked that we press for Saturday sessions. Many of them feel that the date when the session will end, referred to by the distinguished Senator, might be brought about earlier provided the Senate held Saturday sessions and, as the Senator has suggested, night sessions. I would not say that opinion is unanimous, but for instance, the junior Senator from South Dakota said to me, "Why do you not get the majority leader to have Saturday sessions and night sessions and get the legislative program over?" I merely wanted to call that to the attention of the majority leader. I thank him for his statement as to next week.

Mr. LUCAS. Let us try two night sessions next week, and if everything goes along well, we might accommodate the Senator from South Dakota the following Saturday, and perhaps the Saturday after that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, now that we are through with the North Atlantic Treaty, I wonder if the Senator can tell us about the oleomargarine bill.

Mr. LUCAS. Does the Senator think that is more important than the economy resolution?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Since I have been in the Senate I have been very much impressed by the rule of seniority, and I believe the oleomargarine bill has seniority over any other bill on the calendar. It has been before the Senate a number of years, and I think it is high time it be given consideration. It is of very great economic importance.

Mr. LUCAS. I agree with the Senator from Arkansas as to the importance of the bill. As to the question of priority, however, we might disagree as to when we should consider it. However, I am just as much interested in the oleomargarine bill as is the Senator, and I can virtually assure him that we are going to consider that bill before we conclude the present session. We are going to be in session perhaps longer than many think, if much time is taken on some of the bills, as I anticipate will be the case, judging from what has happened in the past. We thought we were going to get the Atlantic Pact through in about 10 days, and it looked at one time as if we would vote on the pact about Tuesday after having had it under consideration for about a week. Yet we have taken 3 weeks, or double the time anticipated. That is a typical example of how the speculative legislation schedule may be upset.

I anticipate that Senators representing dairy States will want to do a little talking on the oleomargarine bill. I do not think they will carry on a filibuster, because the Senators from the dairy sections are opposed to filibusters, and I am certain they would not violate this principle on the oleomargarine bill.

Mr. JENNER. Mr. President, I should like to ask the Senator if there is any

contemplation of bringing up the civil rights bill during the session.

Mr. LUCAS. That is another possibility. It could be.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, a very able colleague has asked me if there was a definite statement as to whether or not Saturday sessions were out or might be in.

Mr. LUCAS. I do not believe we will have a session the coming Saturday.

Mr. WHERRY. There will be an announcement later about Saturday of next week?

Mr. LUCAS. As we move along next week, we will make the determination. The Senator from Illinois has no objection to Saturday sessions.

FOREIGN AID APPROPRIATIONS

Mr. McKELLAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be temporarily laid aside and that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the bill (H. R. 4830) making appropriations for foreign aid for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1950, and for other purposes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill (H. R. 4830) making appropriations for foreign aid for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1950, and for other purposes, which had been reported from the Committee on Appropriations with amendments.

TRIBUTE TO THE LATE VAN A. BITTNER

Mr. KILGORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD at this point a tribute which I intended to deliver on the floor of the Senate to Van A. Bittner, who died in Mercy Hospital, Pittsburgh, Pa., on Tuesday night. Mr. Bittner was a man who shortened his life by his hard work with the War Labor Board during the war. He was a great labor leader, and a very dear friend of mine.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from West Virginia?

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Mr. President, I rise to pay my humble tribute to Mr. Van A. Bittner, one of the truly great Americans, who passed on late Tuesday night in Mercy Hospital in Pittsburgh, Pa.

Although Mr. Bittner had been in ill health for several months his death came as a great shock to his many friends throughout the Nation.

I visited with Mr. Bittner in the hospital last Saturday afternoon. He was very ill, but I could not bring myself to believe he was nearing the close of a great career.

Mr. Bittner was a close and valued friend for many years. I first met him more than 20 years ago when he came into West Virginia from his native Pennsylvania to organize the coal miners.

His life was one of constant struggle for the "underdog." I shall not at this time review his life, but I do wish to mention a few events. Mr. Bittner started working in the mines adjoining his home when he was only 11 years of age. Even though he was in the mines several hours each day he managed to continue his school work and he was graduated from Vanderbilt High School.

Deeply devoted to the cause of trade-unions, Mr. Bittner early in life charted his course that led him to the top in the trade-union movement. To the end he remained a self-sacrificing man who fought for what he believed to be right.

When he was only a boy of 16 his fellow miners elected him president of the local of the United Mine Workers. Seven years later he was elected vice president of district 5, United Mine Workers, and in 1911, when he was only 26, he was elected to the presidency of the district which included the Pittsburgh area.

Later as an international representative of the union, he went into Tennessee, Alabama, and West Virginia coal fields to earn the reputation of being a fearless organizer during one of the most turbulent periods in labor history.

Mr. Bittner developed a close friendship for Mr. Phil Murray during those dark, bitter days, and it lasted to the end of his life. In many respects they constituted the team that built the Congress of Industrial Organizations into one of the world's great union combinations.

Mr. Bittner's great success in organizing the West Virginia coal fields, a feat accomplished in the face of bitter opposition from mine owners, was considered by many people to be the outstanding organizing job in that union's history.

Mr. Bittner served as president of district 17, the large southern West Virginia area of the United Mine Workers, and for many years he played an important role in the Appalachian Coal Conference.

Later Mr. Bittner became nationally famous as the trouble-shooting international vice president of the CIO. When he was stricken a few months ago he was directing the CIO's southern organizational campaign.

Mr. Bittner believed that through unions our democracy could be made to function better, not alone for the membership but for the entire Nation. To that end he devoted his life.

My friendship for Mr. Bittner will always remain as one of my most valued possessions. He was an honorable man in every respect, a leader who inspired his followers in the true meaning of democracy.

I well recall an incident that for me remains an outstanding example of Mr. Bittner's attitude toward his fellowmen. At the time I was seeking public office, and I asked Mr. Bittner for his support.

He said he would support me if I would make one promise. Before I could answer him he said: "Harley, promise me that regardless of the circumstances you will always do what you think is right."

Mr. Bittner fought for his rights and the rights of his fellowmen. It can truthfully be said he made this a better place in which to live.

Van A. Bittner, a man of great magnetic personality, deep devotion to democracy, fervent, unflinching courage in the face of tremendous odds, lives on in the hearts of millions of Americans.

RECESS

Mr. LUCAS. I move that the Senate stand in recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6 o'clock and 9 minutes p. m.) the Senate took a recess until tomorrow, Friday, July 22, 1949, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate July 21 (legislative day of June 2), 1949:

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Philip M. Kaiser, of Virginia, to be Assistant Secretary of Labor.

CALIFORNIA DEBRIS COMMISSION

Col. Walter D. Luplow, Corps of Engineers, for appointment as member, California Debris Commission, provided for by the act of Congress approved March 1, 1893, entitled "An act to create the California Debris Commission and regulate hydraulic mining in the State of California," vice Col. Samuel N. Karrick, Corps of Engineers, to be relieved.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

John S. Denise, Sr., of Washington, to be United States marshal for the western district of Washington, term expired July 2, 1949.

IN THE AIR FORCE

The following-named officers for promotion in the United States Air Force, under the provisions of sections 502 and 509 of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. Those officers whose names are preceded by the symbol (X) are subject to examination required by law. All others have been examined and found qualified for promotion.

To be captains

Adair, Philip Reed, 11927A.
 X Adams, William Pierman, Jr., 11810A.
 Alber, George Dearborn, 11917A.
 Anderson, Alfred Ivan, 11863A.
 Anderson, Conrad Austance, 11888A.
 Anderson, David Samuel, 11954A.
 Baker, Dexter Kingsley, 11929A.
 Baker, Ellsworth Albert, 11862A.
 Beller, Albert Joseph, 11892A.
 Bergeson, Harold Max, 11809A.
 Bissonnette, Alfred Gilbert, 11916A.
 X Bolen, Robert Joseph, 11948A.
 X Boswell, Benedict Arden, 11895A.
 Boyle, Francis Thomas, 11845A.
 Brazee, Donald Francis, 11803A.
 X Brittle, Kent Heath, 11886A.
 Broach, William Gardner, Jr., 11820A.
 Brockhouse, Frederick Willard, 11790A.
 Bruson, George Francis, 11813A.
 Bumgarner, Amon Grant, 11818A.
 Burns, Carlton Lee, 11841A.
 Burns, Richard Lee, 11840A.
 Byington, Telford Smith, 11928A.
 Carkeet, John Lamar, Jr., 11950A.
 Carmody, Francis Charles, 11910A.
 Carter, Joseph Watkins, 11855A.
 Clappitt, William Arthur, 11938A.
 X Clark, James Francis, Jr., 11866A.
 X Cogswell, Robert Whitney, 11889A.
 Coleman, David Harold, 11819A.
 Cook, Robert Frederick, 11800A.
 Corrigan, Thomas Francis, 11953A.
 Cote, Elmer Lee, 11865A.
 X Cox, William Thomas, Jr., 11802A.
 X Crahan, Francis Edward, 11825A.
 Cuddington, James Cedric, 11951A.
 Culp, Alben Barkley, 11894A.
 Ducat, Kenneth Holberg, 11941A.
 Dupont, Rene George, 11836A.
 Edington, Leonard Edward, 11875A.
 Edwards, Clifford E., 11912A.
 X Elarth, Vernon Homer, 11851A.
 Emrich, Daniel Carl, 11824A.
 Esch, Maurice Eugene, 11873A.
 Felice, Carman Paul, 11816A.
 Fisher, Jay N., 11926A.
 Fortney, Robert Stewart, 11815A.
 Gibson, William Melvin, 11874A.
 Good, Arnold Noble, 11918A.
 Grinstead, Albert Hugh, Jr., 11901A.
 Grove, Francis Miller, 11852A.
 Guelich, Frank James, 11799A.
 Guernsey, Harold Jackson, Jr., 11806A.
 Haines, Carroll Eugene, 11868A.
 Hall, John Jay, 11933A.
 Halloran, James Paul Stacy, 11955A.
 Hamby, Malcolm Conner, 11880A.
 Hange, Richard Harold, 11944A.
 Hannon, Leo Joseph, 11914A.
 Harrison, Robert Burfoot, 11946A.
 Hayes, Leland Ray, 11792A.
 Hein, Gordon Elmer, 11942A.
 X Henderson, Daniel Eli, Jr., 11828A.
 Henderson, Vernon Junior, 11899A.
 Hirshberg, Sidney Stuart, 11838A.
 Hockin, Robert Arnold, 11871A.
 X Hughes, William Austin, 11833A.
 Ilmanen, Ralph Werner, 11913A.
 Isbell, Thomas Winn, Jr., 11956A.
 Johnson, George Lowder, 11870A.
 Jones, Dean A., 11893A.
 Kimbrough, Donovan, 11919A.
 X Klein, Junior Fremont, 11939A.
 Korer, Harold Francis, 11856A.
 Kuhn, Francis LeRoy, 11943A.
 LaBerge, Vincent Robert, 11915A.
 Lairmore, Glenn Emmett, 11905A.
 Laridon, Loren Brooks, 11853A.
 Leenerts, Gordon Jerome, 11945A.
 LeFrancis, Richard George, 11937A.
 Lethers, Edward William, 11831A.
 LeVan, Jay Edwin, 11839A.
 Long, John Barrett, 11855A.
 Marsden, Roy Franklin, 11921A.
 X Marshall, George Lewis, 11909A.
 Maxwell, George S., 11896A.
 McAusland, Douglas George, 11795A.
 McCauley, Lon Albert, Jr., 11787A.
 X McDonald, Gorman A., 11791A.
 McElroy, Wilson Freeman, 11908A.
 X MacKay, John Alexander, 11812A.
 Mercogliano, Albert Paul, 11861A.
 Moffat, Harold Larson, 11931A.
 Murphy, James Joseph, 11957A.
 Myers, Horace Herman, 11923A.
 X Myers, Robert Arthur, 11881A.
 Nagel, James Paul, 11882A.
 Nance, Ernest Theodore, 11904A.
 X Nealon, Robert Joseph, 11794A.
 Newstrom, Carroll Marion, 11850A.
 O'Brien, Alden Walton, 11872A.
 O'Carroll, Thomas Kane, 11898A.
 Okey, Joseph Theodore, 11887A.
 Otis, James Dwight, Jr., 11821A.
 Overstreet, Jack Stone, 11857A.
 X Pallo, John, 11891A.
 Pearson, Samuel Leroy, 11897A.
 Phillips, Arthur Garfield, Jr., 11817A.
 Pinson, Claud Carol, 11900A.
 Polindexter, William Ranstead, 11843A.
 Poulson, Raymond Peter, 11867A.
 Prout, Donald George, 11949A.
 Pryor, Gaillard Stoney, 11906A.
 Ralph, John Henry, 11911A.
 Ramirez, Norbert Donald, 11924A.
 Ray, Robert Jackson, 11823A.
 Renner, Robert Nelson, 11879A.
 Richardson, Glen Wehrly, 11848A.
 Roberts, Thomas Carlisle, 11859A.
 Robinson, Hunter Rudolph, 11788A.
 Salmon, Delbert Junior, 11834A.
 X Sampson, George Archibald, 11858A.
 Santala, Eugene Walfred, 11940A.
 Sapp, Roger Elias, 11789A.
 Schaitel, Leonard Jacob, 11907A.
 Schlabs, Frank Wayne, 11832A.
 Schnauber, Louis George, 11793A.
 Shiver, Arthur Marvin, Junior, 11844A.
 Simpkins, Alan Patrick, 11814A.
 Snell, Lester Daniel, 11878A.
 X Solomon, Edward Thomas, 11811A.
 Sparks, Belmont Earl, 11846A.
 Squillace, Dominick Paul, 11864A.
 Stevens, Howell Edward, 11902A.
 Stine, Donald Arthur, 11837A.
 Streit, William Fred, 11932A.
 Stumpf, Oscar Joseph, 11826A.
 Tenold, Leslie Alvin, 11835A.
 Thompson, Arnold Frederick, 11883A.
 Tissue, Jimmie Lee, 11822A.
 Van Noy, Glen Scott, 11920A.
 Vetter, Lawrence Edward, 11829A.
 Wagner, James Bertram, Junior, 11947A.
 X Wakeman, Coyd Victor, 11922A.
 Walker, James Osborne, Junior, 11804A.
 Walker, Samuel Augustus, Junior, 11807A.
 Watkinson, Arlie Gerald, 11884A.
 Wilkerson, Harold Houston, 11801A.
 Wilson, Ernest Ben, 11930A.
 Wood, George Ray, 11860A.
 Wright, Hanford Ralph, 11827A.
 Wright, John Wesley, Junior, 11934A.
 X Wyckoff, Frank Marvin, 11935A.
 Yraceburn, Joseph Raymond, 11805A.

NOTE.—These officers will complete 7 years' service for promotion during the month of August. Dates of rank will be determined by the Secretary of the Air Force.

IN THE MARINE CORPS

The below-named officers for appointment to the temporary grade of major in the Marine Corps:

Harold C. Borth	Albert I. Haas
Irvin V. Masters	Nathan Segal
Melvin E. Mosier	William V. Schwabke
Carlton G. Cole	

The below-named officers for appointment to the temporary grade of captain in the Marine Corps:

William E. Bateman
Erving F. White
Carl W. King

The below-named officers for appointment to the permanent grade of major for limited duty in the Marine Corps:

Frederick Belton	Lee E. Roberts
John G. Johnson	Stephen Lesko
Emanuel Yalowitz	James D. Ludvigson
Marvin L. Ross	Irvin V. Masters
William E. Word	Carlton G. Cole

The below-named officers for appointment to the permanent grade of captain for limited duty in the Marine Corps:

Irving N. Kelly	Lloyd O. Williams
Frederick M. Steinhauer	Ben Eutts
John W. Webber	George R. Eargle
Richard Burgess	Willis R. Lucius
Gilbert McConville	George W. Torbert
Theodore A. Petras	Cecil T. Carraway
William L. Woodruff	Alexis A. Jendenoff
	Clyde T. Waller

The below-named officers for appointment to the permanent grade of first lieutenant for limited duty in the Marine Corps:

Russell C. White	James B. Seaton
Kenneth A. Walsh	George J. Hanft
Douglas K. Morton	Joseph W. Utz
Edwin M. Clements	Roy H. Bley
Reginald M. George	Donald L. Shenaut
Eugene Anderson	Albert F. Rinehart
Stephen K. Pawloski	Anthony J. Roscoe
Matthew J. Kruszewski	Samuel F. Leader
Elmer R. Wirta	Fred K. Thornton
Richard W. Sinclair	Euthledge S. Sasser
Ray M. Burrill	Edgar A. McKean

The below-named officers for appointment to the permanent grade of second lieutenant for limited duty in the Marine Corps:

William V. Schwabke	Wilburn C. Allen
Robert L. Neef	Ray H. Bishop
Elbert L. O'Banion	James B. Darnell
Robert J. Vroegindewey	Cedric A. Fevurly
Doyle Grimes	Sidney W. Cooley
Clifford A. Youngs	Alfred E. Montrief
Harold G. Schrier	Haldon E. Lindfelt
James G. G. Taylor	Harley L. Grant
	Ralph B. Neal

The below-named enlisted man for appointment to the permanent grade of second lieutenant for limited duty in the Marine Corps:

John L. Self

IN THE COAST GUARD

The following officer of the United States Coast Guard Reserve to be commissioned in the United States Coast Guard:

To be Lieutenant (junior grade)

Richard H. Britt

CONFIRMATION

Executive nomination confirmed by the Senate July 21 (legislative day of June 2), 1949:

DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Edward B. Lawson to be Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Iceland.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

THURSDAY, JULY 21, 1949

The House met at 10 o'clock a. m.
The Acting Chaplain, Rev. Jacob S. Payton, D. D., offered the following prayer:

This day, O Lord, we would acknowledge Thee in all our ways in order that Thou mayest direct our paths. Cleanse our vision that we may discern the things that belong to the peace and welfare of America. Sustain our devotion to all high ideals that we may never disappoint Thee. Clarify our judgment that we may correctly appraise the values upon which the durability of a nation rests. Strengthen our wills that with gladness we may obey Thy commandments which are true and righteous altogether. So may these Members give of their best this day with a feeling that their efforts are linked with Thy eternal purposes. In Jesus' name we pray. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate, by Mr. Carrell, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment a joint resolution and concurrent resolution of the House of the following titles:

H. J. Res. 298. Joint resolution to provide for on-the-spot audits by the General Accounting Office of the fiscal records of the Office of the Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives.

H. Con. Res. 52. Concurrent resolution authorizing the printing of additional copies of the publications entitled "100 Things You Should Know About Communism in the U. S. A.," "100 Things You Should Know About Communism and Religion," as amended, "Spotlight on Spies," "100 Things You Should Know About Communism and Education," "100 Things You Should Know About Communism and Labor," and "100 Things You Should Know About Communism and Government."

The message also announced that the Senate had passed, with an amendment in which the concurrence of the House is requested, a bill of the House of the following title:

H. R. 5632. An act to reorganize fiscal management in the National Military Establishment to promote economy and efficiency, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate agrees to the amendments of the House to bills of the Senate of the following titles:

S. 266. An act modifying a limitation affecting the pension, compensation, or retirement pay payable on account of an incompetent veteran without dependents during hospitalization, institutional or domiciliary care;

S. 447. An act to amend the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended, to regulate the transportation, packing, marking, and description of explosives and other dangerous articles;

S. 584. An act for the relief of Rudolf A. V. Raff;

S. 811. An act to adjust the effective date of certain awards of pensions and compensa-

tions payable by the Veterans' Administration;

S. 2010. An act to extend for 2 years the authority of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs respecting leases and leased property.

The message also announced that the Senate disagrees to the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 1184) entitled "An act to encourage construction of rental housing on or in areas adjacent to Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force installations, and for other purposes"; requests a conference with the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and appoints Mr. MAYBANK, Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. FLANDERS, and Mr. CAIN to be the conferees on the part of the Senate.

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Education and Labor may have permission to sit during the remainder of general debate today.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, is that in accordance with an understanding?

Mr. McCORMACK. It is in accordance with an agreement I made yesterday. We were supposed to meet at 11 o'clock but through an honest mistake the adjournment was until 10 o'clock. I like to carry out an agreement I have with a Member.

Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. I do not care anything about the agreement.

Mr. McCORMACK. By making this request and having it granted I at least can face myself and the Member in the future.

Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. I do not see any of our Republican members of the Labor Committee present.

Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, this request is for the balance of general debate, which is about 1 hour?

Mr. McCORMACK. Yes.

Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN. I have no objection to that.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's desk the bill (H. R. 5632) to reorganize fiscal management in the National Military Establishment to promote economy and efficiency, and for other purposes, with Senate amendment thereto, disagree to the Senate amendment, and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none, and appoints the following conferees: Messrs. VINSON, BROOKS, KILDAY, DURHAM, SHORT, ARENDS, and COLE of New York.